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Begin with this: the world has no origin. 
. . . . . 
Continue with this: not body vs. soul, 
but the inherent doubleness of any situation. 
Thus in fusion there is also abyss. 
 






I am very grateful to my co-chairs, Professor Adelaide Russo and Professor Sharon 
Aronofsky Weltman, whose encouragement, guidance, and suggestions immeasurably improved 
this dissertation, and indeed were indispensable to the completion of the project. Even when I 
had doubts about the direction my project was taking, Professor Weltman’s faith in it always 
pulled me through. Her warm encouragement never failed to reassure me. Her many thoughtful 
and insightful comments from the very beginning and as the work progressed are greatly 
appreciated. Professor Russo’s interest in my work and deep knowledge of the field of 
contemporary poetry continues to be an inspiration to me. I am thankful for her encouragement 
and guidance at a time when I most needed it, and throughout the completion of the dissertation. 
I thank Professors Bainard Cowan, Carl Freedman, and John Henderson for their thoughtful 
reading of the dissertation, stimulating discussion during the defense, and helpful suggestions for 
revision. And I am grateful for the encouragement, love, and support of my husband, John P. 
Clark. Our many discussions about philosophy introduced me to ideas that are integral to this 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ iv 
 




Chapter One. Introduction: A Middle Way with No Middle Ground.....................1 
 
Chapter Two. The Voice of Things: Mei-mei Berssenbrugge’s and 
     Lyn Hejinian’s Dialectics of Phenomena........................................................44 
 
Chapter Three. Carla Harryman, Hannah Weiner, 
     and the Poetics of Multivocality .....................................................................90 
 
Chapter Four. Reading the Minds of Events: Leslie Scalapino’s Plural Time 
     and Lyn Hejinian’s Ongoing Life .................................................................151 
 
Chapter Five. Intersubjective Haunting: Self and Other, Public and Private 
     in Mei-mei Berssenbrugge and Leslie Scalapino ..........................................215 
 





A. Biographical Sketches of Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, Lyn Hejinian, 
                    Carla Harryman, Hannah Weiner, and Leslie Scalapino ................279 
 
 B. Comments on Metaphorical Constructions from 
                    Lyn Hejinian’s My Life ..................................................................283 
 
 C. Reflexive Sentences from Lyn Hejinian’s My Life. ...........................284 
 







LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1. Mei-mei Berssenbrugge. From “Irises.” ..........................................................46 
2. Mei-mei Berssenbrugge. “Experience.”...........................................................56 
3. Hannah Weiner. “3/10.”.................................................................................126 
4. Hannah Weiner. “I sjust.” ..............................................................................137 
5. Leslie Scalapino. From “The Woman Who Could Read the 
          Minds of Dogs.” ......................................................................................166 
6. Leslie Scalapino. “bum series.” .....................................................................186 






In this dissertation, I focus on the work of five contemporary experimental poets – Mei-
mei Berssenbrugge, Lyn Hejinian, Carla Harryman, Hannah Weiner, and Leslie Scalapino – in 
order to demonstrate various aspects of a philosophical dynamic at work in their poetry. The 
critical debates surrounding experimental poetry often tend to be structured as a dualistic 
opposition with, for example, the forces of coherence, narrative linearity, and transparent 
referentiality on one side, and the forces of semantic disruption, narrative discontinuity, and 
linguistic materiality on the other. On each side, critics attempt to bolster the essential value of 
one term or set of terms over the other, in a binary polarity. However, such a critique only leads 
to the formation of another hierarchy. I believe that it is important to understand the dialectical 
motion at work in much experimental poetry in order to avoid lapsing into reductive theories that 
reinstate hierarchical structures and dualistic thinking. 
By describing a “radical dialectics,” I am proposing a strategy of reading experimental 
work that recognizes its philosophical significance and its attempts to complicate dualistic 
conceptual constructions such as public and private realms of experience, subject and object 
relations, and narrative and non-narrative forces. This strategy emphasizes the mutually 
informing and critiquing dialogue and the nonresolving aspect of the dynamic interplay between 
conceptually opposed terms. I demonstrate this interdependent dialogue in several different yet 
related realms, including subject and object perceptual experience, the construction of individual 
subjectivity, temporality and narrativity, and intersubjectivity. 
To support my argument for the dialectical motion that I describe in the poetry, I draw 
upon a diverse range of thinkers, some of whom have influenced the poets whose work I analyze. 
These theorists span a wide range of fields, including ancient Indian Buddhist philosophy, 
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cognitive science, feminist psychoanalysis, and phenomenology. In their various ways, these 
thinkers share, along with the poets with whom I place them side by side, the common project of 







A MIDDLE WAY WITH NO MIDDLE GROUND 
 
Because there is a relationship between the mind and the body, 
there are inevitable experiences of instability and therefore of 
loss and discontinuity. 
Loss of scale accompanied by experiences of precision1 
  Lyn Hejinian 
 
. . . disappearing and rooted at once2 
  Hilda Morley 
 
 The epigraphs to this introductory chapter give clues to the theoretical treatment of 
contemporary experimental poetry that I present in this dissertation. Lyn Hejinian juxtaposes loss 
of scale with precision; Hilda Morley proposes the coexistence of disappearance with rootedness. 
The experimental poets whose writings I analyze throughout this work question habits of thought 
and language and investigate conventional and conceptual dualisms, including that between mind 
and body. Their poetry is concerned with the coexistence and the dialogical motion between 
seemingly contradictory terms such as “private” and “public,” and “referentiality” and 
“nonreferentiality.” Moreover, their poetry proposes the interdependence of such terms, and 
indeed, at a certain level, their deep identity. In the four thematic chapters of this dissertation, I 
am concerned with ways in which contemporary experimental poetry enacts a dialogue between 
putatively contradictory realms and generates multiple meanings in the process-oriented and 
endlessly-circulating motion of that dialogue. The non-resolving and endlessly circulating 
dialogue between putatively contradictory terms is what I am calling the radical dialectics of 
experimental poetry. 
 Providing a detailed history of contemporary experimental poetry would be an involved 
and complex project, and is outside the range of possibility for a work such as the present one. 
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The history and historicization of experimental poetry has begun to be seriously addressed and 
reevaluated by critics in recent years, notably by Marjorie Perloff, Eleana Kim, Linda Reinfeld, 
George Hartley, and Peter Quartermain.3 However, a summary of its origins and development 
and some of its major figures will be helpful for contextualizing the theoretical foundation for 
the rest of this chapter, as well as for the analyses in the four thematic chapters. 
 First, it must be stressed that categorizing and labeling poets is anything but a fixed and 
inflexible undertaking. The European and American poetries of the twentieth century inherited 
characteristics from various lineages, and, since the categories of their forebears are not mutually 
exclusive, sometimes from more than one. The modernist period was full of contradictions as 
poets who entered the new century struggled to slough off poetic dictates of the previous century 
yet still had a nostalgic foot in old philosophical and poetic groundings. A poet such as Wallace 
Stevens, for example, has elements of both symbolist and avant-garde poetics. 
 Furthermore, the proponents of both experimentation and traditionalism in poetry have 
been known to claim for their respective sides the same body of work. In this hermeneutical tug-
of-war, critics attempt to bring a particular poet’s body of work over to one camp or the other. 
Thus John Ashbery is championed both by Perloff and other apologists of experimental poetry, 
and by Helen Vendler and Harold Bloom, critics who value the high modernists and their 
successors such as James Merrill, A. R. Ammons, and Robert Penn Warren.4 Similarly, the work 
of Ezra Pound has been embraced by critics who are at opposite poles on the range of the 
experimental and the traditional in twentieth-century poetry. But in spite of such complexities 
and crossover figures, the category of experimentalism is helpful for distinguishing a broad 
poetic tendency that points to philosophical issues critical to understanding problems in 
contemporary poetry and poetics. 
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 In tracing the historical roots of twentieth-century experimental poetry, some critics find 
antecedents in poets of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. In The Poetics of Indeterminacy: 
Rimbaud to Cage, for example, Perloff traces the current schism between so-called mainstream 
or academic poetry and experimental or avant-garde poetry back to two lineages that branched 
off from nineteenth-century French poetry: symbolism, such as that of Stéphane Mallarmé and 
Charles Baudelaire, and the avant-garde poetics of Arthur Rimbaud. Indeed, in distinguishing 
among the various continuities and disjunctions within the history of Western poetry since the 
late nineteenth century, there appears to be, very generally, a polarity between the poetics of 
symbolism and the poetics of the avant-garde, or what might also be generally referred to as 
objectivism. By the latter term, I refer not only to the objectivism or “objectism” of Louis 
Zukofsky and Charles Olson, but to a broadly-based movement that reacted against symbolism 
and advocated a return to a direct and immediate response to reality, or to the object at hand, 
including a preoccupation with perception, thought, language, and the poem itself. The first 
tendency has its roots in the nineteenth-century, and is epitomized by the poetry of Baudelaire 
and Mallarmé, and continuing in a lineage that includes William Butler Yeats, T. S. Eliot, 
Stevens (arguably), Robert Lowell, and John Berryman. The poets who reacted against 
symbolism and whose poetry tends to break down the dualistic and organic approach of the 
symbolists include Rimbaud, Gertrude Stein, Guillaume Apollinaire, Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti, William Carlos Williams, Pound, Tristan Tzara, Zukofsky, Olson, John Cage, Clark 
Coolidge, Ashbery, and more recently, the poets associated with the language school such as 
Ron Silliman, Hejinian, Bruce Andrews, Charles Bernstein, Carla Harryman, Rae Armantrout, 
Bob Perelman, Barrett Watten, and many others. In terms of twentieth-century schools of poetry, 
these poets generally follow a line of development that includes Dada, Italian and Russian 
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Futurism, Surrealism, Objectivism, Black Mountain, Beat, New York School, San Francisco 
Renaissance, and Language poetries. 
 Before moving to the twentieth-century experimentalists, including the language poets, 
let us first return to Mallarmé and Rimbaud, whom Perloff views as representatives marking the 
roots of the historical split between the two poetic lineages described above, briefly to examine 
the nature of their different approaches. Mallarmé believed that there was a crisis in poetry in 
which the “supreme [language] is lacking,” and “since the immortal word is still tacit,” verse 
must make up for linguistic deficiency, “completely superior as it is.”5 In “The Book as a 
Spiritual Instrument,” he conceived of an ideal book that would contain all earthly experience 
and would represent all harmony and joy. The words and motifs of such a book would be 
precisely placed on the page so as to communicate an intended and ultimate meaning, which, 
when properly understood, would allow the reader to escape reality and to “become immortal for 
a brief hour.”6 Critics of symbolism have pointed out that such a book would be impossible to 
write, since human experience is an infinite continuity, and impossible to read, since it would 
take all time to pronounce. In these statements by Mallarmé, a duality is evident between reality 
and an ideal, a divinity or “beyond” that the poet constantly struggles to inscribe, yet is doomed 
to failure. 
 Mallarmé’s poem “Les Fenêtres”7 portrays this duality starkly and vividly. A dying 
patient (who represents the poet as well as the general human condition) gazes from his hospital 
window and longs for the pure azure beyond the “golden panes.” In his yearning for the arcadian 
world behind the glass, he kisses the panes, defiling them. He longs to “wear his dream like a 
crown” and join the paradisiacal world beyond the panes. The glass (his art) both allows him a 
view of the ideal paradise of autrefois, yet also prevents him from transcending the barrier and 
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join the paradise of eternal beauty. He asks whether he dares to crash through the glass into the 
world beyond, with his featherless wings, and risk falling into an eternity. For Mallarmé, the risk 
of “falling” has not only the psychical danger of entering that realm at the peril of insanity, but 
also symbolic Christian moral implications. The duality that the symbolists created between 
earthly existence and an ideal beyond reflects an attempt to substitute art for religion. The 
symbolic tableau that Mallarmé constructs in his poem expresses the semantic and 
epistemological fatalism of this scene. For the symbolists used words as vehicles to point to a 
meaning beyond their ordinary significations, just as they also yearned to transcend physical 
reality and reach toward a utopian place in which the subject/object and signified/signifier 
distinctions would collapse into a Dionysian world of non-differentiation. Ironically, the 
symbolists attempted to fuse subject and object using the very linguistic formation guaranteed to 
assure its rupture, symbolic language. The symbolist poet was torn between the desire for a 
paradise, and the knowledge of its impossibility, unless he resorted to the illusion of the 
windowpane. 
 Rimbaud took a very different approach to symbolist poetics. It is false, he says, to say, “I 
think,” for the moment one does so, one posits a separation between the thinking self and the 
not-self. The mind becomes removed from natural processes, which it posits as an “other,” 
perhaps to be disdained or controlled. It is more accurate to say, “On me pense,” “I am being 
thought.” In such a formulation, the self is no longer a unified, autonomous subjectivity, a 
monolithic thinking being apart from the world, but becomes a witness to the birth of its own 
thoughts. As Perloff puts it, when the poet states “Je est un autre” (I is an other) the “schizoid” 
poet steps aside and observes the mind in its process of thinking itself.8 This stance allows one to 
posit oneself as an object within nature and natural processes, and not apart from them. For “in 
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Rimbaud, the Romantic distinction between subject and object, a distinction that persists in the 
poetry of Yeats and Eliot, collapses.”9 Rimbaud’s loosening of the semantic field and of the 
notion of the discrete and autonomous self gave permission to the modernist and contemporary 
avant-garde poets who followed him to continue the process of diverging from the dualisms of 
Symbolist poetry. 
 The most recent flourishing of American experimental poetry, grouped rather loosely 
under the collective label “language poetry,” arose from a group of poets in the 1960s and 1970s, 
mainly concentrated in New York City, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Washington, D.C. 
Contemporary poets writing in this tradition are sometimes called experimental, avant-garde, 
language, or innovative poets. “Language poetry” is so called because of 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, the ground-breaking journal of poetics that was published between 
1978 and 1981, and because one of its primary projects was to dispel the myths of the 
transparency of the medium of language and to emphasize its materiality. In the present work, I 
use “avant-garde” and “experimental” interchangeably. My preferred term, however, is 
“experimental.” Critics sometimes state that “experimental” signifies work that is unfinished, a 
sketch that is not yet ready to rise above notebook status and attain the more dignified realm of a 
polished piece so finely crafted that its satisfying coherence and emotional import would suffer 
from the change of a single word. The contermpoary poet Jack Foley, however, points to the 
shared etymological roots of “experiment” and “peril.”10 To these I would add “experience.” 
“Peril” is the root of all three: L. peiculum, periclum experiment, trial, risk, danger, f. root of 
experi-ri to try, make trial of + -culum, suffix naming instruments. The roots of the word 
“experiment” indicate its usefulness in describing the decentered approach to the writing and 
reading of what has been previously described as “avant-garde.” It indicates a certain danger in 
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the trial, in the stepping away from a comfortable place and into the unknown, to test convention, 
to risk the consequences of leaving a center and moving into another center, to leave that one for 
another, and another, and perhaps finally to understand that centers do not hold. “Experiment” 
lends itself well to a poetry that encourages the reader to risk letting go of various 
epistemological and existential habits. 
The language poets developed their poetry and poetics in part in reaction to a number of 
interrelated political, cultural, and sociological conditions of that period. Politically leftist in 
orientation, many of the poets perceived their project in utopian terms, creating a community of 
writers seeking a radical alternative to ideologies of state militarism and imperialism, economic 
injustice, multinational capitalism, consumerism, racism, and sexism. Culturally, these poets 
were also reacting against the dominant aesthetic in poetry that was largely fostered in university 
creative writing programs during the 1960s and 1970s. The so-called “workshop aesthetic” 
tended to emphasize the poet’s cultivation of a unique, authentic voice, and to value the writing 
of a kind free-verse lyrical self-expression.11 Thus one of the original projects of language poetry 
was “debunking the figure of the poet as a solo egoist”12 and challenging prevailing ideologies 
about a unified and authoritative subject. In general, language poetry placed linguistic, 
perceptual, social and cognitive habits under scrutiny, compelling the reader – or at least seeking 
to compel the reader – to question the status of those habits or thought patterns as possessing 
inherent structures or qualities. Such conventions as linear narrativity and shape, realistic 
description, unified subjectivity, and the referentiality of language were all subjected to critique, 
from the inside out. Language poetry had from its beginnings a strong self-reflexive impetus, 
encouraging the reader to examine the materiality of the language being used in the poem, as 
opposed simply to accept the marks on the page as a medium transparently conveying a message 
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yet itself invisible to examination. Language poets were eager to show language to be an artifice, 
and they constructed their poetry so that one might become aware of the crane in the deus ex 
machina transporting the supposedly sacred meaning onto the stage of the poem. The reader’s 
innocent absorption in the drama was no longer a goal. The reader was to become implicated in 
constructing meaning in the play of language.13 
 Needless to say, language poetry was not generally received with open arms, either in the 
popular culture or in the academy, and it was often met with open hostility to its perceived 
meaninglessness and total linguistic anarchy. And so the poets themselves created venues and 
forums for the publication and exposure of their work. A number of small magazines and 
presses, edited and published by poets, came into being during this period, creating a means to 
disseminate the work and to discuss and debate its ideological grounds. Tuumba (edited by 
Hejinian), The Figures (edited by Geoff Young), and This Press (edited by Watten) were some of 
the ground-breaking presses of the earlier days of the new experimental poetry. Watten’s This, 
Perelman’s Hills, Tom Mandel’s Miam, Silliman’s tottel’s, Harryman’s Qu, Bernstein and 
Andrews’ L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, and Hejinian’s and Watten’s Poetics Journal also provided a 
means of publishing work that might not have seen the light of day, given the either hostile or 
indifferent attitude toward this work by mainstream presses and magazines. And reading series 
such as The Grand Piano (curated by Silliman, Mandel, and Armantrout) and Talks (curated by 
Perelman) also encouraged the formation of a community of like-minded poets.14 
 Post-language poetry is in a shifting and uncertain period at present. Some younger-
generation poets and critics of language poetry are reacting to the perceived asceticism of the 
poetry, and reinstating elements of such verboten categories as unselfconsciously linear 
narrativity and cohering subjectivity, sometimes with theological or mystical overtones. Poets 
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who inherited the poetic and ideological legacy of language poetry are also departing from it in 
significant ways, sometimes claiming to restore a sense of the foundational importance of 
content, meaning, the experience of material reality, historical contextuality, and a political ethos 
to poetry, while remaining within the avant-garde tradition. For example, the editors of the 
journal Apex of the M (active briefly during the mid-1990s), reacting to the perceived extreme 
semantic disruption of their immediate avant-garde predecessors, the older generation of 
language-centered poets, expressed their desire “for a move away from . . . an avant-garde 
dominated in its practices by a poetics espousing the priority of ‘language itself’ over all other 
relations.”15 While opposing the “conventional referentiality”16 of mainstream poetry, they also 
decried “the self-conscious opacity”17 and language idolatry of the language poets, whom they 
charged with endorsing “the notion that we are restricted solely to slippages within language to 
frustrate its conventional usages.”18 Instead, these poets advocate “a radical transparency of 
language that maintains particular ties with mimesis and narrative”19 and 
 
that is ultimately objectless, that allows for the non-linguistic, and finds the basis 
for its address in a relationship with other that is not a making of the other into a 
theme or an object to be possessed, is not a losing of oneself in another, and is 
certainly not a violent confrontation with the other that first and foremost 
endeavors to alienate individuals from the very possibility of dialogue and 
therefore responsibility.20 
 
These and other broad claims in the manifestos of the Apex of the M tend to blur and homogenize 
distinctions among their forebears and to exaggerate claims for their own dissimilarity from their 
predecessors. One would be hard pressed, however, to find any founding or older-generation 
language-centered poet – even among those who most radically challenged metaphysical 
assumptions of referentiality – who abandoned meaning, history, narrative, and a 
phenomenological concern for the perceptual experience, as issues central to their poetry and 
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poetics. Criticism of language poetry has often emphasized what is arguably a more salient 
feature of the work, that is, its concern with the slippage between signifier and signified, and 
between these and the referent represented by perception, language, and cognition. However, to 
make the sweeping claim that language poetry has been almost exclusively concerned with the 
play of signs at the expense of context, history, and the material world is to ignore the fact that 
many of these very poets have consistently stated that what they are doing is not to erase or 
downgrade such concerns, but instead to question ways in which one thinks about them and to 
destabilize ingrained notions of dualisms and hierarchies among conceptual categories. 
 For this reason, it is perhaps unfortunate that contemporary experimental poets have been 
saddled with the label “language poets.” Some of these writers have expressed their unease with 
this and other terms, which “can be as troublesome as they are illuminating,”21 for diverse 
reasons. For example, Armantrout says, “I use the term [“language-oriented”] but I’m suspicious 
of it, finally, because it seems to imply division between language and experience, thought and 
feeling, inner and outer.”22 For Armantrout, then, the term seems to weigh more heavily on one 
side of the epistemological and ontological scale than the other, and thus gives it a dualistic cast. 
Moreover, the label “language poetry” tends to define the numerous projects of the poetry under 
a single rubric of concern rather than allowing them to circulate in a more open arena. As 
Bernstein and Andrews have pointed out, “[s]logans and catchphrases signal the possibility that 
stylistic fixation can be an entrapment for these as well as other tendencies in recent poetry.”23 
Labels can unduly restrict a project that, “if it can be summarized at all, has involved exploring 
the numerous ways that meanings and values can be (& are) realized – revealed – produced in 
writing. This involves an opening of the field of activity and not its premature foreclosure.”24 
Also, such labels tend to stereotype the concerns of experimental poets, which has probably 
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contributed to the one-sided nature of the criticism, both positive and negative, of the various 
disillusioning investigations associated with their poetry. 
 Within the very broad category of late-twentieth-century experimental poetry, there are 
many conflicting ideologies and political positions. The movement never was in any sense 
monolithic. There are, of course, many philosophical commonalities among experimental poets, 
such as the desire to question linguistic and existential categories such as the autonomy and 
identity of the subject. As with any internally diverse group, the poets associated with the 
Language school were not all equally devoted to, in agreement with, or even aware of, all of 
these oppositional goals, and within the movement there have been differences and debates. 
Megan Simpson, in Poetic Epistemologies: Gender and Knowing in Women’s Language-
Oriented Writing, explores the history of language poetry from a feminist perspective. Pointing 
to some decidedly non-utopian moments in the history of late-twentieth century experimental 
poetry, she demonstrates that sexism is indeed not impossible in a poetry whose primary 
criticism lodged against it has been its “meaninglessness.”25 The sexism, egoism, and intellectual 
arrogance of some male practitioners of the new experimental poetry has been documented and 
analyzed. Sexist positioning has been observed not only in the content of some of the poetry, but 
also in the sometimes poor representation of women in anthologies, journals, and reading series, 
and in practices such as the subtle or overt exclusion of women poets in social contexts. Neither, 
as Scalapino points out, are postures of racial and gender privilege unheard of among the largely 
(but by no means exclusively) white and middle-class practitioners of experimental poetries.26 
 A variety of opinions have been stated, over the history of contemporary experimental 
poetry, on the question of the production of meaning in which language poets claim to have such 
an important stake. As the movement aged, the more extreme positions of some of its 
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practitioners have altered to embrace a more conciliatory attitude toward poetry that is less 
disruptive of meaning and syntax. From the beginning, however, most poets writing 
experimental poetry made it clear that the issue was not, and never was, that “writing should (or 
could) be stripped of reference,” an idea “as bothersome and confusing as the assumption that the 
primary function of words is to refer, one-one-one, to an already constructed world of things.”27 
Not even in the wildest dreams of analytic or logical positivist philosophy has the idea of such an 
ideal language – at least one in ordinary usage, that is – free from irregularities, ambiguities, and 
semantic fuzziness, and embracing a direct correspondence between word and object, been 
entertained. Similarly, Armantrout commonsensically and perhaps with mediating intentions 
reminds us that “[t]o believe non-referentiality is possible is to believe language can be divorced 
from thought, words from their histories.”28 The words of a language cannot be completely, 
absolutely divorced from their meaning, however circulatory, elliptical, slippery that meaning 
might be. Armantrout’s words were not only intended as part of her own statement of poetics, 
but a reply to critics of language poetry who proclaimed the abject meaninglessness of much of 
the work and the resulting assumption of linguistic dogmatism.29 Referring to the works in 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, Bernstein and Andrews state that instead, “reference, like the body 
itself, is one of the horizons of language, whose value is to be found in the writing (the world) 
before which we find ourselves at any moment. It is the multiple powers and scope of reference 
(denotative, connotative, associational), not writers’ refusal or fear of it, that threads these essays 
together.”30 I would extend such statements regarding the inescapability of referentiality to 
include poetic language that, to use Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic terminology, seems to arise 
directly and without mediation from the prelinguistic magma of the semiotic chora and that does 
indeed appear to be divorced from meaning.31 Despite their extreme discontinuity or apparent 
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rejection of signification, nonsense poetry that attempts to create an artificial or imaginary 
language or alphabet; sound poetry, which seems to aspire to the conditions of music;32 and some 
concrete poetry, do not escape signification. Constructed with signs of various types, they elicit 
emotional registers that carry meaning. 
 For example, Isidore Isou’s “Larmes de jeune fille” might seem on first exposure to the 
poem to be communicating nothing at all, yet it has clusters of emotionally suggestive intensities 
and evocative symbols.33 Here are the first three lines of the poem: 
 
M dngoun, m diahl Ohna îou 
hsm îoun înhlianhl M pna iou 
vgaîn set i ouf! saî iaf34 
 
George Steiner claims that such poetry “breaks the association not only between words and 
sense, but between semantic signs and that which can be spoken. Poetry has been produced 
solely for the reading eye.” Despite the poem’s radical unfamiliarity and linguistically alien 
context, the poem is somehow strangely moving.35 Indeed, “[t]he wall is at the same time blank 
and expressive.”36 Yet in spite of a possible feeling that the poem perversely refuses 
interpretation, that very feeling has the seeds of meaning, and indeed may be thought of itself as 
a meaningful reaction to the work. Even to claim that such poems are nonverbal is to deny the 
potential linguistic-cum- emotional effect of the symbolizations. Isou’s poem may leave us 
moved or frustrated. While some might feel its poignancy, others might feel emotionally 
distanced or even feel repelled by its opacity. Our emotional response is as meaningful as it is 
inevitable. Such experiments as these demonstrate the power of linguistic symbols, even of those 
symbols do not seem to correspond in any recognizable way to the structure and semantic 
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content of traditional alphabets or morphemes – and they push back the boundaries of what is 
“tolerable linguistic deviance.”37 
 The lineage of experimental poetries, from Rimbaud to dada, futurism, surrealism, 
objectivism, and so on through the language and post-language schools of poets, have in general 
posed different kinds of inquiries, different sets of questions, often embracing the possibility of 
pain or sorrow, as well as the delight of play or jouissance, that comes with the 
acknowledgement of the rupture between signifier and referent, as does Hejinian: 
 
In the gap between what one wants to say (or what one perceives there is to say) 
and what one can say (what is sayable), words provide for a collaboration and a 
desertion. We delight in our sensuous involvement with the materials of language, 
we long to join words to the world – to close the gap between ourselves and 
things – and we suffer from doubt and anxiety because of our inability to do so.38 
 
Yet the attempt to universalize that sorrow or to attribute an essential or transcendent existence 
to the felt correspondence between mortality and linguistic rupture is not a necessary 
concomitant to such an acknowledgement. Indeed, to do so would be to fall prey to the belief 
that a nihilistic divorce between experience and reality, between language and object, and 
between signifier and signified, is the whole story, a complete philosophical statement of truth. 
We cannot mistake language and perception for the object itself, yet this rupture, this 
acknowledgement of our isolation from the not-self, is only part of a larger and more complex 
picture that also acknowledges the important role of the reality outside consciousness. 
 Stein continues and increases avant-garde poetry’s distance from the symbolist aesthetic. 
The often extreme semantic disjunction in her poetry has spawned debates regarding the 
presence or absence of an overall semantic design in works such as Tender Buttons. The ongoing 
discussion concerning the issue of encoded meaning versus indeterminacy in this work illustrates 
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a potential for dualistic hermeneutical thinking about experimental work in general. In writing 
about the composition of that work, which is often taken to an example of her cubist poetics, 
Stein claims to have studied an object intently and allowed it to suggest associations.39 
Sometimes, the “associations” seem to have absolutely no connection with the object being 
described, as in “PEELED PENCIL CHOKE / Rub her coke.”40 Other works, such as “A 
PLATE,” are described in recognizable terms: “Cut in white. Cut in white so lately.”41 The latter 
seems to emphasize the edges of the object, and attests to an acute attention to the object at hand, 
not to the object as use-function, as vehicle to a transcendental purpose, as the symbolists often 
did in order to evade the distressing and sordid reality of industrialized society. Stein tries to see 
the object as it is and also as an object within the imagination, but not in order to reach, at least 
imaginatively, an ideal of a distant beyond. 
 In Stein scholarship, there is a school that tends to resist interpretation – at least a 
coherent interpretation – that might do violence to the intrinsically polysemous nature of the 
work. Others claim that one can indeed find an encoded trail of meanings that not only disrupts 
conventional phallogocentric notions of signification through its method of radical disjunction 
and incessant beginnings, but also disrupts such conventions thematically. However, to believe 
either one way or the other is to limit one’s appreciation of Stein’s project, for, as Armantrout 
and other poets associated with the language school have stated, words are never entirely free of 
their signifying function. The reader can find patterns of signification in Stein just as he or she 
can enjoy the radical de-centering of her signifying process. 
 On the side of valuing the jouissance and polyvalence in Tender Buttons, Marianne 
DeKoven makes a claim for the extreme indeterminacy of coherent meaning in this work. 
According to DeKoven, 
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[C]oherent, referential meaning – the transcendental signified – is . . . absent from 
Stein’s experimental work. . . . Stein’s radical works deny, avoid, in fact negate 
the transcendental signified. They have no themes. Interpretation of them – close 
reading of a whole text – is reduced to listing all possible combinations of lexical 
meanings, as if those meaning themselves . . . were the point of the writing.42  
 
Despite DeKoven’s qualification of “transcendental” in the doomed search for the signified of 
Tender Buttons, her position of the radical absence of themes in the work still comes across as a 
rather extreme one. After all, the very fact of Stein’s catalogue of objects, sometimes even 
described in such a way that the reader might guess what is being portrayed, attests to at least the 
possibility for an overarching meaning in the work, even if that meaning overlaps with several 
others in dialogue with one another. 
 Other scholars, such as Lisa Ruddick, claim to find a coherent structure of signification 
lurking beneath what DeKoven calls the “word-salad” of the work.43 She finds examples of such 
encoded, “Gnostic” meanings throughout Tender Buttons, which have to do with, on the one 
hand, the sacrifice of the female in a patriarchal society, and, on the other hand, the restoration 
and revitalization of that sacrificed female. For Ruddick, whereas Tender Buttons has been 
viewed as impenetrable, however dazzling stylistically,”44 
 
[it] is far more intellectually cohesive than has been supposed. In the midst of its 
linguistic play lies a series of substantive thoughts that point in the direction of a 
gnostic feminism. Now Stein’s precursor text is the Bible: she contests and 
corrects that text, unlocking within its patriarchal symbols a suppressed, woman-
affirming story.45 
 
Ruddick makes a compelling case for her interpretation, yet it is not the only possible overall 
interpretation. Moreover, such arguments should not detract from the possibility for the reader 
also to experience the sheer pleasure of the text with its splashed and shattered surface play. 
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 The arguments of DeKoven and Ruddick, whom I have taken as representatives of 
supposedly antithetical opinions regarding the more experimental of Stein’s work, are actually 
not so far apart. DeKoven states that Stein’s creative process of blending representations of an 
“outside” (“some feature of the world outside”) and an “inside” (“a compatible point in one’s 
own internal landscape: a mood, feeling, cluster of associations”) 
 
seems to have the effect of cutting the language loose from coherence but not 
from meaning. . . . Conventional description is faithful to the external coherence 
of the object; free association and stream-of-consciousness are faithful to the 
internal coherence of consciousness, or the subconscious; and purely chance 
groupings of words (“word-salad”) are faithful to no anterior coherence at all. 
This experimental writing, however, is neither faithful to an anterior (either 
external or internal) coherence nor completely random. It is . . . senseless and yet 
signifying.46 
 
Ruddick at moments also admits to the possibility for both critical positions for the same work: 
 
Quite simply, I believe that a text can be polysemous and still have themes, or 
“patterns of meaning.” There is no question that Stein opens up what is sometimes 
called jouissance, or the play of the signifier. But the fact that a person’s language 
is mobile and polysemous does not mean that the person cannot at the same time 
be thinking “about” various things, in ways that can be traced and interpreted.47 
 
For both critics, then, it would seem to be a matter of degree, and both admit the possibility of 
the coexistence of both an encoded system of meaning and a polysemous play of language. 
 It is not surprising that the theoretical backdrop of DeKoven’s analysis is deconstruction, 
and that of Ruddick’s is feminism. Reading these two analyses against each other, one senses a 
tension within a larger theoretical arena between questions of representation, meaning, cultural 
and individual identity, and material oppression. Deconstruction and feminism, uneasy 
bedfellows since the beginning of deconstruction’s emergence in the late sixties, continue to 
coexist uneasily and question each other’s categories and tenets. A more dialectical Stein 
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criticism would move in the direction of acknowledging the possibility for the simultaneous 
existence of both an open field of meaning (arguably a feminist endeavor itself in the twentieth 
century) and the possibility for an encoded feminist critique within a single work. Such a 
response would not simply champion disruptive semantic surface for its own sake, nor would it 
seek only to decode the work’s possible feminist interpretations. Instead, it would analyze how 
these two impetuses in Tender Buttons work together in a dialogical manner to inform, shape, 
and critique one another. 
 The analysis of tendencies in Stein criticism exemplifies a broader tension in the history 
of the criticism of twentieth-century Western poetry. This history often chronicles a debate 
between positions that, when described as the extreme ends of a range of possibilities, are 
essentially dualistic. On one side are the proponents of experimentation and the philosophical 
congeries often associated with it: an emphasis on the forces of chaos and entropy predominates, 
as does a valuing of process over product, chance operations, disjunctiveness, the materiality and 
opacity of language, nonlinearity, the diffusion of the authorial self, and generally speaking the 
questioning of all manner of linguistic and conceptual habits and categories. On the other side 
are the proponents of a set of values that can be traced to varying degrees to aspects related to 
Romanticism and to a Cartesian faith in hierarchical binaries, including an emphasis on temporal 
linearity, narrative trajectory, thematic coherence, a faith in referentiality, focus on the 
transparence of the linguistic medium, and a poetic voice emerging from a more or less unified 
and cohering subject. 
 To delineate the two extreme positions so sharply is to oversimplify a field that is 
complex and interconnected, and which contains many examples of cross-pollination between 
the two critical positions. However, the categories are useful in pointing out the overt and latent 
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tensions in discussions of twentieth-century poetry. Issues of faith in the categories of one 
posture or the other have arisen over and over again, like debates that artificially set up the 
argument as a battle between entrenched and diametrically opposed attitudes. The fact that they 
continue to surface testifies to the tendency to understand the issues in terms of dualities: radical 
disjunction versus conservative linearity, centrifugal jouissance versus centripetal coherence. 
 In the criticism of contemporary experimental poetry, then, there are dualistic tendencies 
related to the ones just examined in reference to Stein criticism. On one side, semantic 
indeterminacy is upheld to the extent that it appears to acquire something of the dreaded 
transcendental status it would seek to dismantle. On the other side, critics disparage language 
poetry for its lack of an easily accessible grammatical and semantic depth, as though one should 
be able to approach it with the same hermeneutical strategies and standards as a poem by Robert 
Frost, for example. In this work, I articulate critical approaches and reading strategies for 
contemporary experimental poetry that recognize the operation of a radical dialectics in the 
work, and that avoid dualistic modes of thought. 
 I am focusing primarily on five contemporary poets in the experimental tradition: Mei-
mei Berssenbrugge, Lyn Hejinian, Carla Harryman, Hannah Weiner, and Leslie Scalapino. They 
are all American poets, and with the exception of Weiner, still living. From the 1970s to the 
present, they have all been integrally involved in the formation of the community of language 
poets. And they have all self-consciously written philosophically engaged work that enacts the 
kind of dialectical motion with which I am concerned. 
Of course, the poets themselves are not working in a theoretical or philosophical vacuum, 
and many of them point to specific influences in such fields as ancient and recent philosophical 
thought, feminist theory, and psychoanalytic theory. Many of these influences have in common 
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the rejection of dualistic thinking and the embracing of a reciprocal and non-resolving motion 
between opposed terms or categories. For example, the ancient Indian Buddhist philosopher 
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questioning of any dualistic construction as misleading is particularly apt to my thesis, especially 
in my discussion of time and history in Chapter Four, and public and private realms of 
experience in Chapter Five. 
 The feminist psychoanalytic theories of Jessica Benjamin have inspired the work of 
Harryman. Feminist psychoanalysis, particularly in the work of Benjamin and Kristeva, inform 
my discussion of Harryman’s and Weiner’s breakdown of dualisms in the construction of 
subjectivity, which is the theme of Chapter Three. 
 Another means of imagining the challenge to dualisms is to study the open-ended and 
non-resolving dialectics of the kind that certain twentieth-century phenomenologists such as 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas have described. These figures are particularly 
useful in describing the relationship between subject and object, and subject and other, which 
form the main themes in Chapters Two and Five. 
 And finally, to these thinkers who were either directly influenced the poets, or whose 
work bears a striking resemblance to a particular poet (as in the case of Levinas and 
Berssenbrugge), I add to my theoretical framework several thinkers in the field of cognitive 
science. Their work exhibits many correspondences with the idea of a radical dialectics in 
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experimental poetry. The writings of Antonio Damasio, Richard E. Cytowic, Michael S. 
Gazzaniga, and the collaborative writings of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, among others, 
have contributed much to my understanding of the response of cognitive science to questions of 
dualism. Recent developments in cognitive science during and following the “decade of the 
brain” of the 1990s most often attempt to shatter the last vestiges of Cartesian thought by 
demonstrating the profoundly illusory nature, yet the eminent usefulness to survival, of cognitive 
categories. In each chapter, the work of one or more of these thinkers informs my argument 
regarding a radical dialectics of experimental poetry. 
 The above sources, along with a few others, are admittedly disparate in terms of their 
various fields of investigation as well as the era in which they lived. However, my emphasis is 
not on their differences, but on the resonances of their philosophies with the dialogical poetry 
and poetics of the five contemporary poets I discuss. In their various ways, they share along with 
the poets with whom I place them side by side the common project of overturning a dualistic 
view of the world and engaging in a profoundly dialectical philosophical project. 
 The term “dialectics” has had a long career. Thus it is necessary, if not to pin down a 
term whose meaning has fluctuated during the history of philosophy, at least to give a flavor of 
its application in the present work. In the late work of the phenomenological philosopher 
Merleau-Ponty, I find a helpful exposition of the kind of dialectical thought that best describes a 
similar operation in the work of the five experimental poets in this work.48 One caveat in such a 
defining move is that because of the very unstable nature of dialectical thought, attempting to 
render it into a set of theses has the effect of displacing the very dialecticalism that one tries to 
describe, and ossifying the term so that the motion of reciprocity that is at its heart is stilled.49 
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Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty gives a provisional definition that maintains the dynamic aspect of 
the motion: 
 
From the most superficial level to the most profound, dialectical thought is that 
which admits reciprocal actions or interactions – which admits therefore that the 
total relation between a term A and a term B cannot be expressed in one sole 
proposition, that relation covers over several others which cannot be 
superimposed, which are even opposed, which define so many points of view 
logically incompossible and yet really united within it – even more that each of 
these relations leads to its opposite or to its own reversal, and does so by its own 
movement.50  
 
This motion cannot be seen and captured as if from above, objectively and abstractly, in what 
Merleau-Ponty calls “high-altitude thinking.”51 Instead, it must be thought by “trac[ing] its own 
course”52 and by acknowledging the multiple relationships among terms in all their 
contradictoriness, incompatibility, and multivalence. This movement of thought is thus 
thoroughly implicated in the production of meaning and the engendering of relationships among 
terms. In dialectical thought, dichotomous relationships among terms are essential to their very 
being: 
 
[D]ialectical thought is that which admits that each term is itself only by 
proceeding toward the opposed term, becomes what it is through the movement, 
that it is one and the same thing for each to pass into the other or to become itself, 
to leave itself or to retire into itself, that the centripetal movement and the 
centrifugal movement are one sole movement, because each term is its own 
mediation, the exigency for a becoming, and even for an auto-destruction which 
gives the other.53  
 
It is the dialectical nature of thought that discourages the tendency to purify a term of the shape 
or content of its opposite so that, thus freed from the taint from or dependency on a contradicting 
term, it takes on an intrinsic or meaning or character that must be valued in and for itself and that 
rises to a transcendental status. In a dialectical epistemology, the terms under investigation – say, 
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those of perceiver and perceived, or private and public, or referentiality and nonreferentiality – 
are shown to be interpenetrating, thoroughly implicated in one another’s being and becoming, 
and without an intrinsic or inherent nature. In Merleau-Ponty’s definition there is also something 
of a paradox in the relationship between terms, in the deep identity between the “centripetal 
movement and the centrifugal movement.” It is the same thing, Merleau-Ponty claims, for each 
term to “pass into the other or to become itself, to leave itself or to retire into itself.” The identity 
of the terms is not static and essentialist, but dynamic and dependently originating. At the same 
time that a term merges with another, it also becomes itself. Dependence and independence are 
separate relationships, yet also, paradoxically, one and the same. This paradoxical movement is 
	 	
   
      		   
	  ories, 
as we shall see especially in Chapter Four. And it is also a characteristic of the radical dialectical 
movement enacted by the experimental poetry analyzed throughout the present work. 
By using the term “radical,” I intend to suggest that the dialectical motion that I describe 
is thoroughgoing and dynamic, and involves the mutual investigation and interplay of terms. 
This dialetics radically questions the essentializing of human categorization, in which the 
intrinsic existence of our cognitive and perceptual categories are taken for granted. Yet a radical 
dialectics does not denigrate the mediation of human experience by our cognitive and perceptual 
functions. Instead such a dialectics places such mediation in a dynamic and interdependent 
dialogue with the emptiness – to use a term important to Buddhist thought – of its functions. I 
propose not a hierarchy of terms or an extreme deconstruction of one realm in order to elevate 
the other, but a vital, interdependent, and mutually interrogating drama among terms. In the 
sense that the dialectics enacted in the poetry allows reciprocal critique without closure, and 
allows the paradoxical coexistence of contradictory terms, it is radical. The poetry enacts a 
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leveling of any hierarchical relationship or dualistic construction through the blurring of 
boundaries between terms, at the same time that it acknowledges the discrete alterity of terms. 
Describing this dialectics as “radical” is also a response to the use of the word in what I 
consider to be dualistic critiques of poetry. The Apex of the M espoused “radical transparency” in 
their poetics. Experimental poetry has been viewed as embracing “radical disruption” of various 
linguistic parameters such as narrative, meaning, and the construction of the self. I propose 
instead a “radical dialectics” that rejects either extreme of an essential or transcendental 
formulation of poetics, and instead stresses a dialectical motion between contrary terms. 
 It is easy to think of the binaries under consideration as something other than convenient 
categorizations, as somehow reified and existing apart from our cultural and cognitive 
constructions, or at least somehow inevitable and natural. It would be equally misleading, 
however, to believe that they are exclusively human constructs, for humans do not exist as 
entities that are divorced from their environment, but as beings interconnected with other living 
and nonliving beings. Each term of a dualism can be complicated to be shown to be not so much 
distinct but containing its own range of possible meanings and valences. Moreover, the terms of 
every dualism can be shown to be parts of an interconnected complexity and plurality. To use 
Hegel’s classic example, there exists master and slave, but not as pure entities. Instead, their 
relationship both reinforces and interrogates the binary arrangement. And what is the status of 
the child born of master and slave? The child is “owned” in a sense by the master, yet not purely 
a slave. The categories of master and slave are not only interdependent and complex, but they are 
also parts of a larger dynamics of social relationships. 
 To give an example of a different binary, one can experience degrees of meaning and 
meaninglessness in language, yet in a specific context, each term is dependent upon so many 
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interlocking conditions as to be useless as a pure, abstract term. As I show in Chapter Three, 
Harryman’s Gardener of Stars is neither narrative or anti-narrative, and yet it is both. It is an 
exploration of the terms and conditions of narrative, which is a nominal or conventional 
category. It is what a writer and reader – and their historical and cultural context – make of it. 
One can recognize in conventional binary categories useful terms for describing particular 
aspects of human existence without attributing to these categories essential or absolute values or 
characteristics, or as somehow only in orbit with one another rather than each being itself 
implicated in relationships with other phenomena or categories in a larger dynamic process. 
 In order to understand how this dialectical motion functions in experimental poetry, it 
may be helpful to summarize some of its features exhibited by the poetry and poetics that I 
closely examine in the coming chapters. First, where human convention has designated a binary 
relationship between terms, a radical dialectics suggests that that relationship is fundamentally 
dialogical and investigatory. The dialogue between the two terms means that they mutually 
interrogate one another in a conversation that endlessly circulates and that does not resolve into a 
truth-value or a hierarchical relationship between the two terms. One term does not take 
precedence over the other, but instead the contradictory or opposed terms retain something of the 
discreteness of each while simultaneously blurring the boundaries between them. Thus they 
allow mutual interrogation and critique. The open-ended and reciprocal dialogue between 
opposing terms results in a relationship that is process-oriented: it is the continual enactment of 
the reciprocity between the terms that makes it dialectical. There is no higher synthesis or any 
single or stable truth toward which the dialogue progresses. Moreover, there is no compromise 
between the terms. In terms of poetry, such a compromise might result in a watered-down 
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version of the two and a stasis of motion – perhaps a tepid lyricism rather than a dynamic 
dialogue. 
 Such a dialectical motion breaks down and destabilizes dualities, and admits of 
contradictions and paradoxical states. As Hejinian puts it, the “current [of experimental poetics] 
includes, among other things, swarms of contradiction and ambivalence.”54 And since the 
dialectics enacts or encourages continual circulation rather than closure, the relationship is 
decentering rather than hierarchicalizing, pluralistic rather than monistic or dualistic. 
Armantrout’s description of experimental poetry as “ambi-centric” is apt in this context.55 The 
dialectical motion in the poetry generates multiple meanings: it expands the semantic field rather 
than tending to restrict meaning or to posit a unified semantic structure that is determined by 
authorial intention. 
 A poetics of a radical dialectics can hold no easy answers to polemical questions of, for 
example, linguistic transparency versus the material signifier. In fact, the presentation of such a 
polarity in experimental poetry might take the following movement: the recognition 1) that there 
is some truth to both positions, 2) that there are many ways of conceptualizing the dilemma 
posed by such a duality. These ways might include the possibility a) that both are truth; b) that 
neither is true; c) that only one is true; or d) somewhere between a) and b) with an infinity of 
degrees of positions of truth and falsity. A radically dialectical analysis would recognize, 
however, that words can never be divorced entirely from their signification; they can be divorced 
from signification to a degree (as in a pre-linguistic state, or in the phenomenon of repeating a 
word until its sound seems to detach from its meaning), but it is not possible, short of damage to 
our central nervous systems, not to have a reaction on some level to the stimulus of a symbol or 
representation. 
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 However, it is possible to imagine that without the mediation of human cognition, a word 
scratched onto paper has no inherent meaning and no essential existence. Our concepts, even 
traced down to their roots in perception, are, from the start, profoundly constructed. We might 
rephrase the old conundrum of whether a falling tree makes a sound if there’s no one in the forest 
to hear it, by asking whether colors exist if there is no one to perceive them. Colors are a 
phenomenon of human visual perception and do not exist in or on the objects. We have probably 
all, at one time or other, assumed that objects are actually somehow saturated with the colors that 
we see. Even if we are thoroughly aware of this particular illusion, because of the commonality 
of human experience, and because color seems so unquestioningly natural, we still often blithely 
talk about color as if it is an inherent property of objects.56 
 The binary between, on the one hand, human constructions and interpretations of reality, 
and, on the other, a reality apart from human cognition, is recognized and addressed by almost 
all the poets whose work I analyze in this work. It occurs most strongly and obviously in poets 
such as Scalapino, Hejinian, and Berssenbrugge. All five poets who form the core of my analysis 
in this work are opposed to a correspondence theory of truth, in which concepts or symbols 
somehow correspond to phenomena outside the mind and body. But instead of experiencing 
nostalgia for an Edenic world that holds the promise for a more direct union with reality, they 
posit a continually circulating dialogue between binary categories. And in the work of some 
experimental poets, in addition to the dialogue between contrary terms, it is possible to discern a 
deep identity between the two realms. For to posit that humans along with their conceptual 
apparatus and framework are divorced from nature is to subscribe to an unacceptable dualism 
between humans and the natural world. This aspect of radical dialectics is perhaps most apparent 
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 Another aspect of the radical dialectics of experimental poetry is the engagement with 
self-examination and self-critique. The experimental poetry with which I am concerned is at 
heart philosophically engaged. This engagement is not so much a discursive or logical exposition 
of philosophical ideas, but instead an enactment of a dialectical motion by placing terms in 
dialogue with one another in a reciprocal and open-ended exchange. The poetic face of this 
radical dialectics may seem disorienting in some ways yet quite ordinary in others. The 
philosophical “nonpositioning” is a feature of its radical dialectics. On the one hand, this 
dialectics refuses nihilism and dogmatic relativism, and on the other, it resists the temptation to 
ground itself in a position that shields itself from the possibility of interrogation, or that prevents 
its own transformation into new modes of human expression. In becoming, it may not itself 
become static. It also maintains the ability to question itself and to be wary of any tendency 
within itself to abstraction or essentialism, and to acknowledge its cultural and historical context. 
By setting, for example, autobiography in dialogue with a questioning or critique of 
autobiography, both terms that have been set in motion are placed under investigation. Hejinian 
describes her poetics as having “dilemma (as a border under pressure of doubt, as a border in 
question).” For Hejinian, a “responsible” poetics “vigorously questions assumptions, including, 
or especially, its own,” and allows “swarms of contradiction and ambivalence.”57 
 The idea of a “responsible” experimental poetics is related to the third feature of its 
radical dialectics, which is the question of its ethical potential. The poetics that I am describing is 
neither nihilistic nor devoid of ethical potential. It does not partake in the extremes of either l’art 
pour l’art or didacticism. It tends to be revelatory rather than instructional, investigating and 
questioning rather than lecturing or proclaiming what is morally right. Hejinian, who has 
theorized her poetics more than most of the poets in this dissertation, again provides a relevant 
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description of a responsible poetics. In the following quotation, she defends the ethical potential 
of experimental work against the perception of its nihilistic and anti-ethical stance by some of its 
detractors: 
 
Faced with the notorious gap in meaning, we may ask, “What should we do?” But 
we already know what to do. And this knowing what to do is neither derived from 
nor does it produce guidelines – either prescriptive, proscriptive, or even 
descriptive. It is, rather, intrinsic to living in context. Not to totalize, not to pre- or 
proscribe – we know that this is some of what we must do . . . because we are 
alert to the context in which it must be done – in history and in reason.58 
 
“Living in context” means living within a set of material and historically determined 
circumstances, and living with a deep understanding of the situatedness of language within that 
context. In addition, it means having an understanding of the continually shifting and radically 
impermanent nature of reality. Thus 
 
[v]ictories are particular, local, and almost always temporary. To improve the 
world, one must be situated in it, attentive and active; one must be worldly. 
Indeed, worldliness is an essential feature of ethics. And, since the term poetics 
names not just a theory of techniques but also attentiveness to the political and 
ethical dimensions of language, worldliness is essential to a poetics.59 
 
Hejinian’s emphasis on the importance of “worldliness” and historical situatedness to an ethics 
in experimental poetry serves as a caveat to the seductions of poststructuralist theories in which 
material reality and its contributions to one’s being in the world recedes before the endless and 
fetishistic fascination with the freeplay of the signifier, with semantic circulation and uncertainty, 
and with the mediation of language in experience. Hejinian emphasizes not only the continuum 
between humans and world, but also our dialogical relationship with the world. And she insists 
upon the radical impermanence of both. In the sense that the poetics that Hejinian embraces 
continually investigates cognitive categories, alert to formulations of authority, coercion, and 
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empty rhetoricity in language, it is profoundly ethical. It is tempting to say that it is ethical 
despite its non-prescriptive and investigatory nature. However, it is more accurate to state that its 
non-prescriptive and investigatory nature is concomitant to its ethics.60 For it is the realization of 
radical impermanence, which is closely related to the idea of the non-essential (or, to use the 
Buddhist term, empty) nature of all phenomena, that allows one to believe in the possibility for 
change. And change, the condition of continual circulation and radical impermanence, is the 
alternative to essentialism. It allows one to imagine and to actualize improved material 
conditions for living beings. This is so because of the dialogical and continually circulating and 
reciprocal relationship posited between the realm of human perception, cognition, language, and 
conceptualization, and the realm exterior to human constructions and interpretations of reality. 
The two realms are not in a hierarchical or dualistic relationship. Neither is prior to or more 
important than the other. The realization of the constructed nature of our perceptions and 
interpretations of reality allows one to shed illusions that might otherwise rigidify one’s beliefs, 
as in a correspondence theory of representation, and lead one to hold to dogmatisms and 
authoritative positions. Such a realization allows one to understand the profound importance and 
constant necessity of transformation in the world. And it is the understanding of the 
pervasiveness of change that allows one to imagine any number of shiftings in our 
commonalities, our quotidian assumptions, and putatively held systems of belief. Thus while a 
radically dialectical poetics relentlessly attempts to dispel illusions at all levels, it also 
understands the necessity for human engagement with commonalities, with the realm of 
conventional existence, and thus willingly admits possibilities for a common ethics. The two are 
not mutually exclusive, but interdependent. 
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 Having set forth what I am calling descriptives, I am afraid that they may be, after all, 
interpreted as proscriptives or even prescriptives for understanding a radically dialectical poetry 
and poetics, the enumeration of so many poetic “shoulds” for all time. Perhaps the key phrase 
that allows them to escape this legislative fallacy is “for all time.” For in the diachronic scheme, 
with all its impermanence and vagaries, these descriptives are, in practice, liberatory strategies 
geared to a particular time and place. The poetic approaches I discuss in this work are above all a 
response to a political and cultural context, interwoven with the times, persons, things, and 
places from which they spring. “The fact of the matter is that the world requires improving 
(reimproving) every day. Just as one can’t prepare an all-purpose meal and dine once and then be 
done with the preparation and consumption of food forever; so one cannot come to the end of the 
fight for social justice and ecological safety, for example, forever.”61 An acknowledgement that 
this list of attributes of a radical poetics is historically situated need not negate it. As Hejinian 
reminds us, a poetics needs to be continually in the process of being shaped, defined, revised, 
and contextualized, and this is its strength in the face of its historical contingency. 
What I suggest in the remaining chapters, then, is a set of ways of reading particular 
instances of contemporary experimental poetry that recognizes the open-ended dialectical 
movement among seemingly contradictory terms. This project is unique in the theorizing of 
contemporary experimental poetics. Although, as we will see, some of the poets themselves have 
described or hinted at dialectical processes in their work, and suggested hermeneutical 
approaches that might take these processes into account, the critical debates surrounding the 
poetry often tend to be polemical, one-sided, or grounded in dualistic preconceptions. There has 
not yet been a sustained analysis of what such an approach, with close readings of the poems, 
might be like. There are, however, a growing number of books and dissertations that address 
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contemporary experimental poetry and poetics, including writings by the five poets in the present 
work. I have already noted several recent books on the topic of contemporary experimental 
poetry and poetics. As to the dissertations written in the past twenty-five years, there are now 
twenty in which Hejinian is discussed, six in which Scalapino’s work is analyzed, three devoted 
to Harryman, two featuring Berssenbrugge, and one that highlights the work of Weiner.62 I am 
confident that soon it will no longer be possible to claim that the field of experimental poetry is a 
neglected or a particularly marginal one. My effort is unique in its emphasis on a philosophical 
description of dialectical processes at play, in which contradictory impulses are integrated in a 
dialogical, reciprocal, mutually determining, and mutually critiquing motion. 
One dissertation approaches the theme of the present work: Simpson’s “Poetic 
Epistemologies: Gender and Knowing in Women’s Language-Oriented Writing” (later published 
as a book, cited above) discusses the poetry of Hejinian, Scalapino, Berssenbrugge, and 
Harryman, among others, in terms of the intersection of gender and ways of knowing. Simpson 
acknowledges “the tension between immanence and transcendence” in the work of 
Berssenbrugge,63 and invokes the kinship of her work with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. 
My work is not specifically feminist in orientation, at least not in a sustained way, and it also 
differs from Simpson’s work in that it explores particular ways in which the poetry creates a 
dialogical enactment of that tension. Whereas Simpson’s work explores “the subversion of 
conventions of identity and gender and the deconstruction of culturally reified oppositions, 
binarisms, and categories,” I am concerned to demonstrate ways in which these subversions and 
deconstructions of categories interact dialogically and dialectically with impulses to form 
categories, identities, and narratives. My argument emphasizes the necessity of the interaction of 
boundary-forming with boundary-transgression in order to produce the semantic proliferation 
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that is so characteristic of experimental poetry. I wish to show that categories are not simply 
invoked by the poets only to dismantle, and thus devalue them, but rather in order to place them 
in dialogue with one another, on an equal footing. It is this dialogue that generates plurality on a 
field of both knowing and unknowing. 
 In the chapters that follow I examine the works of specific poets who have been either 
directly or peripherally involved in the language poetry movement, and who seem to me to 
exemplify some aspects of the practice of such a theory of radical poetics. Biographical sketches 
of these five poets are included in appendix A. These are poets whose work, it seems to me, 
demonstrates an attempt to complicate binary categories without lapsing into nihilism or 
dualism. My intent is not to idealize the poetry that I exemplify, but to point the reader to 
tendencies in certain contemporary experimental poetry that enact aspects of the radical 
dialectical movement that I describe. Although all of the poets are female, and although I am 
using feminist theory to frame some of my arguments (particularly in Chapter Three, which 
explores subjectivity), I am not claiming an overriding feminist approach to this work, but 
instead one that is more broadly philosophical. However, I believe that the argument could easily 
be made that many of the themes and approaches to them do have feminist implications. 
 In each chapter, I place poets in analytical conversation with philosophical traditions that 
seem to me to be most compatible with their philosophical approach. In some cases, there is a 
direct relationship of influence from theorist or philosopher   	   	     
and Scalapino, and Merleau-Ponty and Hejinian. In other cases, there is not so much a direct 
relationship as sympathetic vibrations between the philosophical approach of the poet and 
philosophical and scientific thinkers. 
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 Each of the following chapters explores a different kind of binary opposition in the work 
of two different poets, and proposes reading strategies for recognizing the dialectical motion 
between binaries at play in their work. In Chapter Two, I investigate the relationship between 
subject and object, and perceiver and perceived, in the work of Berssenbrugge and Hejinian. 
These two poets are intensely concerned with the objects around them and the ways in which 
they perceive those objects – in short, their work is a poetic philosophy of perception. The poetry 
enacts rather than describes the perceptual process and the relationship between subject and 
object. This relationship is enacted as reciprocal and interdependent. The poets portray the object 
of perception not as passive and inert, but instead as actively contributing to the process of 
perception. Through their poetry, they demonstrate their understanding of the embodied nature of 
cognition, language, and perception, and of the shared material connection with the objects of 
their perception. The dialectical relationship between subject and object that Berssenbrugge and 
Hejinian explore in their poetry points to a close affinity with the phenomenological philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty, especially to his theories of perceptual openness in the relationship between 
subject and object, a relationship he calls the “flesh of the world.” Through analyses of 
Berssenbrugge’s “Irises” and “Experience,” and Hejinian’s “The Person” and “The Flying 
Statues,” I demonstrate the dialogical and investigatory nature of their poetry and some 
correspondences of their poetics with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. 
 The representation of the self in the poetry of Weiner and Harryman is the theme of 
Chapter Three. I propose strategies for reading their work that reveal the dialogue between the 
centripetal and centrifugal impulses in the construction of individual subjectivity. Multivocality, 
a primary concern in their work, is shown to be in continual and reciprocal dialogue with 
integrative impulses of the self. Both tendencies work to reinforce as well as critique one 
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another, and neither one is ascendant or dominates the other. I first demonstrate, by way of 
contrast, a kind of poem that invokes a rather heroic – or at least individuated – model of an 
integrated self and authentic voice that produces a coherent and unified model of subjectivity. 
This model is strikingly similar to that of the homunculus often described in cognitive science as 
a remnant of Cartesian dualism. Stanley Plumly’s statements in “Chapter and Verse” are 
generally representative of this type of authorial stance that is common in mainstream poetry. In 
my analysis of works by Harryman and Weiner, I show a quite different model of subjectivity 
that reveals a dialogical tension between the impetus to conceptualize the self as unified, and of 
the recognition of the multiple voices within the self. Subjectivity is shown to be a dynamic 
interaction between these impulses in the self – the centrifugal and centripetal forces that 
continually interrogate the construction of a subject. Weiner, whose neurological condition 
caused her involuntary to visualize words arising from her subconscious mind, constructed her 
poetry as a dialogical engagement with her conscious language and the voices that she saw 
projected onto objects. Through an analysis of works from Clairvoyant Journal and Little Books 
/ Indians I demonstrate the poetic processes of the splitting and cohering of her subjectivity. 
These processes engage in a dynamic and never-resolving conversation of the drives within her 
multiple self. Harryman’s poetic novel Gardener of Stars shows her construction of characters 
whose selves are unbounded, fluid and ever-shifting, at the same time that they are discrete and 
interdependent beings. The multi-layered narrative encourages a variety of interpretations of 
various types of dialogues, including a dialogue of characters in a drama of human evolution, 
intersubjective dialogues, and intrasubjective dialogues. The psychoanalytic theories of Kristeva 
and Benjamin provide theoretical support for the ideas of the dialectical relationship between the 
unifying and shattering forces within individual consciousness. In addition, the cognitive theories 
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of such thinkers as Damasio, Daniel Dennett, and the collaborative work of Lakoff and Johnson 
provide evidence for a more dialectical and less dualistic view of the multiple versus unified self. 
  Chapter Four treats the phenomenon of the event in time and narrativity in works by 
Hejinian and Scalapino. In my analysis of their poetry, I identify approaches to the work that 
acknowledge the relationship between the forces of narrative disjunction and narrative linearity. 
Neither is essentialized, but instead shown to be in dialogue so that each interrogates the other to 
produce a rich semantic field of possibilities. Their work does not suppress narrative, but instead 
explores the premises of its construction. This is done by allowing elements of both narrative and 
its disruption to question one another in a dialogue without definitive answer or closure. 
Scalapino’s philosophical concerns with time, narrative, and the nature of memory produce a 
poetry that interrogates, without denigrating, the premises of our conventional conceptualizations 
of past, present, and future, of causality, of an event occurring in time, and of one’s memory of 
events. A close look at a section from her early work “The Woman Who Could Read the Minds 
of Dogs,” along with a later work, New Time, shows that Scalapino demonstrates a rupture 
between phenomena and perception, yet also recuperates experience, memory, and narrative 
through her treatment of the reconstruction of an event as an event in its own right. The radical 
impermanence that forms the basis of her poetics also informs its ethics. The work of the ancient 
	 	       	 	  

discussion of time, event, and narrativity in her work as well as that of Hejinian, I refer to 
   	  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  
 ptions of time and narrative and the 
emptiness of those temporal suppositions. In my analysis of Hejinian’s now classic work of 
experimental autobiography, My Life,64 I demonstrate that in spite of the disjunctions at the level 
of the sentence, there are threads or motifs that run throughout the work. Contrasting motifs, 
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such as that of sentences containing precise realistic descriptions, juxtaposed with sentences that 
question the ability of language to record events mimetically, produce a dialogue in which each 
category – faithful recording of events and the impossibility of doing so – critiques the other in a 
non-resolving dialogue that discourages the formation of a dualistic hierarchy. 
 Chapter Five returns to the notion of the relationship of the subject with the world, this 
time exploring intersubjectivity in the work of Berssenbrugge and Scalapino. This relationship is 
developed in two aspects. First, I investigate the relationship on the simplest scale, that between 
subject and other, in the work of Berssenbrugge. My close reading of her poetic essay “Kate’s 
Talk” reveals a vital awareness of the shared materiality between self and non-self, and the 
intensified consciousness and increased richness of experience that comes from social 
interactions in which the integrity and transcendence of the other is recognized, as well as from a 
deep realization of the impermanence of reality. Merleau-Ponty’s theories are revisited as they 
apply to intersubjective experience. However, it is to the works of Levinas that I turn for a more 
sustained analysis of intersubjectivity and its ethical implications. Berssenbrugge’s poetics of 
self and other bears a striking resemblance to phenomenological and ethical vision of Levinas. 
Like Berssenbrugge’s idea of empathy in human relations, Levinas sees the encounter with the 
other as an occasion for a generative and enriching experience – what he calls the “infinite.” His 
philosophy is not a dialectics of totality, but one of continual interplay between the radical 
alterity of individuals and the continual overflowing and surplus of signification that arises from 
the generosity of the ethical intersubjective encounter. The second part of this chapter explores 
the dialectical relationship between private and public realms of experience in the work of 
Scalapino. By complicating traditional divisions between private and public experience, she 
seeks to demonstrate – but not necessarily denigrate – human categories of intersubjective 
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experience and the illusory nature of their conceptualization and hierarchicalization. She 
questions the rigidity of categorizations of intersubjective experience in order to reveal the 
tendency to reify boundaries that impoverish experience. She attempts to recover the richness of 
experience by demonstrating the interdependence of the private and public realms, and to 
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provides a useful conceptual framework for destabilizing and complicating notions of human 
conceptualizations. In addition, Giorgio Agamben’s theories of the expropriation of experience 
in public and private life provide an instructive comparison with Scalapino’s poetics. And 
cognitive science also has a say on the fallacy of separating the biological and the social. 
Scientists such as Damasio are pointing to the interpenetrating and interdependent relationship 
between the neural and the intersubjective, which is consonant with the poetics of both 
Berssenbrugge and Scalapino. 
 In bringing together in one work such a broad spectrum of thinkers from various fields to 
inform the work of contemporary experimental poets, I am not claiming that the scientific and 
philosophical bodies of work that inspire my analyses of the poetry are completely compatible 
with each other in the fine points of their theories. Within the tradition of phenomenology, for 
example, there is much debate and disagreement. And there is a vast cultural and temporal 
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ive science. 
Nevertheless, in the work of the thinkers whom I cite in this work, I find a commonality of 
approach that involves what might be called a dialectics of the middle way. I hope that the 
analyses in the coming chapters elucidate some of these commonalities among the thinkers and 
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THE VOICE OF THINGS: MEI-MEI BERSSENBRUGGE’S 
AND LYN HEJINIAN’S DIALECTICS OF PHENOMENA1 
 
For our eyes are no longer the subjects of vision; they have joined the 
number of things seen.2 
  Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
Everything is subject to visibility.3 
  Lyn Hejinian 
 
A sensitive empiricism identifies with the object . . .4 
  Mei-mei Berssenbrugge  
 
 The works of Lyn Hejinian and Mei-mei Berssenbrugge investigate the nature of 
perception and of the relationship between subject and object. These contemporary experimental 
poets are vitally concerned with the objects at hand, and their poetry demonstrates an intense 
involvement with epistemological and ontological questions regarding perception and 
consciousness. Their poetry attempts not simply to describe objects from the perspective of a 
perceiving subject, but also to give utterance to the act of experience close to the roots of 
perception, with due attention to the intertwining relationship between subject and object. The 
analyses of Hejinian and Berssenbrugge that follow focus on the treatment of language and 
perception as mediators of experience, particularly the experience of a non-human object by a 
subject, while Chapter Five concentrates on intersubjective experience. The philosophical 
implications of the relationship between self and object and between self and other are by no 
means mutually exclusive, and indeed, as I will point out in Chapter Five, they share some 
important characteristics. 
 Both Berssenbrugge and Hejinian might be described as poets working in the 
phenomenological tradition, that is, they are both deeply engaged in an investigation of an 
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experiencing self in relation to the objects of its perception. Their respective projects are 
philosophically aware, and the investigations in their work are characteristically open-ended. The 
relationship that they posit between self and object is reciprocal, and does not resolve into a 
hierarchy of active perceiver versus passive perceived. In addition, their poetry is concerned with 
the objects of perception, but it does not simply name or describe objects. Nor does it engage in 
the rhetoric of philosophy, at least not in a traditionally rational way, to describe the nature of the 
act of perception.5 Instead, the poetry does something akin to an enactment of the perceptual 
movement. For example, through its semantic, thematic, and temporal disjunctiveness, the poetry 
effectively disrupts hierarchical or one-sided formations in the expression of the subject-object 
relationship. The kind of perceptual motion that I describe in their poetry is consonant with the 
dialectical perceptual motion that Maurice Merleau-Ponty made one of the fundamental projects 
of his philosophy. A close analysis of works by Berssenbrugge and Hejinian reveals a 
remarkable affinity with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological thought, particularly his notions of 
the primacy of perception, reversibility, intersubjectivity, and the “flesh of the world.” In his 
unfolding of each of these notions, he is steadily and consistently undermining traditional 
dualistic ways of polarizing categories.6 
Thus my analysis of perception in Berssenbrugge and Hejinian will engage in a sustained 
comparison with the phenomenological thought of Merleau-Ponty. This comparison is useful 
because it demonstrates the poets’ inheritance of ideas from a profoundly dialectical philosopher. 
In his critique of dulalism and his development of a phenomenological dialectics, Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledges the shared rootedness in materiality of all living and nonliving things, a 
nonhierarchical and reciprocal perceptual relationship between subject and object, and a 
receptiveness to the a rich multivalence that perception offers to us. These are all characteristics 
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of the works of Berssenbrugge and Hejinian, who explore poetically what Merleau-Ponty 
explores philosophically. Furthermore, the kind of dialectical motion in the realm of subject and 
object relationships is related to a similar kind of dialectics motion in other areas – such as 
conceptualizations of time and narrative, and of public and private realms – that I will explore in 
subsequent chapters. 
 Even a superficial reading of their work will show Berssenbrugge and Hejinian to be 
poets following very different stylistic paths. Berssenbrugge’s long lines, serious tone, and 
homogeneous texture contrast rather sharply with Hejinian’s ebullience, humor and disjunctive 
juxtapositions. One would never mistake one for the other. Yet in spite of their surface 
differences, they are probing similar philosophical issues, and, I would argue, come to similar 
conclusions, if that word may be used to describe a poetics that is singularly anti-conclusion. 
 Throughout her career as a poet, Berssenbrugge’s work has consistently investigated the 
nature of perception and the relationship between self and not-self. In Endocrinology, for 
example, she develops, in collaboration with the artist Kiki Smith7, the theme of the 
interrelatedness of the body and the natural environment. And in Sphericity, which was written 
before and after the birth of her daughter Martha, she was concerned with “the changes in body 
chemistry” that “so dramatically changed my language and perception, during this time.” In both 
of these works, she interweaves ideas about the body’s organs, chemistry, and functions into her 
poems, often in great detail and with scientific specificity.8 
 A section from her longer poem “Irises” in Four Year Old Girl demonstrates 
compellingly Berssenbrugge’s interest not only in naming and evoking perceived objects, but 
also in philosophically questioning of the nature of her perception of objects, and of the 
relationship between perception and cognition (see Figure 1). The continuity among the images 
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and concepts in the poem is more elliptical than linear or causal; the terms in the metonymic 
chain are more mutually determining in unpredictable ways than inevitably or formally 
structured. Despite its discontinuities, the theme of the dialectical relationship between an object 
and an idea of that object runs through this section. The actual meat of one’s winter food 
(“During winter, this had been a matter of stripping meat from the bone, to dry and freeze”) leads 
to a “dream of shadows of meat.” The sight of a “satellite dish” is followed by the “white dish” 
on which the dreamed meat-shadows lie. An imagined ghost and a real deer are both true. An 
experience lies next to the form that its communication takes, and “a wild animal automatically 
lies next to its form.” The appearance of a metaphor in the text (“like proximity to death, the way 
a wild animal automatically lies next to its form”) leads to an investigation of the relationship 
between metaphor (an imagined relationship) and such a linguistic relationship taken as real (the 
animal lying “next to its form”). These juxtapositions demonstrate the interchange between the 
material object and its idea or form, and the dialectical relationship between the two. 
Berssenbrugge also sets up a dialectical relationship between the objects and their 
representation in the human brain during the perceptual process. Material objects and their 
qualities are everywhere represented in the poem: “stripping meat from the bone, to dry and 
freeze” to provide food during cold weather, the sight of “the color of black iris along the edge of 
a satellite dish,” “a blue wall,” “lily pads” in a “pond.” This fleshy and concrete “matter” of the 
world, however, soon gives way to matters of the interior world of dreaming, feeling, thinking, 
and imagining, which are all cognitive processes (“thoughts”). Berssenbrugge represents one’s 
thoughts about objects to be as real as the objects themselves; they are effectively a “ladyslipper 
behind the eyesocket, pollen falling through interstices / of her brain cells.”9 The linguistic 
metaphor of having some object on one’s mind is a literal “occurrence” in the mind of the 
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woman of the poem: “[t]he metaphor that the eye knows a particular by internalizing its color 
and shape” is also a literal happening, and is used by the woman as a “method” and a criterion 
for determining the reality of her intentions. The link between knowledge of the world (as 
represented in the brain) and knowledge of intentions is infallibly there; our “willed” actions and 
the action of the world on our bodies are enmeshed and inextricable, since they contain one 
another. 
 Instead of projecting her own desire to know the objects of her perception onto those 
objects, Berssenbrugge expresses the motion of a dialectical interchange between object and 
thought. In other words, she understands the objects of perception not as passive and consumable 
but instead as involved in the act of perception. She enacts in her poetry the mutual 
interdependence between subject and object. The images of both “[a] gossamer, livening fabric 
tips up alluringly to points of your body” and “a blue wall had assessed the posture of the 
women” express the action of objects on bodies in anthropomorphisms that underscore the 
importance of these objects in shaping our constructions and interpretations of the world, just as 
they influence and “acknowledge,” so to speak, the very matter and posture of our bodies by 
their presence. Unlike many traditional uses of anthropomorphism and prosopopeia, 
Berssenbrugge’s do not attempt to absorb the objects into a subjectivity by attributing to them 
human shapes and intentions, projecting onto them a subject’s psycho-sexual dramas, and 
generally remaking them in our own images.10 Instead, she uses the trope to level the field of 
mutual influence and interdependence between subject and object, which are shown to shape, 
determine, and in a sense contain one another. 
 Berssenbrugge’s emphasis on embodied consciousness, on the shared materiality of self 
and not-self, and on the cognitive movement between consciousness and perceived objects is 
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closely related to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological dialectic of subject and object. One of 
Merleau-Ponty’s most significant theses is his profound and intricately dialectical sense of the 
contribution of the world in shaping our constructions of reality, his acknowledgement that “[t]he 
perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all 
existence.”11 At the heart of his philosophy is the grounding of our perception in the world that 
we perceive, and on the importance of that reality in shaping our cognitive process and neural 
matter. He brings to philosophy a sense of the embodied nature of our perception and of the 
dialectical and non-hierarchical relationship between the perceiver and the perceived. His 
acknowledgment of the active participation by objects and beings in the perception of a subject is 
a hallmark of his phenomenology and constitutes a sustained critique of scientific objectivity. 
Science, he insists, must realize “the illusion of the absolute view from above” and “enjoin a 
radical examination of our belongingness to the world.”12 
 Referring to the interpenetrating dialectic of a painter and the visible world, Merleau-
Ponty states his thesis of the “reversibility of the seeing and the visible, of the touching an the 
touched,”13 in a subject’s relation with the objects of his perception: 
 
Inevitably the roles between [the painter] and the visible are reversed. That is why 
so many painters have said that things look at them. As André Marchand says, 
after Klee: “In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at 
the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, where speaking to 
me. . . . I was there, listening. . . . I think that the painter must be penetrated by the 
universe and not want to penetrate it. . . . . I expect to be inwardly submerged, 
buried. Perhaps I paint to break out.”14 
 
And again: “[T]he vision [the seer] exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as 
many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity . . 
.”15 In such a dialectic, conventional boundaries demarcating conceptual categories of visible and 
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invisible, subject and object, sense and nonsense, are questioned to the point that the categories 
formerly assumed to be discrete or intact or possessing essential qualities instead become less 
distinctly demarcated and isolated and more interdependent. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is 
based on the notion of the shared materiality of the objects and beings of the world, as well as 
their shared perceivability, which he calls “flesh,” about which I will have more to say 
momentarily. Flesh, for Merleau-Ponty, is not the same as materiality, but is instead “the coiling 
over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is 
attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, 
such that, simultaneously, as tangible it descends among them.”16 
 Merleau-Ponty’s work (as well as the work of Berssenbrugge and Hejinian) is in stark 
contrast to Descartes’ dualistic theory of an absolute division between matter (res extensa) and 
soul or consciousness (res cogitans), “so that this ‘I,’ that is to say, the mind, by which I am what 
I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the body, and 
moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.”17 Upsetting the 
Cartesian dualities of body and soul and redefining what it is to be an animated being in the 
world, Merleau-Ponty posits a “system of exchanges,” in which “[t]here is a human body when, 
between the seeing and the seen, between touching and the touched, between one eye and the 
other, between hand and hand, a lending of some sort takes place – when the spark is lit between 
sensing and sensible . . .”18 According to Merleau-Ponty, humans are, in the fullest sense, 
implicated in the things they perceive and the things they think, for they themselves may also be 
perceived and thought. The relationship in the act of perception is not that of an active perceiver 
acting upon a passive object, but that of mutual and active participation by both seer and seen, 
toucher and touched. Perception is reciprocal, not unilateral. 
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 Merleau-Ponty developed his phenomenological dialectic in part from an argument with 
Cartesian dualism, which necessitates a rupture between subject and object, a bifurcation 
between world and consciousness.19 In this model, the perceiving self has been reduced to an 
active observer, and the perceived world has been reduced to an object of cognition. In 
philosophical terms, there has been a rupture between the realms of immanence, which refers to 
interior cognition or subjective consciousness, and transcendence, which refers to the existence 
of things apart from conscious awareness. Descartes reduces the act of perception to the realm of 
immanence, thus hypothesizing grounds for certainty in our knowledge of the world. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the primacy of perception, which is the overarching thesis 
of his work, he refuses these polarized fields of immanence and transcendence as foundations for 
a philosophical exposition. He thus refuses intellectualism, which takes the sphere of immanence 
as its ultimate ground. Intellectualism posits consciousness as the only realm where knowledge 
and meaning is possible, and claims that nothing can positively be known about reality outside 
consciousness. Equally, he refuses empiricism, which takes transcendence, or the experience of a 
reality outside consciousness, as its ultimate ground.20 In the tradition of empiricism, the two 
realms of immanence and transcendence coexist, but skepticism is the result of the 
incommensurability of the two. However, reality is always mediated by the very act of 
perception, which engenders thought, emotion, and language, and so can never be known with 
any degree of certainty. The solution to extreme skepticism requires that a middle term be 
posited between the mutually exclusive realms of the immanent and the transcendent, “between 
certainty and ignorance, between transparency and opacity.”21 For Merleau-Ponty, this middle 
term was that of “flesh,” a concept he developed in his late and unfinished work The Visible and 
the Invisible. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh is not matter, mind, or substance.22 It is rather an 
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“element,” “the concrete emblem of a general manner of being” (147), and “a connective tissue 
of exterior and interior horizons” (130). It is neither totalizing nor “fact or sum of facts” (130) 
but “the locus of an inscription of truth: the false crossed out” (130). It is the overlapping of the 
subject and object in the act of perceiving. To use a different metaphor, it represents a kind of 
perceptual dialogue between perceiver and perceived, in which no voice gets the upper hand. 
 In Berssenbrugge’s “Irises,” there is a similar interplay between subject and object that 
interrogates and confounds their distinctions. The relationship between physicality – the world 
stripped down to the bone, so to speak – and the interior, cognitive world, is continually being 
queried and reshaped, just as our interpretation of the material world is continually shifting. The 
relation between the form of that interpretation of “an experience / that needs to be 
communicated” and the experience itself cannot be described definitively by anyone. For such a 
relation is like a “wild animal,” perhaps unpredictable and very much of the world, lying “next to 
its form,” its ascribed and communicated meaning. The two are opposed yet also necessary to 
one another. Were the description possible, it might spell a divorce of the self from the not-self, 
since our relation to it would thus be defined and ossified instead of engaging in a dialectical and 
continually circulating movement. Or perhaps that divorce is also from the start a part of our 
perceptual experience, since there is very real and experiential sense in which the self is separate 
from the not-self. Yet the link between the material world and the human perception and 
interpretation of it contains both concrete and relational or formal aspects, which coexist side by 
side. There is both “wild animal” and “form”; there is both a representation of an object in our 
brain cells and a relation, impossible to describe, between that neural network and concrete 
reality, impossible to describe perhaps because impossible to distinguish so rigorously between 
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the two realms. These realms not only coexist, but also in a sense are contained within one 
another since they cannot be absolutely described in isolation from one another. 
 My semantic unfolding of the poem suggests a way of approaching the phenomenological 
issues it raises. Just as Merleau-Ponty encourages us to imagine perception as a reciprocal 
motion between subject and object, instead of as an objectifying act by a discrete subject, 
Berssenbrugge’s poetry interrogates the dualistic relationship between subject and object. She 
suggests that subject and object are at once separate in a real sense and intimately related through 
their shared “flesh of the world,” which is the overlapping perceptual motion between the two. 
Experience for Berssenbrugge is a blurring between the exterior objects and the interior 
representation of those objects in which “the eye knows a particular by internalizing its color and 
shape” and “objects . . . exist in the same size / as their image in her mind, ladyslipper behind the 
eyesocket, pollen falling through interstices / of her brain cells.” 
My analyses of Berssenbrugge’s work should also dispel any notion that its primary 
focus or aesthetic value resides in the very elusiveness and undecidability of its surface, as critics 
of language poetry sometimes claim of works written under the sign of this broad movement. 
Certainly, the poem as a whole does not resolve into a clear description of a scene or landscape 
or a linear narrative consisting of a causal chain of events. Yet there is a philosophical and 
continually circulating (that is to say, elusive and ultimately undecided) query taking place that 
suggests depth beneath a surface blurred with disjunctions. The poem has both surface and depth, 
and its meaning is both determinate and indeterminate. These qualities do not suggest a 
hierarchical order or dualistic relation between them. To claim that Berssenbrugge is mainly 
interested in semantic slippage would be to miss an equally crucial aspect of her poetics of 
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perception, which seems more related to the phenomenological thought of Merleau-Ponty than to 
the deconstructive decentering of Jacques Derrida. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical foundationalism responds to the dualism implicit in both 
Cartesian skepticism and the ensuing British empiricism, and, avant la lettre, to deconstructive 
theory, which places greater emphasis on the circulation of signs in a cognitively constructed 
reality, to the detriment of the material reality that contributes to the shaping of that cognition. 
David Abrams, an ecological thinker in the phenomenological tradition, encourages a balance to 
“all those admittedly shaky foundations” that deconstructive analysis exposes, by acknowledging 
the materiality of “the actual ground that we stand on, the earthly ground of rock and soil that we 
share with the other animals and the plants.” He recommends that we “keep our thoughts and our 
theories close to this nonarbitrary ground that already supports all our cogitations.”23 Abrams’ 
suggests that the phenomenological tradition can contribute useful correctives to some of the 
extremes of deconstructive theory by emphasizing a less reductive approach to human cognition. 
In going into some detail regarding Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in this chapter, I do not 
mean to suggest that his phenomenology, or even the phenomenological tradition in general, is 
the only way to approach the philosophical problems in subject-object relations with which some 
contemporary experimental poets are grappling. However, in his philosophy exist useful tools for 
discussing ways in which these poets are challenging dualistic notions of being in and perceiving 
the world. In the poetry under consideration here, the poets are attempting to blur the boundaries, 
still culturally strong in the Western ontological and epistemological zeitgeist, between subject 
and object, and to complicate and render more dialectical the reductivist division between self 
and world, and between self and other. Numerous critics have pointed out the influence of 
deconstruction and, more generally, French poststructuralist thought on contemporary 
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experimental poetry. However, deconstructive analysis alone is inadequate for dealing with ways 
that these poets posit of merging with the world without necessitating the objectification or 
subsumption of the one by the other; with ways of humans’ being in and of the world that do not 
necessitate an irreparable alienation from the world and from our own bodies; and with ways of 
healing dualist constructions through a reconceptualization of the notion of the perceiving the 
self’s fundamentally mediated condition. There is a risk in such analysis of being reductively 
constructivist, and Derrida’s justly famous attacks on dualisms sometimes appear to be harboring 
survivals of the very metaphysical structure he sets out to overturn. 
Abrams suggests an approach that is the reverse of Derrida’s “assimilat[ion of] all 
language to writing (l’écriture)” in order to demonstrate instead “that all discourse, even written 
discourse such as this, is implicitly sensorial and bodily, and hence remains bound, like the 
sensing body, to a world that is never exclusively human.”24 Abrams, like Merleau-Ponty before 
him, is correct to emphasize that we must not forget the ever-present contribution of material 
reality in shaping those aspects of existence that seem most remote from it, such as many 
linguistic and cognitive functions. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology argues against a correspondence theory of reality, in 
which one’s beliefs about the world are held to be true if they correspond to some essence or 
quality in the external reality. It allows a complex and ambiguous notion of phenomena, which 
Merleau-Ponty calls an openness upon the world (ouverture au monde). This perceptual 
openness, which characterizes the relation between cognition and its object, “contains neither the 
whole nor even the essential of our commerce with the world.” If we are to remain open to the 
richness of perception, we must “situate that relation back within a more muted relationship with 
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the world,” and suspend any illusion of completion or precision in our interactions with it.25 To 
understand the world is not to attempt to capture it descriptively by translating it into signs, for 
 
[t]o reduce perception to the thought of perceiving, under the pretext that 
immanence alone is sure, is to take out an insurance against doubt whose 
premiums are more onerous than the loss for which it is to indemnify us: for it is 
to forego comprehending the effective world and move to a type of certitude that 
will never restore to us the “there is” of the world.26  
 
The ultimate illusion is to reduce the world to immanence, to an ideality that presupposes that 
“reflection is only that perception returning to itself.”27 Instead, Merleau-Ponty’s 
 
thesis of the primacy of perception invites us to attend to the phenomenon as it 
appears in its richness and multi-determinability, that is, as lending itself to 
subsumption under a plurality of categories and to placement within a plurality of 
practical horizons and theoretical contexts. It is this richness of meaning that 
underlies Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the intrinsic ambiguity of phenomena . . .28 
 
Merleau-Ponty posits “a ground where immanence and transcendence intersect: that is, in the 
phenomena manifesting themselves in the perceptual field.”29 In this dialectical relationship 
between immanence and transcendence, the knower is not strictly separated from what is known, 
and the object of knowledge does not exist strictly for perceptual consumption. 
 Berssenbrugge’s “Experience,”30 included in her collection Sphericity, is in seven short 
sections (see Figure 2). An analysis of the first three sections of the poem demonstrates a poetic 
realization of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about the permeability of subject and object. Berssenbrugge 
often uses philosophical language, yet deliberately avoids rigorous or logical analysis. Instead, 
her philosophical queries move flowingly, effectually interrogating boundaries between self and 
other, perceiver and perceived, and active and passive perceptual positions. 
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 “Experience” opens with an exploration of difference and similarity as conceptual 
categories or “illusions”: 
 
The idea of illusion suggests that existences in different worlds, herself at 
different 
stages, or moving from one metaphor to another, can compare. She is trying to tell 
you 
the moon’s color in eclipse, because she cannot reproduce a light in her memory 
with a pigment 
that is made, like a word, though seeing the moon enables a person to make 
inaccurate color. 
Think, if experience in her is time, because she gets to a state of being by 
experience, first. 
Experience is an interval in the body, but it also accompanies remembering. 
 
The categorization into groups of similar and different objects or ideas is a cognitive function 
that enables us effectively to function in the world. Categorizations are illusions because they are 
constructed, that is, they don’t exist outside human cognition; they don’t correspond with 
categories inherent in the world-in-itself. Thought accommodates the comparability between 
“existences in different worlds,” and allows us to imagine consistency in the self (a sameness in 
“herself at different stages”) and stability of meaning in linguistic constructions (a fundamental 
kinship among the representation elements that constitute a language, despite “moving from one 
metaphor to another”). Berssenbrugge thus acknowledges a fundamental rift between mental 
constructs and a transcendent or objective reality outside human cognition. However, far from 
expressing an inveterate skepticism in the knowledge of this rupture, she questions the dualism 
concomitant with a staunch empiricism. On the one hand, the woman in the poem “cannot 
reproduce a light in her memory with a pigment / that is made, like a word.” There is ultimately 
not a direct and exact correspondence between the color that is constructed, like language, in her 
brain, and any actual light waves. After all, as cognitive science would be quick to point out, 
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color does not reside inherently in the world, but is the result of conditions both in the world (the 
nature of the source of light and the wavelengths of the light as it is reflected on an object) and in 
our optical and neural processing of those conditions (the color cones in our eyes, and the 
extremely complex processing of this data in our interconnected neural networks).31 The 
practical functionality that our cognitive constructs enable tend to obscure the fact that 
perception and memory (both experiences) enable inaccuracy. Remembering is itself an 
experience, and as such is a unique event, not a simple reproduction of a perception, such as 
seeing the color of the moon. Berssenbrugge chooses an object with a subtle range of colors to 
suggest that the colors of the moon are among those analogous but never identical “existences in 
different worlds.” On the other hand, it is the object of perception that enables the production of 
color (or any other perceived quality such as shape, motion, sound timbre, texture, etc.), however 
illusory it is to think of that perception as an accurate reproduction of an objective reality. 
 For Berssenbrugge, as for Merleau-Ponty, it is not a philosophical error to acknowledge 
the partiality, ambiguity, inaccuracy, constructedness, and illusory nature of perceptions. It is, 
however, an error to hold to an abstract model of a transcendent, objective reality that irons out 
differences that accompany the spatial and temporal incompleteness of subjectivity, just as it is 
an error to believe in the absolute unknowability of the world outside a self-enclosed subjectivity 
that has no interdependent relationship with anything outside subjective experience and linguistic 
constructs. Both ways of conceiving of our being in the world are abstractions that have little to 
do with lived, everyday experience of functioning in the world. They acknowledge neither the 
groundedness of our perception through the contribution and participation of the object of 
perception, nor the fact that the god-like objective realm that contains the totality of all 
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perspectives and temporalities is a god-like, or scientifically unifying, construct of our 
mentation. 
 In the second section of “Experience,” the experiencing subject finds correspondences of 
the phenomena within herself: 
 
Low sun from behind you on asters, chamisa. You find a space as wide as if time 
fell outside 
the stimulus of that glow, and her memory of it became space in her. Her body 
and will coordinate, 
like the relation of experience to seeing and experience to feeling the moon, 
which has no size. 
Actual size of its color in her body assesses the vicissitudes of an aspiration 
created by seeing, 
so in this case, actual size became a piece of size in her. 
 
She experiences bodily manifestations of experienced phenomena: the “stimulus” of the reflected 
light from a sun near the horizon glowing on some flowers creates the sensation of a space as 
immeasurable as timelessness. It is “as if time fell outside” of the stimulus so that she 
experiences no sense of the hierarchical divisions of past, present, and future. It is as if the 
boundaries of space and time have fallen away, and thus also the boundaries between perceiver 
and perceived have also blurred so that the subject experiences a boundless or oceanic feeling. 
She incorporates the experience within her body, so that the experience, as well as the memory, 
of the stimulus, “became space in her.” The feeling of boundlessness can be usefully related to 
Merleau-Ponty’s positing of “a primordial realm which subtends the polarized categories of 
subjectivity and objectivity.”32 This realm is the communal space in which subject and object, as 
well as subject and subject, are contained within one another, so that “actual size became a piece 
of size in her.” 
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 Instead of giving primacy to the subject’s “will” and “aspiration[s],” which might 
normally be thought of as assessing and otherwise acting on experience, Berssenbrugge 
questions such primacy. One’s “aspiration” is “created by seeing”; one’s cognitive processes are 
thoroughly enmeshed in perception, so that thought is understood to arise from the bodily 
experience of phenomena. Thus consciousness is grounded in the body. Yet this grounded 
consciousness also creates categories with which we conceptualize our being in the world: the 
idea of “will” and “aspiration,” for example. These terms may cause us to believe that there is a 
division between body and mentation. Berssenbrugge reverses the usual order of human 
cognition acting on experience. Instead of a subject willfully assessing experience, the 
internalized phenomena of the “[a]ctual size of [the moon’s] color33 in her body assesses the 
vicissitudes of an aspiration created by seeing.” In other words, for Berssenbrugge as for 
Merleau-Ponty, experience is primary: it is the active ground from which emerges all that then 
emerges in one’s embodied consciousness, including notions of Cartesian dualities, of unified 
subjectivities, and so forth,34 for “[a]ll consciousness is perceptual, even the consciousness of 
ourselves.”35  
 In the third stanza, Berssenbrugge addresses the question of agency in the event of 
perception: 
 
You look on the plain from a bluff with him, and a point of juniper grows dark 
and dense 
of scattered ones, a piece of sieved material on your side of a membrane of noon 
light. 
Seeing the object locates it like a cause in your body, for noticing a faint green 
around it 
as an underground stream. Seeing what had been invisible is a response to the 
object. 
His presence, a cause or weight in nature, does not enter experience, but 
accompanies it, 
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as experience had accompanied her memory of her, her features in her relative’s 
face. 
 
A perceived thing is not a passive object of a subject’s observation. Instead, an object is “a cause 
in your body,” a motivating factor in the act of perception. For Berssenbrugge, subject and object 
cannot exist as distinct categories on either side of the equation of the act of perception. Both 
perceiver and perceived are implicated in the act of perception. The perceiver is not simply the 
agent gathering sensory data from a disengaged and passive object, but because of the body’s 
“openness upon the world” and the intertwining of the object and subject in the act of perception, 
the world “thinks itself” within me.36 Further, the object of perception (“[h]is presence”) “does 
not enter experience, but accompanies it, / as experience had accompanied her memory of her, 
her features in her relative’s face.” The relation between subject and object is not that of one 
acting on another, or even simply of one entering the other. In the event of perception, the field 
of agency is leveled, so that subject and object accompany one another, as opposed to the one 
acting on the other. Similarly, “experience had accompanied her memory of her, her features in 
her relative’s face.” Perception does not enter her memory, but accompanies it. The relationship 
between subject and object, as between experience and memory, is thus reciprocal rather than 
hierarchical, mutually involving rather than unilaterally involved: “My body as a visible thing is 
contained within the full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the 
visibles with it. There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other.” As for 
Merleau-Ponty, vision involves “[a] participation in and kinship with the visible,”37 so 
Berssenbrugge’s image of seeing one’s features in the face of a relative is an apt analogy for the 
relationship between subject and object, and between experience and memory. Two related 
persons may be recognized simultaneously as separate beings yet also connected by virtue of 
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their common genetic matter. One sees one’s own features in the face of a relative the way that 
when one touches an object, one might feel the awakening of the object within oneself. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s formulation cited above, one might feel that the object is thinking itself within 
one. 
 Living within such an ontologically communal perspective, it is possible for one to feel 
more related to the world than if one held to a more dualistically structured perspective. It is no 
coincidence that Merleau-Ponty is one of the most important philosophical thinkers in the 
contemporary ecological movement, since his radical revision of Husserl’s idealism overturns 
dualistic positions that fail to challenge the separation of the human from the natural and the 
domination of nature by humans.38 It is also not a coincidence that Berssenbrugge, whose poetics 
parallels Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy in many ways, might be considered one 
of the most important nature poets of our time. She achieves this not through detailed or 
sentimentalized descriptions of natural phenomena, but by investigating a person’s attitude 
toward his or her relationship to objects, often of the natural world, at the level of perception. 
This basic philosophical stance is the ground upon which one’s feelings of kinship with, or 
alienation from, the not-self is founded. In her “response to the object,” she attempts to “[see] 
what had been invisible,” in other words, the invisible link, or in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the 
flesh of the world, that indicates a “general manner of being,” “the coiling over of the visible 
upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body.”39 
 The self-described “phenomenological” and “anti-transcendent” poetry of Hejinian also 
addresses – arguably with more philosophical directness, and certainly with more of a sense of 
humor – the question of the perceptual relation between subject and object. Hejinian, one of the 
founding practitioners of language poetry, opened a recent talk on the influence of avant-garde 
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modernism on her poetry and poetics by claiming that her “writings are those of an empiricist in 
the tradition of Gertrude Stein.” In this talk, Hejinian claims Stein as both a progenitor of her 
own disjunctive poetic practices and a precursor whose work has “provided me with a 
demonstration of the fundamentally phenomenological and thereby mobile character of 
perceptual articulable reality.”40 The Stein that Hejinian emphasizes here is a poet not only of the 
disruption of semantic and cognitive habits, but also of solid, quotidian reality, a poet grounded 
in the sociability and realism of the nineteenth-century novel. For Hejinian, this articulation of 
what she calls the “routine” occurs in Stein’s earlier The Making of Americans, and also pervades 
the sensibility of such a difficult later work of jagged perception and cognition as Tender 
Buttons. Despite its famously disjunctive semantic and syntactic texture, the latter work 
nonetheless names ordinary objects and (arguably) describes them, however elliptically and 
cabalistically. The main divisions of Tender Buttons testify to the importance of the realms of 
everyday existence: “Objects,” “Food,” and “Rooms.” The titles of many of Stein’s prose poems 
(for example, “Mildred’s Umbrella,” “Seltzer Bottle,” and “A Blue Coat”) also point to her 
concern for the everyday object.41 Hejinian’s Stein “is about the social milieu, the ordinary 
things around her in her life. . . . It’s a domestic social life, even an eccentric, idiosyncratic and 
personal one, but nonetheless, it’s social life.” The presence of objects occurs not simply in a 
condition of static being, but in movement, and the objects’ coming-into-being is an event that 
involves reciprocity between perceiver and perceived. 
Like Stein, Hejinian says, she sees “appearances. I am attracted to and engaged with what 
moves, what comes into view. Things have presence because they occur in and as motion. They 
exist by virtue of motions in and as character. And our role among them is participatory, shared, 
in and as.” For Hejinian, writing the quotidian expresses its active and continuous “motion of 
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appearance,” as well as its irregular and digressive process.42 She does not consciously exclude 
digressive elements or meandering thoughts in order to shape coherently delineated frames of 
experience; her poems are not structured as frozen frames of images, scenes or persons, or 
detailed description of the quotidian as if it were a still life captured on paper. Instead, she 
embraces and follows the wandering progress of perception and consciousness. Hejinian’s 
writing of the quotidian is political, since it concerns itself not only with the nature of individual 
perception but also with the social interactions and formations that grow from an 
acknowledgement of one’s continual and participatory coming-into-being in the world and 
among others. 
 Hejinian’s affirmation of the phenomenological aspect of her Steinian poetic lineage and 
philosophy is an important admission. It responds to critics who sympthize with the project of 
avant-garde poetics, and who tend to concentrate almost exclusively on the importance of the 
freeplay of the signifier to language-centered poetry. Such criticism, which often prizes such 
freeplay for its own sake, constitutes a lopsided response to the poetry it values if it 
overemphasizes semantic slippage to the detriment of the groundedness of experience and 
language in material reality. While it is true that some poetry emphasizes formally disjunctive 
processes more than others,43 it is simply not possible for a linguistic construction to be 
completely free of any relation to embodied experience. As studies in the cognitive sciences 
demonstrate, cognitive functions – including semantic, linguistic, conceptual, and logical 
processes, and even the most abstract reasoning – arise from our sensory and motor interactions 
with the world. In other words, “the mind is inherently embodied,”44 and it is impossible to 
interpret symbols in an experiential vacuum. 
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 Hejinian’s statement also answers poets and critics who are unsympathetic to 
experimental poetry, and who use similarly one-sided claims to formulate an offensive against its 
apparent fetishizing of language and apotheosis of indeterminate meaning. Such cases by both 
apologists and detractors of language poetry tend to present an essentialist conception of the 
poet’s relation to materiality and to perception. It is in juxtaposition with the views from two 
very different camps making similar claims, that Hejinian’s statement might seem startling. 
Hejinian’s proclamation of her philosophical and poetic lineage, acknowledging equally the 
disjunctive (decentered) and referential (centered) aspects of Stein’s influence, as well as the 
interdependence of these realms, has important implications for a dialectical analysis of her 
poetry. 
Speaking of the influence of Stein on her continually evolving autobiographical poem My 
Life45, she could just as aptly be referring to her poetry in general when she claims that the work 
is 
 
about the quotidian, and though ostensibly autobiographical, and built from 
materials accumulated in the imagination, it is in fact a work exclusively of the 
present. The quotidian, by definition, exists nowhere else. Invisible, but essential 
to the jagged progression of phrases, it’s a primarily perceptual movement among 
three equally and reciprocally active elements: the perceiver, the perceived, and 
language.46 
 
In Hejinian’s phenomenology, the primary characteristic of the reciprocity among subject, 
object, and language is motion. The motion does not trace a trajectory of teleological progress 
with some kind of closure as a goal. Instead, Hejinian is concerned with 
 
the fundamentally phenomenological and thereby mobile character of perceptual 
articulable reality. The entirety of what’s available to the senses is 
phenomenological in character. Everything that is happening is happening 
phenomenologically, as something appearing, that we appear to experience, 
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something that we sense coming to be sensed. This by its nature involves motion. 
Something’s happening, something’s taking place, something’s taking time.47  
 
The process of this experience is a continual arrival of appearances to the senses. She is 
“attracted to and engaged with what moves, what comes into view. Things have presence 
because they occur in and as motion. They exist by virtue of motions in and as character. And 
our role among them is participatory, shared, in and as.” What matters for her is not only the 
reciprocal and participatory nature of the relation between self and not-self, or subject and object, 
but the continually becoming present of perception and consciousness. This process is, for 
Hejinian, “what is known as the routine,” the quotidian acts of being and doing. “How and why 
things matter, how they materialize, how they appear, is contingent but intrinsic. The motion of 
appearance is active, ongoing.”48 For Hejinian, this motion involves a dynamic and nonresolving 
reciprocality in the act of perception. 
 One of the most distinctive features of Hejinian’s poetry is the continual testing of the 
boundaries between inner and outer realities. Many examples of such testing can be found in her 
long poem “The Person,” which consists of twenty-eight sections, each subtitled “The Person.”49 
In her investigation of how one comes to know and represent reality, she imports characteristics 
normally associated with one realm, say, that of the perceived object, into that of consciousness, 
and transfers aspects from the category of objective reality to that of subjectivity. Here are 
examples of such transferences in separate lines excerpted from the first few pages of “The 
Person”: 
 
I am having the sensation of description 
. . . . . 
Physical reality consists of sympathetic units 
. . . . . 
I heard the sounds of the many stones outside pronoun 
 67 
. . . . . 
The internal objects stand 
. . . . . 
You may pull the strings 
of your many nerve-surroundings50 
 
The results of this borrowing and lending between traditional dualities are often startling, and 
they raise serious philosophical ontological and epistemological issues. For example, in the first 
excerpt above (“I am having the sensation of description”), Hejinian begs the question of how 
one can have the sensation of something (“description”) generated internally. It is as if one’s 
cognitive process has been turned into an object of perception. 
 In the second excerpt (“Physical reality consists of sympathetic units”), “[p]hysical 
reality” is given the characteristic of the emotional response of sympathy. Above, I quoted 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of painters feeling that they are being observed by the things they 
paint. Hejinian echoes this idea in her statement of emotional solidarity in the world. With 
tongue-in-cheek humor, the statement is couched in the objective scientific language of “units” 
of sympathy. As in the case of Berssenbrugge, Hejinian’s anthropomorphic attribution is not the 
result of a subsuming or totalizing consciousness, but is rather an attempt to question the 
traditional dualistic boundaries between subject and object by imagining an emotional nexus 
among the objects and beings of the world. Later in “The Person,” Hejinian gives an example of 
a somewhat grandiose and exaggerated anthropomorphism in the style of a nineteenth-century 
novel: “The personification in branches gesturing from the desperate trees.” More specifically, 
this kind of personification is what John Ruskin disparagingly called a pathetic fallacy, in which 
human emotions are projected onto the non-human world. Hejinian acknowledges the trope as a 
literary device in which the subject attributes his or her own feelings of agitation onto trees that 
willfully gesture in desperation. By highlighting the literary convention, Hejinian thus 
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distinguishes this kind of articulated relationship between subject and object from that which is 
evident in her own work. The pathetic fallacy (and its long literary lineage that dates to pastoral 
conventions) is based on the imposition of human characteristics onto objects without a 
consideration of their own unique existence, nature, and function in the world. Thus it relies on a 
hierarchical relationship between subject and object. As I will demonstrate, Hejinian’s 
epistemological literary project questions the dualistic relationship between subject and object by 
positing a relation of mutual and sympathetic participation among the things of the world. 
 In the third excerpt (“I heard the sounds of the many stones outside pronoun”), the 
subject’s act of perceiving the sounds made by objects (“stones”) outside a grammatical unit 
(“pronoun”) again questions conventional language-perception-object circumscriptions. In a 
subtle acknowledgement of the otherness of reality external to the subject, Hejinian states that 
the sounds from the “many stones” originate external to a linguistic construction. This statement 
recalls Merleau-Ponty’s thesis regarding the importance of external reality in shaping 
subjectivity (including a subject’s use of pronouns). 
 And in the fourth excerpt (“The internal objects stand,”) “[i]nternal objects stand” as if 
they were physical units outside the self, which is not a sovereign subject but instead consists of 
multiple objects. Thus the status of objects internal and external to the self are confounded. 
Hejinian also suggests a pun on “stand.” The objects that are internalized and interpreted through 
perceptual processes “stand,” that is, they stand up as objects in their own right, since they are 
cognitive creations. They also stand for, in the sense of representing, the objects perceived. 
 Lastly, consider the rather comical image of the fifth excerpt (“You may pull the strings / 
of your many nerve-surroundings”). One is “pull[ing] the strings” of one’s nerves, which are 
“nerve-surroundings” instead of “nerve-endings.” It is as if these strands of neurons existed 
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outside the body, like strings attached to a marionette that one might pull to achieve motion and 
manipulate objects. 
 In many of the images in “The Person,” not only are the boundaries among language, 
subject and object transgressed, but also those between mind and body. In this schema of 
consciousness and body, “[s]incerity is an intestinal part”51; a mental attitude is linked with the 
viscera, the body’s least likely candidate for collusion with states of consciousness. Yet the 
oddness of this juxtaposition seems less so in the context of persuasive evidence from 
neuroscience regarding the contributions of the entire body in shaping cognitive processes. 
Increasingly, studies in cognitive science are blurring dualistic delineations between body and 
mind and demonstrating the interconnectedness and interdependencies among the parts of the 
whole body.52 
 The “jagged progression of phrases” that is one of the characteristic features of 
Hejinian’s work arises in part from the “perceptual movement” that transgresses boundaries 
“among three equally and reciprocally active elements: the perceiver, the perceived, and 
language.” This jaggedness of perceptual movement, far from being a philosophically or 
phenomenologically exceptional occurrence, is for Hejinian the hallmark of the quotidian: it 
occurs naturally and constantly in daily living. The “portrait” of the person that emerges from 
this poem is not self-contained or isolated from its surroundings or from its own body. Thus the 
comically absurd opening of the poem, “Let’s get isolated” (perhaps an ironic revision of the 
popular 1981 song “Physical,” whose lyrics include injunctions such as “Let’s get physical” and 
“Let’s get animal”) is everywhere contradicted by the blurring of bounds. And yet, as she also 
says later in the poem, “[i]n discontinuity, distinction.”53 However, that distinction is one of an 
increasingly complex version of the self and subjectivity, not one of increasing isolation. 
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 Hejinian’s poetry encourages a revision of the conventional model of perception, which 
takes for granted an active subject perceiving a passive object. It invites the reader to understand 
the act of perception not as a spectator consuming an object through the senses, but instead as an 
“active and dialogic” reciprocity that involves both subject and object in the act of a creative and 
generative perception.54 The portraits of viewer and viewed that emerge from the poem are 
multi-dimensional; the identities of subject and object are ambiguous and multi-layered. Thus the 
act of perception, which is the act of knowing and also of representing, involves the interacting 
of multiple perspectives that produces neither absolute certainty nor utter chaos, but a richness of 
signification that partakes in a dialectically impure mixture of both. This cognitive movement 
acknowledges the intermingling of elements from the two competing sides of a dualism. It 
accepts the opacity and transcendence of the material world, which motivates sensations that can 
thus never be considered certain or complete or absolutely truthful. It accepts equally the idea 
that the semantic product of sensations are a part of the structure of those perceptions, and so 
perception is acknowledged to have some degree of transparence, and the object is 
acknowledged to have some degree of immanence.55 Thus, as Martin C. Dillon explains, there is 
“an affinity between thought and its object: [one’s] cognitive posture with regard to the objects 
of experience can thus never be one of total ignorance or of complete obscurity and utter 
confusion.”56 Absolute certainty can never be guaranteed, just as absolute divorce from certainty 
cannot be justified. 
 Before moving on to a reading of a poem by Hejinian that embraces many of the 
phenomenological ideas, it may be helpful to delve deeper into the relationship between the 
subject and object dialectics I have been describing and signification through language, since this 
relationship is consistently of great importance to Hejinian. Although Merleau-Ponty does not 
 71 
use psychoanalytic terminology to describe his phenomenology of perception, he does refer to a 
“prelogical bond” of the self with the world, which describes our perceptual link with material 
reality that does not presume a controlling relationship with it, but rather one that is mutual, 
reciprocal, and non-hierarchical. Such a bond would seem to tap into a cognitive function or 
place that recovers the (pre-Oedipal) state of being prior to the linguistic accretion of 
symbolizations. Instead of articulating the world through given formulations, we must, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, seek a perceptual reciprocity with objects that allows them to speak, in their 
silence, through us, their coming-into-being. If our thought about the world is not to make undue 
and controlling presumptions regarding the nature and descriptions of the objects of perception, 
it 
 
must seek in the world itself the secret of our perceptual bond with it. It must use 
words not according to their pre-established signification, but in order to state this 
prelogical bond. It must plunge into the world instead of surveying it, it must 
descend toward it such as it is instead of working its way back up toward a prior 
possibility of thinking it – which would impose upon the world in advance the 
conditions for our control over it. It must question the world, it must enter into the 
forest of references that our interrogation arouses in it, it must make it say, finally, 
what in its silence it means to say.57  
 
This is not to say that objects will dictate their own translation into language, but to acknowledge 
the dialectical nature of experience, and the significance of the role that objects play in our 
representations of them in perception and in language. Following Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the 
semantic infinity that subtends the phenomenal world, it is to allow the voice of things to be 
heard, to restore “a wild meaning, an expression of experience by experience”58 in our speech. 
But reflection on the mediation of language is not, for Merleau-Ponty, the occasion for positing 
absolute disconnection between referent and signified. Language is not the flip side of an 
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absolute correspondence between thing and word, “not simply the contrary of the truth, of 
coincidence”; one must believe 
 
that there is or could be a language of coincidence, a manner of making the things 
themselves speak – and this is what [the philosopher] seeks. It would be a 
language of which he would not be the organizer, words he would not assemble, 
that would combine through him by virtue of a natural intertwining of their 
meaning, through the occult trading of the metaphor – where what counts is no 
longer the manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the lateral 
relations, the kinships that are implicated in their transfers and their exchanges. . . 
. But we have to recognize the consequence: if language is not necessarily 
deceptive, truth is not coincidence, nor mute.59  
 
Such a dialectical breakdown of categories speaks to the disintegration of the hierarchical duality 
that has reigned in the objective modes of scientific thought. For Merleau-Ponty, this breakdown 
and radical dialectic takes the metaphorical shape of the chiasm, which is a reference to the 
crisscrossing of the optic nerves. The failure of objectivist modes is “to be understood not as a 
victory of the ‘interior’ over the ‘exterior’ and of the ‘mental’ over the ‘material,’ but as a call 
for the revision of our ontology, for the re-examination of the notions of ‘subject’ and 
‘object.’”60 
 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their groundbreaking critique of dualistic thought 
Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, similarly 
reject an either-or proposition in formations of subjectivity and objectivity. Their philosophical 
revision is based on findings of cognitive science, namely the embodiment of the mind, the 
largely unconscious nature of the mind, and the largely metaphorical origins of 
conceptualizations and categorizations.61 Their theory of “embodied realism” rejects “the 
Cartesian view that reason is transcendental, universal, disembodied, and literal,”62 and instead 
makes use of the evidence of “a strong dependence of concepts and reason upon the body,” and 
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“the centrality to conceptualization and reason of imaginative processes, especially metaphor, 
imagery, metonymy, prototypes, frames, mental spaces, and radial categories.”63 These revisions 
of Cartesian and analytic philosophical traditions, based on current knowledge in cognitive 
science, relate to the question of the relation between subject and object. It is worthwhile to 
present the extended quote below for its consonance with the emphasis on embodied cognition 
and the interrogation of traditional subject-object dualism in Merleau-Ponty as well as in the 
work of Berssenbrugge and Hejinian: 
 
 Embodied realism can work for science in part because it rejects a strict 
subject-object dichotomy. Disembodied scientific realism creates an unbridgeable 
ontological chasm between “objects,” which are “out there,” and subjectivity, 
which is “in here.” Once the separation is made, there are then only two possible, 
and equally erroneous, conceptions of objectivity: Objectivity is either given by 
the “things themselves” (the objects) or by the intersubjective structures of 
consciousness shared by all people (the subjects). 
 The first is erroneous because the subject-object split is a mistake; there 
are no objects-with-descriptions-and-categorizations existing in themselves. The 
second is erroneous because mere intersubjectivity, if it is nothing more than 
social or communal agreement, leaves out our contact with the world. The 
alternative we propose, embodied realism, relies on the fact that we are coupled to 
the world through our embodied interactions. Our directly embodied concepts 
(e.g., basic-level concepts, aspectual concepts, and spatial-relations concepts) can 
reliably fit those embodied interactions and the understandings of the world that 
arise from them. 
 The problem with classical disembodied scientific realism is that it takes 
two intertwined and inseparable dimensions of all experience – the awareness of 
the experiencing organism and the stable entities and structures it encounters – 
and erects them as separate and distinct entities called subjects and objects. What 
disembodied realism (what is sometimes called “metaphysical” or “external 
realism”) misses is that, as embodied, imaginative creatures, we never were 
separated or divorced from reality in the first place. What has always made 
science possible is our embodiment, not our transcendence of it, and our 
imagination, not our avoidance of it.64 
 
Subject-object dualism thus necessitates adherence to the equally untenable constructions of 
objective reality. In one, the assumption is made that our categorizations exist “out there,” 
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embedded in perceived entities, which then take on the essential qualities projected onto them. In 
the other, intersubjective commonalities and relations assume the aura of transcendental truth, 
leaving out the bond between subjects and physical reality, and ignoring their shared materiality. 
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of embodied realism suggests a fluid dialectical relationship 
between subject and object, between intersubjective relations and embodied mental processes. 
Merleau-Ponty’s revision of dualism also calls for a dialectic of the terms of subject and object, 
and sense and nonsense, whose relation can encompass and even unite logically contradictory 
perspectives. Further, each relation “leads to its opposite or to its own reversal, and does so by its 
own movement.”65 
 Like Merleau-Ponty, Hejinian shows the relation between subjectivity and objectivity in a 
paradoxical light, as the coexistence of contradictory realms. The necessary cohabitation of 
opposite realms is apparent in “The Flying Statues,” an eleven-page poem written over a three-
week period in 1978. On a first reading, a reader might feel puzzled by the elliptical language 
and the seeming randomness of images and thoughts. However, with increased familiarity with 
the poem comes the growing awareness that Hejinian is very much concerned with perception 
and with both the possibility and the impossibility of representation. A note following the poem 
indicates that it was written during travels through North America and Europe. Hejinian probably 
wrote the poem or took notes for it while traveling by train, considering references to rumbling, 
clattering, speed, motion, tracks (and being “on track”), and a quote from Edgar Degas stating 
his preference for riding in trains over cabs, perhaps the most coherent, or at least conversational, 
lines in the poem: 
 
“. . . I love to ride 
on the train 
you can look 
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at the people 
we were created to look at 
one another – weren’t we?” 
 
The poem as a whole also gives a sense of frequent shifts in terrain and location, and the imagery 
is reminiscent of the flow of impressions from the window of a train. It is not that the imagery is 
simply descriptive of objects on the other side of the window – aside from a few references to 
rocks, trees, the terrain, “dun cows,” and the window itself, the writing doesn’t try to describe 
objects; it rather traces mental movements, a stream of digressive thoughts perhaps triggered by 
passing images seen by the passenger or otherwise experienced during travels. 
 The opening of “The Flying Statue” suggests several modes of thought, including 
separation, ambiguity, and contradictory states. These modes imply a complex and perhaps 
paradoxical interaction between self and not-self: 
 
limb on limb 
things often change 
fingering 
from the lights of night 
between rocks 
and the commoner trees 
around blocks bulge 
as interest rumbles 
undelivered in its versatility 
the place, its verticality 
and foreground clapping – 
a knife moves the thinker 
of information – 
and information speaks 
of visibility – little trees 
on which glass glows 
pass as I pass 
as can’t be said of clay 
the windows separate 
metamorphoses from discontinuity 
and half heads at a pool 
spitting self-portraiture 
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at assimilation – everything 
– I can’t assimilate it 
in an hour at awful emotional speed 
without animal 
 
The repetition of “limb” in the first line introduces ambiguity – the word can signify either the 
projecting flesh of one’s body or the projecting branch of a tree; one is “on” the other. Or the 
limbs might both be human or both of a tree. But which is which? Are the limbs one or the other, 
or are they both? The line doesn’t decide for us which kind of limb is intended, and remains an 
ambiguous construction, perhaps suggesting ambiguity between self and the object of perception. 
The next line, an offhandedly obvious observation that “things often change,” suggests the 
possibility of a transformation of some sort, perhaps merely a reference to the changing view 
from one’s window, or the frequently shifting thought process of the poem. If we take it as a 
commentary on the previous line, we might take it to suggest an interchangeability between the 
limbs, an indication that the boundary between them might be indeterminate. 
 The tautological construction of “limb on limb” is echoed twice later in the poem in the 
lines “embraces / the embrace” and “the pleasure / of an enormous pleasure.” Just how does one 
embrace an embrace, or experience the pleasure of a pleasure, much less an enormous one? The 
act (“embracing”) and the sensation (“pleasure”) rebound on their own words, seemingly 
redundantly. This construction brings to the fore the words for the events, as if to emphasize 
what Robin Blaser calls a “reversal of language into experience, which is not a dialexis between 
ourselves or a discourse true only to itself, but a broken and reforming language which composes 
a ‘real.’”66 Hejinian’s oddly non-descriptive train ride is moving toward language as experience, 
and not simply language in the service of experience. 
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 Like “limb,” the word “fingering” is also semantically ambiguous. It can refer both to the 
act of touching or the act of pointing; the act of perceiving or the act of referring. Again, as in the 
first line, one doesn’t have a frame of reference to know which is which, and so perception and 
the act of referring to something are merged. 
 As the train rumbles down the tracks, the observer’s “interest rumbles” also; Hejinian 
seems to be drawing a correlation between the train’s journey through a landscape and a 
subject’s progress through a succession of perceived objects. However, this interest or perception 
is “undelivered”; although “on track” it doesn’t reach its goal, despite its versatility, despite 
being “on track.” Hejinian uses the old metaphor of the window to signify the separation of 
subject from object, perceiver from perceived: “little trees / on which glass glows”; “the 
windows separate / metamorphoses from discontinuity.”67 Glass shines, as if “on” the trees 
visible beyond the window. And windows separate change, a universal Heraclitean condition of 




with an attractive disproportion here 
like a burr 
between a person and a panorama 
 
The “burr” between self and scene (seen) is their “disproportion”; despite the vastness of what’s 
beyond the self, one can experience only a very small part of that reality, from the very limited 
spatial perspective of one’s own body. 
 And yet, as Hejinian says elsewhere, “[d]iscontinuity in my experience / to me means 
radical coverage.”68 The other side of the dialectic, enmeshed with its opposing tensions, is the 
possibility, even the radical possibility, of coverage, of speaking, of describing, albeit not in the 
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sense of a subsuming subjectivity that would claim a voice on behalf of an object. There are “no 
silent facts on track”; something does speak – the facts, or the perceiver of facts – and that 
speech is “on track” in all its discontinuity and metamorphoses. The self in the train and the 
objects experienced by that self are fellow travelers: the “little trees / . . . pass as I pass.” 
Thinking and perceiving are, in profound ways, separated from experienced reality, and yet in 
ways just as fundamental, they are also motivated by that same solid reality, for, as Hejinian 
states in “The Person,” “the objects deliver perception.”69 In the following passage from “The 
Flying Statue,” thoughts are motivated by a knife: 
 
a knife moves the thinker 
of information – 
and information speaks 
of visibility 
 
Like the subject perceiving a tree, the thinking self is moved to think by the objects of its 
perception, in this instance, a knife. And like the subject separated from the object by the 
window, the object of the thinking self (with the implied violence of the knife), separates it from 
the information (either thought or perception) that informs it; and that very information, whether 
internally or externally generated, speaks of one of the means by which it comes to be thought, 
visibility.70 These passages also demonstrate the tension in the poem between silence and 
speaking; both are conditions of our being in the world. For our reflection on the world “must 
question the world, it must enter into the forest of references that our interrogation arouses in it, 
it must make it say, finally, what in its silence it means to say.”71 
 In “The Flying Statue,” Hejinian speaks of the impossibility of an objective description 
transparently communicating some essence of an object, as if delivering goods from one station 
to another. But however present this impossibility, however fundamental the rupture between 
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perceiver and perceived, this impossibility constitutes only one side of a dialectic, and what is 
experienced contributes vitally to what comes to be represented. In one somewhat humorous 
passage, she deals explicitly with representation: 
 
I cannot draw in dome 
at all a duck in tracks 
. . . . . 
but if I had some days in room 
I could draw good ducks 
 
The first two lines are metrically regular, in iambic trimeter. The syntax seems quaintly stylized 
and contorted; instead of the syntactically more normal “I cannot draw a duck at all in a dome,” 
she delays “at all,” giving the impression of an older, formalized English prosody with its 
complex syntactical inversions. The choice of “cannot” over the contraction adds to the formal 
style of the lines. The oddness of “duck in tracks” further complicates the meaning of the 
sentence; “track” can refer to train tracks, or to the tracks the animal makes, or, more abstractly, 
to a trace or mark, or to a succession of events. 
 The second pair of lines is distinctly more conversational, and its meter follows more 
natural and irregular speech patterns. In both couplets, she leaves out the article before “dome” 
and “room”; the syntactical elision draws attention to the language used for both passages. The 
difference between these two words is crucial, for, the question is begged, why can she “draw 
good ducks” in a room, but not in a dome? A “room” is a more domestic, quotidian place than a 
“dome,” which is architecturally more formal and possibly more sublime; the word also carries 
religious or academic connotations. Representing the duck, a decidedly unsublime and 
potentially comical subject for drawing, is more possible in the everyday realm of one’s room, 
whereas in the theological or formal environs of a dome or academy, it is not “at all” possible. 
 80 
Perhaps Hejinian is implying that representation (and the belief in one’s ability to accurately and 
functionally represent) belongs to the everyday quotidian realm. In the rarefied realm of the 
dome, however, far from domestic functions and contingencies and the necessity to represent by 
language or picture, one might easily enough swing to the opposite view, that representation (and 
thus also communication) is impossible. Neither world is particularly impugned; drawing “good 
ducks” is not simply possible in one, impossible in the other. Both realms are necessary if we 
are, in the first instance, not to harbor illusions, and, in the second, to function with some 
proficiency in the social and material world. 
 The importance of humor in Hejinian’s work cannot be underestimated, for it often 
philosophically charged. In the following passage from “The Person,” she addresses the enabling 
function of comedy in the context of some primary philosophical questions regarding the self and 
the exterior world: 
 
It’s funny – 
I do love poetry 
with a certain speed of mind 
 
But funniness! 
it is a technical vibration 
which enables us to swallow 
at a single gulp 
 
under clouds of exterior reality 
It is also capable of stopping 
Do I have time for this? 
Yes, realism, yes, time; yes, paradise 
 
I can’t believe it! 
Congratulations! 
to imagine 
not being born in fear of solids72 
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Humor can both enable and prevent, a double-edged “technical vibration” with which humans 
are endowed. It carries the gift of enabling comprehension “at a single gulp”; it can give us the 
sense that, despite the possibility of human alienation “under clouds of exterior reality,” despite 
our knowledge of rupture between self and not-self, such feelings need not translate into despair 
or “fear of solids.” “[S]olids” also evokes the first hard foods of an infant; we can imagine being 
born without the fear of solids because we are also a part of that solid world, solids being what 
we ingest. 
 The two duck-drawing couplets exhibit a salient feature of Hejinian’s work: humor in the 
midst of some profound philosophical questions. If there is a message to Hejinian’s humor, it is 
that she believes we can investigate such philosophical questions fearlessly and with good 
humor, without invoking nostalgia for some originary, unified, or unmediated state of being in 
the world., that we can be a consciousness of solids living in a realm of other solids, because we 
are a part of that realm. 
 My analysis of passages from “The Flying Statue” offers possible meanings that a reader 
might construct. The syntax and words are more ambiguous and investigatory than logically 
coherent. However, even if one were to arrive at a different interpretation, I would argue that 
Hejinian demonstrates complexly intertwined, interdependent, and perhaps contradictory 
relations among subject, object, and language. This is consistent with her definition of the 
quotidian being “a primarily perceptual movement among three equally and reciprocally active 
elements: the perceiver, the perceived, and language.” 
 Hejinian’s poetry is profoundly interested in investigating a subject’s relationship to 
reality at the fundamental level of perception. In this respect, she is one of the most important 
contemporary phenomenological poets. In the sense that she is also intensely concerned with 
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expressing what it is to live in social and material world, she is indeed an empiricist in the 
tradition of Gertrude Stein, exploring the nature of that lived quotidian being in all its disjunctive 
and multitudinous state, and, as Merleau-Ponty says, the “phenomenon as it appears in its 
richness and multi-determinability.” Hejinian recognizes the influence of both Stein and 
Merleau-Ponty on her poetic and philosophical when, in The Language of Inquiry, she quotes 
from Merleau-Ponty’s preface to Phenomenology of Perception and states that “[i]f one accepts 
Merleau-Ponty’s definition of phenomenology, Tender Buttons might be read as a 
phenomenological masterpiece, a work that guarantees writing a role in the exploration of 
‘realness.’”73 That concern with the “real” and with the richness of the language that mediates 
the subject’s experience and expression of that reality, shows Hejinian to be a poet well engaged 
in the phenomenological tradition of inquiry. 
 The philosophical explorations in the work of Berssenbrugge and Hejinian are very 
similar: they are both equally preoccupied with questions of perception and in creating a poetic 
language that interrogates notions of dualism in the relationship between subject and object. The 
poetic realization of their philosophical investigations is very different, however. 
Berssenbrugge’s work has a more consistently sensual quality, less jagged in texture than 
Hejinian’s self-consciously digressive jumpiness. This aspect of Hejinian’s poetics might be 
summed up in a sentence from “The Guard”: “I / ‘whatever interrupts.’”74 Whereas her poetry 
demonstrates the overdetermined play of perceptual impressions, Berssenbrugge’s work has a 
more even-toned emotional register and a more limited range of sensory impressions in its 
concentrated yet nonlinear philosophical inquiry. Hejinian often bubbles over with humor and 
playfulness; Berssenbrugge’s work gives the impression of a more serious, even spiritual tone. 
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Yet both poets are deeply engaged in phenomenological explorations, and their differences in 
approach do not point to any fundamental divergence in their philosophical inquiries. 
 Both Hejinian and Berssenbrugge are also intensely involved in the social and material 
world of lived reality, and in seeking through their poetry ways of dismantling old and ingrained 
dualisms and their concomitant hierarchy and domination of a lower term by a higher term. 
Merleau-Ponty’s frequent criticism of the kind of scientific thinking that makes a religion of 
objectivity (“high altitude thinking”) attests to his belief that such thinking posits a subject 
soaring over a passive object, an unequal relationship in which the terms do not accompany one 
another or acknowledge a kinship with one another, but instead feature a subject that perceives 
foreignness in the faces of things, and that sees in them no resemblance to its own being. 
 The subject of perception can be thought of as plural in at least two senses. First, the 
subject is not only a self-contained individual unable to prove the existence of other 
subjectivities due to the conviction that what an individual cannot experience (another’s 
subjectivity), cannot be proven definitively to exist. Cartesian ontology logically ends in 
solipsism. However, once certain ontological premises are challenged, the subject may be 
reconceived in a communal and public context, in a dialectically balanced relationship with its 
private aspects. I will explore this aspect of subjectivity in Chapter Five, using the poetry of 
Berssenbrugge and Leslie Scalapino as poetic challenges to dualistic divisions between private 
and public realms and between self and other, and to an ontological perspective rooted in the 
Cartesian cogito that cannot but refuse a communal conception of the phenomenal world.  
 Second, the subject is plural in that it does not consist of an essentially unified being, but 
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 CARLA HARRYMAN, HANNAH WEINER, 
AND THE POETICS OF MULTIVOCALITY 
 
The “personal” is already a plural condition. Perhaps one 
feels that it is located somewhere within, somewhere inside 
the body – in the stomach? the chest? the genitals? the 
throat? the head? One can look for it and already one is not 
oneself, one is several, a set of incipiences, incomplete, 
coming into view here and then there, and subject to 
dispersal.1 
  Lyn Hejinian  
 
There is no whole self.2 
  Jorge Luis Borges 
 
Some say the brain under substantial scrutiny 
Belongs to someone other than the subject.3  
  Sheila E. Murphy 
 
 With the possible exception of referentiality, the representation of the self most 
adamantly separates contemporary American poetry along the fuzzy divide between mainstream 
and avant-garde. Although by no means homogeneous in style or strategy, the dominant mode of 
free verse lyricism during the past thirty to forty years nevertheless demonstrates a consistent 
indebtedness to romanticism, more specifically to an emphasis on individual subjective 
experience and emotional epiphany.4 Generally speaking, around the time that language poets 
were emerging on the reading and publication scenes in the late 1960s, and early-to-mid-1970s, 
mainstream poets during that same time were cultivating and valuing a voice that they felt 
possessed the stamp of sincerity and authenticity, and that rang true to its own inner emotional 
coherence. These benchmarks hold regardless of whether the poet’s voice is seen as broad and 
public or personal and confessional, and whether its prevailing tone is perceived by readers as 
expansive or humble.5 Broadly speaking, mainstream poetry tended to represent the self (whether 
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speaking or spoken of) as a coherent identity, as relatively autonomous, individuated, and 
unitary, and as possessing a clear, if often troubled, agency. This is usually the case, despite the 
anxieties, fears and desires that might bind one person to (or separate one person from) another 
person or object. However agitated the emotional surface of the self might be, however much the 
self projects its psychological ripples onto the world or its vision of the world, that self is 
nonetheless most often manifested as a dualistic entity, defined by its basically integrated model 
and its possession of a measure of authenticity or inherent nature, and by its fundamental 
individuation from other selves and from the world. The selfhood constructed in such poetry 
does not normally reflect on or question its own constructedness. 
 With the understanding of the diversity within the rather artificial but nonetheless useful 
category of mainstream poetry in the United States, the values adhered to within the dominant 
lyricism can be summarized thus: 1) a preoccupation with authenticity or sincerity of voice, 
which involves the expression of an emotional center of gravity and an individuated and 
believable speaking voice; 2) the necessity for an urgent and unartificial translation of experience 
so that the craft of the poem is unobtrusive and subservient to the conveyance of the emotional 
hub; and 3) the control of narration so that there is a feeling of closure, in the sense of an 
achieved emotional empathy if not a simplistically clinched moral. 
 Setting up a model of mainstream aesthetics and demonstrating why such a model is 
dualistic and problematically unselfconscious in its presentation of subjectivity, invites an 
instructive comparison with the more decentered subjectivity of experimental poetry. However, 
my purpose is not simply to set an “either” of the mainstream (authorial control, authentic voice, 
cohering subjecthood) over against an “or” of experimental poetry (erasure of the author, 
dismissal of speech-based diction, non-individuated “I”). As Marjorie Perloff points out in a 
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recent essay intended to question essentialist thought in discussions of subjectivity in 
experimental poetry, “must it be either/or?”6 Why pit the lyrical ego against a model of 
egolessness that is just as essentialized as its sincere but equally deluded antithesis? Such a 
critical exercise in shadowboxing would reveal the contenders to be closely identified as 
opponents, each making a claim for an inherent quality about the self, whether that quality be its 
cohesion or its absence of cohesion. It is more helpful to identify strategies of reading 
experimental poetry that reveal a dialogical tension between, on the one hand, the positing of a 
recognizable individual consciousness, and on the other, an interrogation of the construction of 
subjectivity. Such strategies can encourage readings that recognize the possibility for both 
positions, the “either” and the “or,” in the poetic presentation of subjectivity.7 
 The notion of a novice poet finding his or her authentic voice has been prevalent for 
several decades, and is in large part a product of the emergence of an aesthetic widely respected 
in the M.F.A. poetry workshop that has developed in the United States since the 1960s. 
Countless reviews of recent poetry books as well as recent statements of workshop aesthetics 
celebrating the development of an “authentic voice” expressing unique moments of individual 
experience, reveal that the achievement of a privileged center of subjectivity continues to be a 
dominant ideal in contemporary mainstream poetry. It is so prevalent that it seems to have 
entered the mass consciousness of popular culture as a primary criterion of poetic excellence. 
 One of the clearest statements of the ideal of the authentic voice, individual expression, 
and the cohering self in poetry occurs in Stanley Plumly’s “Chapter and Verse,” a two-part 
supplement to the American Poetry Review in which he analyzes the hallmarks of what he 
considers to be good contemporary poetry.8 It is worth analyzing aspects of this statement in 
some detail, since many of the ideals that Plumly expresses have continued to exert a presence in 
 93 
mainstream contemporary poetry. While it is beyond the scope and purpose of this work to 
analyze the poetry celebrated by Plumly, his analysis offers a compelling contrast to the poetics 
of multivocality and dialectical movement with which I will be concerned in this chapter, as well 
as to theories about subjectivity in cognitive science and psychoanalytic feminist theory. 
 According to Plumly, the ideal poem must have a singleness of design, an “emotional 
imperative”9 that grants the speaking voice the authority to make assumptions about the inner life 
of subjects reflected upon and the control to “preside” with authority, whether as a participant or 
a narrator, over the poem’s materials (21-22) It is a poem’s centripetal forces that lend it power 
and intensity, whether the center of gravity is emotional or emblematic (23). 
 In addition, the poet should, through careful attention to craft, render the very material of 
his or her trade invisible. The language should not focus the reader’s attention on itself, which 
would detract from the poem’s de rigeur components of authentic voice and clear narrative: “At 
its flexible best,” the free verse lyric “calls less and less attention to the language and more to the 
body of the action. Ideally, . . . its language should be transparent.” And what makes the poem’s 
inevitable narrative 
 
convincing or authentic is the tone of its master’s voice. Tone is what we are left 
with once the language assumes transparency. 
 But there is a mind as well as a body to the action. And together, whole, in 
terms of voice print, fingerprint, phrenology, and shadow on the wall, they 
probably should look and sound a lot like the person of the poet. The point of a 
poem declaring its freedom as verse is that it somehow better represent the 
individuality – no, the personality of things, the metaphysics of the action, and 
who is presiding (23). 
 
The poem usually illuminates a “single moment, worked out in its single voice” that remains “in 
control” (24-25). The valued work is a “whole poem . . . that surrounds its ‘subject,’ that 
completes its emotional arc.” The voice must have a “sense of fullness” whose unity is enhanced 
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by the narrative (26). The voice is, in effect, the “hero of the story” (27). Referring to a book by 
C. K. Williams, Plumly asserts that the reason that the “voice throughout the book is so 
consistent, so complete” is that “[i]t comes from an absolute source, an emotion so exposed as to 
call into question the very idea of artiface [sic]” (31). 
 Not only individual poems, but the gathering of poems into a book must exhibit a similar 
coherence. In a description that subtly, if unconsciously, alludes to its theological underpinnings 
(as does the title of Plumly’s article, for that matter), Plumly states that “the genuinely good 
book, the one that returns and returns its value, offers more than a miscellany of fine poems. It 
provides us, we usually say in such circumstances, with a whole conception, a design, a vision, 
an organic unity, etc.” (25-31). In short, the free verse lyric of the past thirty years places great 
emphasis on unity, coherence, control, authority, and authenticity on the part of the poet, who 
exercises command over his or her materials, and suffuses them with the uniqueness and 
authenticity of his or her vision. 
 Even when the center of gravity is not ostensibly the poet’s voice but instead the central 
image of the poem, voice is still present, either in the form of the poet, whose voice registers 
more as a “guide” than a “hero,”10 or through the objects themselves. Objects, often cloaked as 
metaphors, effectively speak and take on a kind of subjectivity of their own: “The subject, the 
implicit source of ‘speech’ here, is, from the beginning, the object” (24). And the primary 
organizing principles of unity and coherence still apply: 
 
[D]iscrete images tend to separate the poem from its implicit center of gravity, 
and the greater their distinction the more the poem is forced out to its peripheries. 
This can create tremendous tension and power. It can also waste opportunities. . . . 
There ought to be a metaphysical compromise, oneness without sameness, unity 
of music without locking in the metaphor” (30). 
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Although Plumly proposes that the unity and oneness be expressed without rigidity, he is 
primarily concerned with the centripetal forces in a poem that encourage coherence and 
singularity, and that express an essential and unified projection of the creating self represented 
by its unique, authentic voice. 
 These descriptions bear a striking resemblance to an antiquated model of the functioning 
of the human mind: the homunculus. In this model, a metaphorical little person inside one’s 
brain represents the central command post of experience and of mental authority in an individual. 
This is the mythical place where sensory data come together and are interpreted by an “internal 
agent” – a Mind – that mysteriously understands this information.11 Such a hypothetical 
cognitive process is dualistic because it tends to bypass questions of modular and interdependent 
functioning, and instead posits, in various metaphorical constructs, a “ghost in the machine,” or a 
“finish line” – a precise threshold – of consciousness. In recent years, many thinkers in the field 
of cognitive science have insisted on the importance of debunking survivals of the homunculus 
in critical thinking, attempting, in effect, to knock the centralized view of consciousness from its 
Cartesian pedestal. Daniel Dennett, one of the strongest critics of residual dualistic thinking in 
cognitive science, reminds us that 
 
[t]here is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness,” because there is no 
central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater where “it all comes together” for the 
perusal of a Central Meaner. Instead of such a single stream (however wide), 
there are multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel 
pandemoniums, to do their various things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. 
Most of these fragmentary drafts of “narrative” play short-lived roles in the 
modulation of current activity but some get promoted to further functional roles, 
in swift succession, by the activity of a virtual machine in the brain.12 
 
According to Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory, the process interpreting perception creates 
“multiple ‘drafts’ of narrative fragments at various stages in various places in the brain.” There is 
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no “single narrative . . . that is canonical,” no final published version that has been read and 
revised by a master editor inside the mind. The distributed and multiple interpretations yield 
something akin to a narrative sequence, but are “subject to continual editing by many processes 
distributed around in the brain, and continuing indefinitely into the future.”13 The idea of a self 
with a recognizable identity that is created from the richly interconnected accumulation of 
interpreted experience is both real in a practical sense, and also an illusion. One’s self is, 
practically speaking, unique and identifiable, both to oneself and to others. One’s identity is also 
a representation of many different and constantly shifting narratives about oneself and one’s 
surroundings. The formulation of identity as both a functional reality and a myth composed of 
ephemeral narratives is thus paradoxical – the discrete self both is and is not, simultaneously.14 
Furthermore, the boundaries of the biological self are not discrete. The human body is host to 
many microorganisms, some benign and some destructive. And there is a sense in which a group 
of individuals can be considered to behave like a single organism. 
 Antonio Damasio is engaged in a similar project of dismantling the dualism that still 
haunts cognitive science: 
 
[B]ecause of the brain’s design, the requisite broad-based knowledge depends on 
numerous systems located in relatively separate brain regions rather than in one 
region. A large part of such knowledge is recalled in the form of images at many 
brain sites rather than at a single site. Although we have the illusion that 
everything comes together in a single anatomical theater, recent evidence suggests 
that it does not.15  
 
Instead of envisioning consciousness as a central theater where experience all comes together, 
most cognitive scientists agree that consciousness is much more diffuse, and is spread over many 
layers in a process involving many functions that are interconnected and that don’t always 
communicate effectively or rationally with one another. What merits inclusion in the contents 
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available for consciousness is a much fuzzier affair than previously thought. In current thought, 
brain processes are less centralized and hierarchical, and instead more distributed and 
interdependent. 
 The model of a “single voice,” “in control” of a narrative that illuminates with coherence 
and completeness a “single moment” in a narrative that is “consistent” and “complete,” 
emanating from an “absolute source,” sounds very much like the model of the homunculus 
presiding over the raw materials of experience and directing a coherent narrative with its 
authentic “master’s voice.” The poetic ideal that Plumly describes is also akin to the illusionary 
construction of the self that we all more or less take for granted in everyday life – what George 
Lakoff, Mark Johnson and others in the field of cognitive science call “folk psychology,” which 
consists of the common sense assumptions of a culture. Folk psychology provides explanatory 
models that help people to function on an everyday basis, but are not necessarily an accurate 
model of cognitive matter or functioning. In differentiating among the various metaphorical 
conceptions to describe one’s inner life, Lakoff and Johnson propose that the folk theory of 
essences dictates the metaphor of a true or authentic self, which “is the locus of consciousness, 
subjective experience, reason, will, and our ‘essence,’ everything that makes us who we uniquely 
are.”16 There is nothing particularly harmful about our conceptualizations about the self, for “we 
all grow up with a view of our inner lives that is mostly unconscious, used every day of our lives 
in our self-understanding.” However, this locus of rationality and center of consciousness is 
“both internally inconsistent and incompatible with what we have learned from the scientific 
study of the mind.”17 Borges’ admonition in the epigraph to this chapter that “there is no whole 
self,” which he repeats like a refrain throughout his essay “The Nothingness of Personality” is a 
cultural corrective to the commonplace of the sovereign self, and an attempt to dethrone the 
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homunculus from its privileged command post: “I want to tear down the exceptional 
preeminence now generally awarded to the self . . . . I propose to prove that personality is a 
mirage maintained by conceit and custom, without metaphysical foundation or visceral reality. . . 
. There is no whole self.” 18 Furthermore, Borges reasons, the locus or essence of that ineffable 
yet entirely commonplace thing called the “self” is impossible to pin down: 
 
I am not my own activity of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. Nor am I 
my body, which is a phenomenon among others. Up to this point the argument is 
banal; its distinction lies in its application to spiritual matters. Are desire, thought, 
happiness, and distress my true self? The answer, in accordance with the precept, 
is clearly in the negative, since those conditions expire without annulling me with 
them. Consciousness – the final hideout where we might track down the self – 
also proves unqualified. Once the emotions, the extraneous perceptions, and even 
ever-shifting thought are dismissed, consciousness is a barren thing, without any 
appearance reflected in it to make it exist.19 
 
The idea of a definitive, bounded, and discrete self, with a locus and a will, is illusory. Borges’ 
prescient and bold questioning of the sovereign self was years ahead of neuroscientific theory 
confirming, at ever deeper levels of neural processes, the fiction of the autobiographical self.20 
After enumerating all the various components of the self and their neural regions, there is no one 
place or function within one’s being where everything miraculously comes together in order to 
ponder the intellectual conundrum of selfhood. Who, or what, after all, is chasing down the self? 
The self is not only more internally diffuse and unlocatable, but it is also factitious to claim that 
it emerges from a biological individual being. What we think of as the self emerges from a 
person’s interactions with other beings and entities as well as from internal biological functions. 
 Historically, avant-garde poetry has also interrogated the construction of identity or 
selfhood, so that the boundaries between self and not-self are problematized. This aspect of 
avant-garde poetry was explored in the previous chapter. In addition, one of the principal 
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projects of experimental poetry is to represent the self not simply as a unified construct. Instead, 
the self is shown to be capable not only of expressing multiple voices, but of experiencing the 
otherness of the self, a simultaneous self-integration and self-alienation, and of being deeply 
aware of the self’s multivocality.21 
 The constructedness and artifice of one’s image of self is just what the free verse lyric as 
described by Plumly attempts to obscure. Experimental poets attempt to make the social and 
individual conditions for the construction of the self apparent. For 
 
our lives are completely permeated not, as we think, with ourselves, but rather 
with exactly a concept that we call a person, or ourselves. This concept is 
embedded in our language, our forms of thought, our forms of art. . . . [P]opular 
art . . . assumes or accepts the socially affirmed concept of the person, [whereas] 
avant-garde art . . . does question the concept of the person.22 
 
Norman Fischer’s division between popular art and avant-garde art is somewhat simplistic, yet 
there is truth to his assertion that avant-garde art generally has tended to interrogate the 
essentialist construction of the self common in Western culture, and to make that construction 
visible as construction. Instead of occupying a self-evident position within the person, the self is 
dependent on the concept we form of the self. This may seem obvious, but when one considers 
the extent to which commonsensical conceptualizations permeate much of our language and 
effects the ways that we shape our awareness of being, there is much for poets to interrogate. 
Experimental poetry generally attempts to represent the state of permanent flux in consciousness 
and identity. As Hélène Cixous aptly states, 
 
All poets know that the self is in permanent mutation, that it is not one’s own, that 
it is always in movement, in a trance, astray, and that it goes out towards you. 
That is the free self. Our time is afraid of losing, and afraid of losing itself. But 
one can write only by losing oneself, by going astray, just as one can love only at 
the risk of losing oneself and of losing.23 
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Cixous’ acknowledgement of decentered human cognition is very similar to the description of 
many cognitive scientists regarding the nature of human consciousness: “the self is a repeatedly 
reconstructed biological state; it is not a little person, the infamous homunculus, inside your 
brain contemplating what is going on.”24 Furthermore, 
 
At each moment the state of self is constructed, from the ground up. It is an 
evanescent reference state, so continuously and consistently reconstructed that the 
owner never knows it is being remade unless something goes wrong with the 
remaking. The background feeling now, or the feeling of an emotion now, along 
with the non-body sensory signals now, happen to the concept of self as 
instantiated in the coordinated activity of multiple brain regions. But our self, or 
better even, our metaself, only “learns” about that “now” an instant later. . . . 
Present continuously becomes past, and by the time we take stock of it we are in 
another present, consumed with planning the future, which we do on the stepping-
stones of the past. The present is never here. We are hopelessly late for 
consciousness.25 
 
This constant cognitive flux, only a tiny percentage of which actually reaches conscious 
awareness, produces the sense of a self in constant permutation. It is not simply to engage in 
misplaced hyperbole to say that the self is other to itself in a very real sense. Current 
neuroscientific theories often speak of multiple levels or layers of self owing to the multiple 
regions of the brain that process neural and hormonal information, and to their 
interconnectedness in ways that are not purely logical, noncontradictory, or particularly 
conducive to accuracy of recall. To give one example, memory is stored not in one site, but in 
many separate regions of the brain that somehow are coordinated – with widely variable 
accuracy and reliability – to form images, whether verbal, visual, aural, and so forth.26 
 The “homunculus at the helm” invoked or implied by previous generations of cognitive 
scientists has died, or has at lease relinquished a good part of its supposed control, and in its 
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place is a more complex and diffuse notion of the self and how it shapes its self-images and 
interprets its experiences. Such theories also approach questions of why the illusion of the 
integrated, unitary self exercising its free will is so appealing and comforting, and why the 
illusory construction is so convincing as to seem natural and inevitable. Gerald M. Edelman, a 
neuroscientist who is grappling with questions about the nature of human consciousness, refers 
to a “homunculus crisis,” which is the consideration of the seeming contradiction of “the unitary 
appearance to a perceiver of perceptual processes that are known to be based on multiple and 
complex parallel subprocesses and on many maps. . . . Who or what organizes a unitary 
picture?”27 The paradox, once more, is that in constructing a theory of subjecthood, the 
homunculus is to be rigorously avoided at the same time that one attempts to account for the 
processes by which humans generalize and categorize, and for all practical purposes, seem to 
behave as if there is a homuncular command post. 
 There seems to be a real sense in which things do come together in the brain, organizing 
around more or less centralized zones of neural activity, and giving the impression of coherence 
and unification, however illusory that feeling is. In fact, our ability to conceptualize and 
generalize about phenomena – including our characterization of the self as a discrete and 
coherent being – is necessary for animal survival. The very image of the homunculus – the very 
fact that humans do have the impression of some kind of unified consciousness and autonomous 
will – implies the existence of a neural function that produces the impression of the homunculus 
steering human awareness and decision-making. Various theories regarding the unification of 
conscious experience have been set forth, including that of “global mapping” (Edelman), a 
“global workspace” (Bernard J. Baars), and the “left hemisphere interpreter” (Michael S. 
Gazzaniga).28 These scientists are attempting to account for the integrative, as well as the 
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distributive, aspects of consciousness without invoking the dreaded homunculus, Cartesian 
dualism, or a correspondence theory of truth. 
 On the other hand, consciousness is simultaneously rather hopelessly fragmented and 
fallible. The concept of “multiple selves” within the individual is being discussed and debated a 
great deal recently in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. The holding of 
contradictory belief systems, making illogical decisions, self-deception, and the existence of 
dialogical inner speech are all held to be evidence for a divided self, whether in a strong, literal, 
sense, or a weak, metaphorical, sense.29 
 It may be correctly pointed out that the idea of multiple selves is also a metaphorical 
construction of the self. Lakoff and Johnson give the example of the language of a person who 
feels morally divided between spheres of values within herself: “I keep going back and forth 
between my scientific self and my religious self.”30 However, I am less interested in the 
statement of divided mind in a literary work than I am with its demonstration of mental processes 
that more closely follow the way that the brain seems to function. In other words, I am not 
claiming that characters or personae in a poem of the kind Plumly admires might not describe the 
state of being of a divided mind. However, the process of description and narration of such a 
state would most likely have the requisite coherence, authenticity, and consistence that Plumly 
extols. Similarly, in a poem of a more experimental nature, I am interested in the way that 
writing or reading the poem invites a process of interpretation that more closely investigates 
cognitive process (as opposed, for example, to making the language transparent), including the 
revelation of the constructedness of the self’s image. I am also concerned with the way in which 
the poem brings to consciousness the illusions of selfhood and will that humans create. 
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 Psychoanalytic theories also offer versions of the self that contradict the illusion of the 
autobiographical whole and of the unified entity. Notably the theories of Julia Kristeva propose a 
narrative of the individual centering around the acquisition of language, and suggesting a 
dialectical relationship between unifying and rupturing forces that effectively shatters 
representations of subjectivity and discourse in poetic language. Although psychoanalytic 
theories most often take the form of a narrative or diachronic view of the forces that shape the 
self and its images, and neuroscientific theories most often express structures and processes 
synchronically taking place within the individual, their theories regarding the multiple and 
decentered constructions of the self often bear a striking resemblance to one another. Both 
reinforce the notion of the kind of dynamic and reciprocal exchange between terms that I am 
theorizing. 
 My position is that the human mind encompasses both unifying and dividing functions 
and structures, and that there exists, in both the synchronic state and the diachronic narrative of 
an individual, a dynamic and reciprocally dialectical motion between the centripetal self (the 
unifying structures and functions) and the centrifugal self (the splintering structures and 
functions). This dialectical movement between division and unification, a movement may also 
describe the biological interaction and interdependence among the regions, layers, and systems 
of the brain, and what Edelman calls the “global mapping” that brings these regions into 
coordination and helps to form the impression of a coherent and unified consciousness. This 
global mapping is not a static organization, but instead a “dynamic structure” that is continually 
being reshaped “with time and behavior.”31 
 It may be helpful at this point to recall my previous discussions of dialectical 
“movement” or “motion.” I am not referring simply or literally to an object that is in motion, but 
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to a dynamic interrelationship between structures and functions that lend themselves to the sense 
of fragmentation (i.e., different brain regions processing information separately), and structures 
and functions that lend themselves to the sense of unification (i.e., the interconnectedness 
between systems). The relationship between these two tendencies of splintering and integrative 
forces is one of interdependence, so that they do not cancel out one another, but depend upon one 
another for their very existence and activity. In the remainder of this chapter, I will investigate 
ways in which the illusion of the coherent, centered consciousness coexists with the decentered 
self theorized in of cognitive science, and mutually interrogate one another in experimental 
poetry. I will show how avant-garde poets acknowledge the forces of both coherence and 
disunity in their representation of the self, without evoking the control and heroic model of the 
poetics of authentic voice. 
 The work of Carla Harryman and Hannah Weiner consistently engages dialogical 
strategies in order to disrupt dualistic, unitary and nonreflexive notions of selfhood, resulting in a 
multivocality of the self. Their poetry demonstrates the heterogeneity of subjectivity and the 
signifying process, as well as a reciprocal exchange between unifying and shattering cognitive 
forces. Aside from their both being contemporary experimental poets vitally concerned with the 
construction of subjectivity, on the surface Weiner and Harryman have very different approaches 
to the presentation of the self in their poetry. However, both take as primary to their work the 
idea of voices in dialogue with one another, and through these voices they investigate the 
multivocality of the self. They would both consider antithetical to their work the notion of 
authorial control or a unified subjectivity. Rather, the subjectivity that develops is, from the start, 
decentered and plural, shape-shifting and evanescent. 
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 The theatricality or performativity of Harryman’s work applies not only to her frequent 
use of characters in dialogue, but also to her juxtaposition of different kinds of writings and 
genres in order to have them interrogate one another: “I like to put families of language in 
conversation with each other, such as theoretical discourse, fiction, and nonsense – I use the page 
to perform the dialogue, first, although I think of the page also as a staging device. Virtually 
anything can be performed, after all.”32 Harryman’s writing transgresses many of the norms 
associated with particular genres. For example, her essays often are so concentrated imagistically 
and dramatically that they might just as easily fall into categories other than those that tend to 
restrict their content to logical and analytical modes. In “Toy Boats,” she inserts, in a fairly 
discursive essay about narrative, a humorous dialogue under the heading, “What is the Status of 
Narrative in Your Work?”: 
 
 . . . I can only make fun of the possibility of your tale. 
 My tale? 
 Isn’t that what you wanted? 
 You have no tact, no skills, no frame of, frame of . . . 
 You mean no plan. 
 Nor do you produce resemblance or have a serious purpose of struggle 
with truth. 
 Or dally in genre literature.33  
 
This reads more like an inner dialogue than an exchange between author and critic, since the 
voices mutually interrogate one another. They play a sparring game in which each voice 
alternately critiques and defends the mode of narrative and of its own interlocution. In her 
dialogues, Harryman constantly questions subjective autonomy, whether her dialogues are 
interpreted as an imaginative discourse among characters, or as a conversation among different 
aspects of the self. 
 The shifts among discursive types and from inner speech to objective narration 
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continually thwart[s] any gestures toward wholeness or autonomous identity for 
the speaker that any one of these modes might initiate on its own. These units of 
language become the performers in Harryman’s dramatic insistence that 
autonomy – if it exists at all – can be neither discovered nor expressed in 
language. . . . Harryman’s critique of autonomy extends to incorporating into her 
writing material appropriated from other texts; her many sources include H. D., 
Freud, Saint Augustine, the Marquis de Sade, and “nonliterary” material such as a 
promotional brochure for the Rova Saxophone Quartet.34 
 
These conversations among modes of discourse as well as among characters, genres, and aspects 
of the self demonstrate her concern with the linguistic construction of subjectivity and voice, and 
tends to diffuse the sense of an author in control of material that has the stamp of a unique, 
individual voice. 
 In “My Story,” a brief poetic prose piece in Animal Instincts, Harryman uses birth and 
infancy as the inceptive event and state of subjecthood in order to explore the possibility of the 
faithful or mimetic rendition of that subjectivity.35 Birth and early infancy are apt for Harryman’s 
purpose because they are perhaps the most remote from human memory and understanding, and 
thus are least accessible to descriptive recounting. The material fact of “living flesh” of an other 
is not to be denied, yet “[s]peaking in a state of fidelity to the subject . . . is similar to assuming 
one has acquired the song of birth through the ritual repeating of names and gestures of newborn 
infants.” Harryman compares the linguistic capture of a state of being to the futile attempt to take 
on the mantle of a subjectivity (“acquir[ing] the song of birth”) simply by verbalizing its name 
and mimicking its behavior.36 “This,” she says, “makes me want to cry” – perhaps like a baby, 
but not, according to her comparison, presuming to capture what it is like to be a baby. To define 
a being by its gestures would be to reduce the complexity of subjectivity to a set of behaviors 
observed in a “neutral light” that doesn’t exist, anyway.37 For as Harryman states, she “can’t lie: 
no way am I going to disguise myself in the habit of that body, the one that isn’t mine.”38 Thus 
 107 
she would deflate the hubris of an author who imagines having descriptively captured a state of 
being, who, for example, solemnly “assum[es] the tone of reverence” and “describes a woman 
climbing a hill.” Harryman does not accept the traditional authorial prerogative to climb into the 
skin of a subject and make the reader believe that she is linguistically living, or reliving, that 
consciousness. Such a narrative, Harryman claims, would be “a braggart’s tale.” Neither 
phenomena nor subjectivity are transparently available to understanding or linguistic translation: 
“I was born but do not understand that phenomenon any better than whatever creature may never 
think about it.” On “My Story,” Harryman comments that her intention was to articulate 
 
a radical questioning of the representation of subjectivity in writing, the sense of 
the continuity of the self in language, constructing a character or person as having 
a continuum, which I think has very little to do with the “living flesh, though it 
may be.” . . . I am submitting “the authentic subject” to a kind of erotic play or 
tease. The teasing would not be possible without our already constructed sense of 
a subject as being whole – the whole baby, the whole person. On the one hand, 
there is no partial person, and on the other, our persons are constitutive of parts.39 
 
Harryman’s critique of “authentic self” is dialectical because she posits a reciprocal and 
interpenetrating relationship between positions of wholeness and diffusion in subjectivity. To 
critique the subject position of authorial authenticity is not to deny the human sense of 
wholeness, “our already constructed sense of a subject a being whole.” 
Such a feeling (one of many ways of conceptualizing the self) is a metaphorical 
construction arising from our physical experience in the world. Lakoff and Johnson remind us 
that 
 
when you try to find your “true self,” you are using [a] usually unconscious 
metaphorical conceptualization. . . . When we consciously reason about how to 
gain mastery over ourselves, or how to protect our vulnerable “inner self,” or how 
to find our “true self,” it is the hidden hand of the unconscious conceptual system 
that makes such reasoning “common sense.”40 
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According to Lakoff and Johnson, conceptualizing subjectivity in such a way that “there is 
always a Subject that is the locus of reason and that metaphorically has an existence independent 
of the body . . . arises around the world uniformly on the basis of apparently universal and 
unchangeable experiences.” Such a view of the self is largely unconscious and habitually used in 
our daily lives, yet it is “both internally inconsistent and incompatible” with current cognitive 
scientific understanding of the mind.41 
 Harryman does not disparage the wholeness of the subject as a conceptual category, one 
that is in fact quite useful in quotidian life. “On the one hand,” she states, “there is no partial 
person.” Our neural systems that articulate different aspects of our subjecthood are integrated 
well enough so that we do not normally speak of divergent beings within a biological individual. 
Yet equally, “our persons are constitutive of parts.” And the relationship between the parts and 
the whole is fluid and reciprocal. On the one hand, “[t]he subject is alienated and fragmented – 
there is no golden age of the self . . .” On the other, “[t]he desire for unity . . . is true, a true 
desire, and it has constructive and destructive outcomes.”42 Harryman attempts in her writing to 
place both views of self – the unified and fragmented conceptualizations – in conversation with 
one another. For Harryman, the representation of the self necessarily evades any historically 
accurate or objective rendering, for her “aesthetic project is not related to a transparent 
construction of personal history.”43 She also recognizes the reality, strength, and usefulness of 
the universal desire for wholeness and unity, and submits that conceptualization and desire to a 
dialogue of “erotic play or tease” that disrupts gestures towards absolute or inherent unity. 
 Harryman’s experimental poetic novel Gardener of Stars is a richly textured and multi-
layered long narrative work that presents a complex working out of her ideas regarding 
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subjectivity.44 The complex characters exist and interact with one another as if in a child’s 
fantasy or a dreamworld. They spin out their games and shifting identities on a post-apocalyptic 
and surreal stage in which virtually anything that can be imagined can be performed. The 
narrative is primarily concerned with utopian desire, and plots the dynamic tension of the 
characters moving among various ideal and dystopic settings. The two principle persons in the 
drama are Gardener and M, who live on opposite ends of a wooded area. They are both childlike, 
in the sense that they inhabit and continually dream up a spontaneous and imaginatively shifting 
world, yet they are also fully sexual beings with desires and fantasies that they play out, often 
with inventiveness and ferocity. 
 Gardener and M are complementary, though not entirely opposite, female beings. M is 
mercurial, wild, artistic, spontaneous, fun, boyish, self-sufficient, and instinctual. She is capable 
of aggression, including erotic aggression. She is described in animalistic terms: she has “paws” 
and “claws” (18, 145). In one scene she “crashes into the woods willfully as an overfed skunk” 
(20). Her appearance is perpetually filthy, sweaty and coarse: Gardener “can’t tell [M’s] flesh 
from dirt” (18). She lives in a tiny shack on the opposite side of the woods from Gardener, who 
has never visited her there. Her shack is for protection only; it is not a homey, domestic place, 
but a mere shelter in which “the relationship of inside to outside is slight,” and “[t]here is little, 
albeit enough, between the elements and me” (29). M has little need for the conscious, rational or 
collective ordering of the world, and experiences no strong boundaries between inside and 
outside. However, she does not lack intellectual knowledge about the world. She reads “science 
and mechanics” in order to find her place within the outside, and to reinforce what she already 
instinctively knows, that “humans are part of the world” and that they orient themselves around 
the “all the complex interrelationships” in the world: everyday life “is as external as anything 
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could possibly be” (29, 30). She is not interested in forming a community, which would be 
“redundant,” since the world already functions proficiently without the self-conscious 
interrelationships and orderings of the group (30). She is more autonomous and individualistic 
than Gardener, and is concerned with practical and mechanical functions in the world. When she 
is not lying naked in the dirt, she is sometimes depicted as the archetypal handyman, carrying a 
set of tools under her belt and a screwdriver between her teeth, “look[ing] into the bowels of 
some wayward machine” (25, 105). M’s character comes close to being pure desire, and she does 
not have the ability to plan for and carry through an event. Neither does she have much 
consciousness about the desires of others: “I have always wanted to be pregnant and I don’t 
know what other women want” (38). In cognitive terms, M is closer to limbic functions, which is 
to say emotional and instinctual: in one scene, she describes to the child Babs “a magnificent and 
bucolic world of insults” (84).45 
 Whereas M is a scavenger, Gardener is a farmer and more domesticated, though “not 
deeply rooted” (18). M frequently visits Gardener at her “chaos of light and yelling called a 
home,” especially when there are men hanging around, with whom she might engage sexually 
(86). M loves and desires Gardener’s ethereal qualities of creativity and imagination, which 
complement her own earthiness and connection to material reality. At Gardener’s, 
 
[t]he premise that one is part of the natural world flies out the door. One might as 
well be a part of a work of fiction written by someone who doesn’t know the 
wilderness exists. It would be a work written by someone who does not exist. One 
is so far inside the fiction that practicality appears to be a coincidence, and yet the 
vegetables do grow in the garden, the household is well engineered, and meals, if 
not served regularly, are almost always available. People want to do things for 
other people in her house, more than I ever think I want to do anything for myself 
(30). 
 
Entering Gardener’s abode 
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is as marvelous as knocking on the magical door to a great city. One knows 
something terrible will happen when invited to pass through the opened door, that 
one’s role will be that of a stranger caught up in a ruse or revolution. It will 
contaminate one’s judgment. . . . Everything has become subjective. The loss of 
judgment is the door (29). 
 
If we read Gardener as a force in the history of human consciousness, she would represent the 
culture-producing aspects of human consciousness. She is less analytical or practical than M: she 
doesn’t want to research the stars (she knows almost nothing about them), and is weary of 
studying them (15). Her psychic energies are of a more self-conscious and subjective nature: she 
feels compelled to “read [her] own genetic code” if “for no reason other than that I had been 
genetically programmed to read it” (15). She is linguistically precocious and digressive: she has 
a “skewed wayward gabbiness” (109) in which she tends to “associate anything with anything 
else” (15). She is creative (though in a less wild and unselfconscious way than M), imaginative, 
and fictionalizing. Events sometimes seem to occur simply because Gardener thinks of them. Her 
identity is fluid; she constantly reinvents herself. She also represents the desire for the individual 
and collective ordering of the world, although she also tires of trying to understand and 
conceptualize things, especially on a transcendental level. She loves, but less violently and 
instinctively than M, and more with a sense of curiosity. 
 If the eponymously named Gardener represents the cultivating force in humans – the 
evolutionary tendency to settle into agrarian-based communities that demands a collective 
endeavor – then M’s animalistic and instinctual nature could represent what Ken Wilbur calls the 
“archaic-uroboric” stage in the evolution of human consciousness, particularly prevalent in 
hunter-gatherer societies. This is the period of the “typhonic self” (referring to the part-human, 
part-snake mythological being) “that has differentiated its body from the environment but not yet 
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differentiated its own mind from its body.”46 M’s thoughts are more bodily than self-conscious 
or conceptual, practical and material-bound rather than linguistically sophisticated and fiction-
creating. When Gardener and M are taken captive into a dystopic rural “paternalistic boot camp” 
(59) consisting of a “harem” full of “creeps” (83), M asks whether they are “just stock characters 
in an historical fantasy” or perhaps “squatters reinventing a trauma our descendants will brood 
over later facing the chalkboards” (90). She exhorts Gardener, as a historical force of 
acculturation who is trapped in a patriarchal nightmare, to regain her feminist pluck and fighting 
spirit by recalling her passage through history, including her “poverty and hatred of power and 
attack on international investors and the big war machine interests. . . . Was that you? Or the 
ghost of yourself?” (134). Later, a character named Serena, who is the “revolutionary of memory 
when there is no history, when there is only the option of making whatever must be made in an 
economy of scarcity and hope looking backward” (131), encourages Gardener to “return . . . to 
the past . . . . What is your past? It was the industrial revolution and women were still burning, 
but it was not only women who burned. Why would the plague, any plague, seem more horrific 
than all this murder?” (132). Thus the characters sometimes emerge as historical tendencies, but 
not reenacting events in a realistic drama set within a historically specific framework of 
personality and event. Instead, the narrative’s shifting and unsettled structure allows synchronic 
and diachronic layers to unfold side by side. That is, the multi-layered narrative enfolds the 
possibility of several kinds of dialogues, including those among 1) characters in a drama of the 
evolution of human consciousness, 2) characters in an intersubjective drama engaging dualistic 
cognitive archetypes such as master and slave, body and mind, chaos and order, imagination and 
practicality, and 3) characters presenting various aspects of an individual consciousness, 
including the exemplification of stages in childhood development. The novel’s hybridized 
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structure also allows more discursive modes, such as a reflexive commentary in the form of 
literary criticism. A third person analyzes the literary predilections of M, who distrusts 
psychological realism as a “labyrinth of snapshots in words” that attempts to anticipate and 
capture the reader’s “neurotic reaction” to the work (127). The simultaneous existence and 
intertwining of these various interpretations in Harryman’s novel attest to its fluid model of 
subjectivity, or rather intersubjectivity. Parts of an individual’s person’s psychological being 
reflect and relate to parts of other persons’ subjecthood, and these, in turn, may be related to the 
development of human consciousness in the individual as well as through history. These layers 
are not separate but interdependent modalities of subjectivity. 
 Thus part of the richness of Gardener of Stars is that it presents several interpretive 
layers, of which the scheme of characters in the evolution of human consciousness model is one 
possibility on which I will focus for the purposes of this chapter’s theme. The characters present 
contrasting facets of an individual, such as the airy imagination and narrative-generating 
Gardener versus the bodily drives and earthy practicality of M. It is as if the various elements of 
a person have been given free and unbounded articulation and dramatization. The work can be 
conceptualized as a map of a human psyche with mysterious and sometimes unreadable 
signposts, fluid boundaries, and shape-shifting denizens. On this cognitive map, for example, 
M’s love for Gardener is “the same as having loved myself” (31). In a scene between Gardener 
and a doctor that includes the possibility of the two being parts of a single consciousness, 
Gardener argues with the doctor as if “with her own reflection in a pool of sweet water” (33). 
Sometimes M seems to be a manifestation of the subconscious mind, which has knowledge about 
Gardener (the more linguistic and self-conscious part of the self) before Gardener becomes 
aware of it: “M I can’t get up! I cannot get my mouth open. M knows it already. It is so like her 
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to already know it, I can’t stand it” (53). It is as if M, the voice of the subconscious, knows 
everything before Gardener becomes aware of it. In another scene that conflates the identities 
and desires of the two main characters, Gardener feels “caught between [her] impulse and [M’s]” 
(105-06). Sometimes, however, M seems to be much less cognizant of the makeup of Gardener’s 
being, for “even as [Gardener] invents herself” she also “escapes the grasp of my knowledge” 
(110). Like the unconscious mind, M knows things about Gardener before Gardener becomes 
conscious of them. However, M doesn’t have full knowledge of Gardener. During a game of 
“pretend,” Gardener asks M whether she will hold her to her words, since she is merely 
 
talking about my thoughts . . . not what you can see.  
 If I could see your thoughts said M. 
 We would be having the same ones (121). 
 
If they were capable of perceiving one another’s thoughts, they would be self-identical, and there 
would not be any differentiation within the self that makes possible their dialogue with others. 
Recall that Gardener and M may be considered not only as facets of a single being, but also as 
individual beings. 
 Like the creature of consciousness that she is, Gardener never visits M’s side of the 
woods, but M often emerges in Gardener’s dwelling, energetically enacting her bodily drives and 
bringing Gardener’s celestial and mythical musings down to an earthy and sexual level. Early in 
the novel, during a visit from M, Gardener retreats into her home, where she “flop[s] on a sofa 
freshly upholstered in lemon-colored fabric facing the window that frames, just now, a wintry 
light” (21). The sofa, its upholstery, and the light are all spontaneous fabrications of Gardener’s 
thought. Through the window she sees 
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what appears to be a sensuous tangled neoclassical sculpture tiled on the ground 
in an odd position . . . . Overgrown sages and rocket plants partially obscure the 
object. It is a deliciously aromatic spot that has often filled my pores with a heady 
love. I think about the crouching tit-ridden fertility goddesses sporting the garden 
as forms of inert consciousness to remind us, the gardeners, of an invasive being, 
something useless. Sometimes I associate uselessness with the divine (21). 
 
She goes outside and, hearing a “thumping from the direction of the object,” gradually realizes 
that what she took for a statue of a mythological figure is actually “M on the ground struggling 
with someone, a man I think. . . . They seem to be wrestling and fucking at the same time.” 
Gardener attempts to join in their sexual act, but M rebuffs her. Gardener senses that there is 
something in what she has witnessed “that belongs to [her],” yet she also feels she doesn’t know 
M at all (21-22). M, like the unconscious, influences Gardener, but is at a certain epistemological 
level inaccessible to her conscious being. Similarly, Gardener “escapes the grasp of [M’s] 
knowledge” (110). 
 As different as M and Gardener are, they can be understood as aspects of one mind and 
thus they are also not absolutely drawn with fixed boundaries. Instead, their relationship is 
interpenetrating and dynamic, just as in the human brain the multiple regions are in reciprocal 
engagement with one another. The characters are not pure types, but exaggerations that share in 
each other’s natures. Gardener is the cultivator, the orderer, the associator, but there is a wildness 
to her associations, not unlike the chaotic wildness of M. M is the wild, untamed, instinctual one 
who yields without hesitation or forethought to her desires, yet perhaps through the influence of 
Gardener, she also desires acculturation. She dreams and desires the bonds of society within a 
city, “without knowing what a city would be anymore” (26). The beings within the mind are in 
one sense discrete, since they are not fully accessible or comprehensible to one another, yet in 
another sense they are in a constant dynamic conversation with one another and through their 
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mutual influence, assume aspects of one another, similar to the way children assume various 
roles in play-acting. 
 The flexible and fluctuating model of subjectivity in Harryman’s novel is very far 
removed from the kind of cognitive structure implied in Plumly’s model of the integral and 
authentic self, and its carefully crafted and presiding voice. Far from resembling the model of the 
ideal and dualistically individuated homunculus at the helm of the subject, Harryman’s 
characters propose a model that is closer to the prevailing views in cognitive science of the self 
as decentralized with interdependent regions and pathways, and of the more intersubjective and 
multi-vocal models of the self proposed by such psychoanalytic writers as Jessica Benjamin and 
Kristeva, about whose work I will have more to say later in this chapter. 
 Not only are the boundaries within the multiple aspects of the self confounded in 
Harryman’s intrigue, but also the utopian city that emerges as the novel progresses is one of 
erased or diffused boundaries between dwellings and between objects of personal property. 
Throughout the novel, the roads are rambling, and they rarely progress in a rational or orderly 
way from place to place. This geography of loosely structured roads and communities is 
reminiscent of the metaphor of the medieval city that Amélie Oksenberg Rorty uses in describing 
one view of the self, which is suggested by the phenomenon of a subject holding contradictory 
views (self-deception) and the irrational aspects of human agency. This version of the structure 
of the self is represented by 
 
the older medieval city of relatively autonomous neighbourhoods, linked by small 
lanes that change their names half way across their paths, a city that is a very 
loose confederation of neighbourhoods of quite different kinds, each with its 
distinctive internal organization, and distinctive procedures for foreign relations, 
even different conditions for entry into the federation: a city of guilds, the courts 
of grand families, religious orders, and old small towns.47  
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The other, more rationalistic view of the self, is represented by the orderly structure of a central 
plan and government of the city, with its “grand plan of radial avenues emanating from the 
centre to the outskirts; the rational plan of the city that one can see from an aerial view.” In this 
view of the self, “decisions emanate directly from the centre, along the broad boulevards to the 
outskirts, to the commercial and industrial centres, to the suburbs.”48 In terms of human 
subjectivity and agency, the rational and centralized map exists simultaneously with the 
decentralized and meandering map, and within individuals, the two views of selfhood can have 
varying strengths and emphases.49 However, “the new main arteries [of the centralized plan] do 
not necessarily provide the best routes from one part of the city to another, and they do not give 
the most perspicuous idea of the working relations among the various parts of the city.”50 The 
meandering archeological plan in Harryman’s novel corresponds to the view that the subject has 
multiple cognitive centers, as opposed to a central command post to which all roads lead and 
where information from its various hypothetical branches is processed and evaluated. In 
Gardener of Stars, subjectivity is imagined as characters with identities, but at the same time 
those identities are in a state of flux and revision. In addition, as my previous comments show, 
the characters can also be thought of as part of a larger social being, in both a synchronic and a 
diachronic sense. One of the driving forces in Harryman’s novel is the impetus, not to resolve 
these contradictory states or movements, but to keep them in a continually circulating reciprocal 
and dialogical exchange so that utopian desire does not create hierarchical structures that merely 
invert structures of power. 
 To demonstrate how Harryman is challenging dualistic frameworks in her 
conceptualization of subjectivity in her characters, I will highlight one more aspect that is 
pertinent to this question: that of the characters Caesar and the slave, and their relationship to the 
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utopic desires and structures in the novel. The problem of intersubjectivity in the following 
discussion foreshadows a more extended analysis in Chapter Five. However, it is also relevant 
here, since the question of intrasubjective construction and intersubjective relationships are 
closely related. 
 Caesar, who is the son of Gardener, is introduced in the novel as a slave who, perhaps 
because of his own subjugation by masters, attempts to denigrate M and her “land of cunts.” M 
recounts that “[h]e was either a slave, or imitating one. . . . In an extremely disorganized manner 
he told me that he was a slave from a city about two hundred miles away. . . . He preferred his 
life to mine, women were also welcome in his city, but he was disgusted by this land of cunts” 
(37). When M responds that she likes to be called a “cunt,” the slave says that he intended to 
insult her, implying that words and names can have slippery meanings and intentions (37). “A 
slave is nothing, he said. Nothing but a name.” He shows her the word “Infant” branded on his 
head, and M asks whether he wants to be called “Infant.” “Only if you want me to be what I am,” 
he responds. M prefers that “he act the part he wasn’t” (38). 
 It is in infancy that issues of domination, control and independence arise, as the child 
develops an increasing sense of her separation and individuation from the parents. According to 
Benjamin, one of the central problems in departing from dualistic notions of the self in classic 
analytic thought is that of “recognizing the other” [emphasis in original]: 
 
Establishing myself (Hegel’s “being for itself”) means winning the recognition of 
the other, and this, in turn, means I must finally acknowledge the other as existing 
for himself and not just for me. The process we call differentiation proceeds 
through the movement of recognition, its flow from subject to subject, from self 
to other and back. The nature of this movement is necessarily contradictory, 
paradoxical. Only by deepening our understanding of this paradox can we 
broaden our picture of human development to include not only the separation but 




Benjamin’s image of a bird flying in two different directions at once nicely echoes the 
conceptualization of cognitive processes and the reading strategies in the poetry I have presented 
thus far. The simultaneous and dialogical coexistence of contradictory movements and terms 
takes the form of a paradox, which we will encounter again in the context of intersubjectivity in 
the discussion of Emmanuel Levinas, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, and Leslie Scalapino in Chapter 
Five. Benjamin’s model of intersubjectivity overturns Hegel’s theory of the recognition of the 
other as a competitive struggle. In his analysis of the relation between self and other, Hegel 
posits, in one stage in the development of self-consciousness, “two self-conscious individuals” 
whose relation “is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death 
struggle.” 52 If a subject kills the other, the subject’s need for recognition by the other in order to 
establish his own status as separate being is thwarted. The resolution of this struggle is the 
domination of one by the other. Since Hegel takes as a given the necessity of an independent 
consciousness being for itself, and Hegel’s the ever-developing dialectical progression toward a 
higher social unity, the object or other continues to exist for a subject. For Benjamin, however, 
“[t]he ideal ‘resolution’ of the paradox of recognition is for it to continue as a constant tension”: 
“true independence means sustaining the essential tension of these contradictory impulses; that 
is, both asserting the self and recognizing the other.”53 If one cannot recognize the other as 
subject, as opposed to an object that exists for one’s own subjecthood, then the result is 
domination.54 Benjamin recognizes this possibility yet also suggests the possibility for the 
movement of non-resolution, which means continual dialogue between the contradictory 
positions within the subject. This principle of reciprocity between the contradictory aspects of a 
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self is demonstrated in Gardener of Stars in the relationships among Caesar, the slave, and 
Gardener. 
 Throughout Harryman’s novel, Caesar and the slave both have independent existences, 
yet they also seem to be interchangeable, flip sides of one another in a single being. They both, 
for example, have the word “Infant” branded on their heads (38, 44). Because of his dual status 
as dominator and dominated, Caesar is a contradictory being. He “can act the part but he can’t be 
a slave, even if he has no power. Infant is branded on his head. He is a walking contradiction. 
My greatest desire is to inhabit paradox, make the world big enough for the both of us in our co-
constructed movie” (44-45). In order to “make the world big enough” for both of them, Gardener 
must discover how to retain the possibility of the coexistence of contradictory states so as not to 
banish Caesar entirely, which would be to exchange one dualistic condition for another. If Caesar 
is allowed to “rule the roost” (56), as Gardener puts it, he will dominate others, and the master 
and slave dichotomy will prevail. If Caesar is banished, a crucial aspect of the psyche will 
wither. As Benjamin points out, a more dialectical view of the psyche must be developed that 
embraces a view of the person as both an individuated, discrete being, and an intersubjective 
being, a subject interacting among other subjects: 
 
I suggest that intrapsychic and intersubjective theory should not be seen in 
opposition to each other (as they usually are) but as complementary ways of 
understanding the psyche. To recognize the intersubjective self is not to deny the 
importance of the intrapsychic: the inner world of fantasy, wish, anxiety, and 
defense; of bodily symbols and images whose connections defy the ordinary rules 
of logic and language.55 
 
Caesar thus needs to loosen a few boundaries within himself and learn to recognize others as 
subjects. And one of Gardener’s central problems in the narrative is to find a place for Caesar – 
for “His Majesty the Baby,” as Freud puts it56 – within the utopia that she is trying imaginatively 
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to construct. Gardener worries that if, in the care of others, no one will set limits on his 
omnipotent tendencies, he’ll end up lonely because he won’t be able to relate to others as 
subjects in their own right. He’ll simply “rul[e] over the roost. No one will care. I am supposed 
to be there to prevent him from thinking he’s god. It is my responsibility to bring him down for 
his own good” (56-57). In the utopia that Gardener seeks across the bridge, there’s no place for 
an absolute ruler, yet a place must paradoxically be found for Caesar, for repression is not a good 
response to the desire for power, either. Gardener hesitates to “[abandon] him to a world we have 
refused to live in” (45). She sees the task of her and others in her envisioned community as being 
“to provide a kind of human bridge between one territory or community and another and to 
deliver Caesar to the right place. When there cannot possibly be a right place for him. This story 
is not about him but about myself, or myself as him as wanting to be him” (45). Here again, the 
roles of the characters as both individuals and as parts of a single psyche is ambiguous. For 
Gardener, crossing the bridge turns into a misadventure of floating down a river and visiting 
various utopian – and dystopic, in the case of the “paternalistic boot camp” – communities. And 
Caesar proves his usefulness to Gardener: “Caesar, the mot juste ghost of the living, intervenes in 
her desire to be taken in by wedding decor and the haunting tragedy that maintains it. It is a 
world assimilated in death, and her child Caesar is the unassimilable” (65-66). Caesar thus 
prevents Gardener from being seduced into a patriarchal marriage arrangement in the harem, by 
being the unassimilable part of her consciousness. 
 Gardener abandons Caesar when he is four years old, leaving him to be raised by “M and 
Gardener’s friends” (153), for, “[a]s in many utopian fantasies, the idea of a natural mother was 
modified so that child rearing wasn’t a burden” (154). During her absence from Caesar and his 
female caregivers, Gardener joins the “City of Men” and proceeds to tear down the fences that 
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separates the yards and houses (140-143). Meanwhile, Caesar is tearing down a few borders 
within himself, fantasizing himself first as riding on a motorcycle with a girl, then being “a girl 
on a bike.” Identities of others around him also blur, for the girls that he plays with are “a little 
bit like him and a little bit like everybody else too” (155). The boundaries between master and 
slave within Caesar also shift. He is “a slave who was not a slave but a person without a clear 
designation” (130). 
 In the last chapter of Gardener’s Stars, “Not the World Beyond but the World Below,” M 
and Caesar are reunited with Gardener during a walk in the hills, and Caesar experiences rapid 
alternations in his identity. The slave is everpresent, ready to emerge as a part of who Caesar is, 
in case Caesar needs him. In the following scene, Caesar seems to be recalling his relationship 
with Henry, who is from “the land of the dead, where “all the cars are still running (160),”. 
before the “Great Collapse” that results in Gardener and M’s post-apocalyptic world (96-97). 
Caesar also thinks of death when, during their rambling walk, he and Gardener see the seated 
corpses of three women, simply because “in this world everything was desired and there had to 
be three corpses (175)”: 
 
The fact is, said Caesar, I didn’t die yet. How old are you? asked M. Get closer 
and I’ll tell you, said Caesar. M was still keeping her distance. The slave found 
this somehow agreeable. Nothing is as it seems. I am twelve I think. No not yet, 
said Gardener. Gardener had forgotten that there was a way to talk to children. 
She actually hadn’t forgotten but did not know how any more. I think that might 
be all for the best, is how she justified her own cruelty. It isn’t so mean after all is 
it? I could be dead but I’m not, said Caesar. I could be in those chairs. The skull 
could be mine. Or mine, said Gardener. She took Caesar’s hand and Caesar didn’t 
seem to like it but then he did. He wanted his mother to hold him. Even if it was 
the slave who never left his side. He and the slave were men. 
 And yet Gardener wanted everything. So the hand was somehow just part 
of everything. Caesar was first intoxicated and then rebuked, denied, crushed by 
her lusty voracious feelings of proliferation. How could you be my mother? He 
put his hand on her big belly. The baby is going to kick he announced. And it did. 
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 The slave gave a little start when he saw Caesar touch the mother again. 
He did not like Caesar’s fascination for the person who had left him for so long. 
He wanted Caesar to grow up strong as he had but connected to something useful. 
Something truthful perhaps, accurate and precise, dizzingly [sic] adult. And yet 
the slave was not simply a victim of emotion, he was not only guided and 
trampled by impulse, he did not just seek pleasure for the sake of the infancy he 
had lost. They had all lost it (176-77). 
 
The slave in Caesar at first resents Gardener’s emergent role as a mother-subject instead of 
simply an object to hold him. He distrusts Gardener’s newfound “lusty voracious feelings of 
proliferation.” But, perhaps because of Gardener’s subjective stance, Caesar didn’t die but lives 
alongside the slave in a paradoxical state. 
 Harryman’s characters resist killing off the ones that might be considered to have no 
place in their desired utopia. Instead, they are integrated, engaged, and made useful to others as 
well as to their own beings. They become engaged in a dialogue in which they must recognize 
the other as a subject with the same interdependent function within the group as their own. As 
contradictory and conflicting parts of the self, they must recognize the self not as a unity of being 
but as a multiplicity of drives, moods, positions, sexual impulses. 
 Gardener of Stars beautifully and complexly demonstrates the dialectical tensions 
between the intrasubjective and intersubjective realms. The recognition of the multiplicity of the 
former is crucial to the recognition of the differentiation between self and other. Moreover, the 
recognition of the radical alterity between self and other is, paradoxically, crucial to the 
development of non-coercive and non-dominating relationships with others, and to the 
development of feelings of empathy with others. Through the ambiguity of the status of the 
characters as arts of a self or as individual subjects, Harryman’s drama develops the idea of the 
paradoxical and simultaneous existence of both functions in a profoundly dialogical and 
dialectical dynamics of characterization. 
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 Like the work of Harryman, Weiner’s poetry demonstrates an acute awareness of the self 
as an internally dialogical and multivocal being, although Weiner takes a very different approach 
to the issue. An examination of Weiner’s writings provides a particularly instructive and unusual 
example of a multivocal poetry. Diagnosed with schizophrenia in her forties (rather late for the 
manifestation of this illness),57 Weiner experienced the onset of an ability that is unique even 
among poets, artists, and musicians who have reported exceptional neurological conditions such 
as neurasthenia, synesthesia, and schizophrenia. She saw words hovering in the air and projected 
onto walls, paper, her typewriter, people’s foreheads, and other objects, including her own 
forehead “in such a way that she [was able to perceive] them from within.”58 These words 
appeared in both color and black and white, and sometimes seem to be infused with light.59 
Weiner reports that the ability to see words was the culmination of a progression of visual 
experiences, that progressed from “feeling and seeing auras, to seeing pictures, and finally the 
slow development of seeing words which first appeared singly, then later in short phrases.”60 She 
wove these words, often along with her “own” words, to create a patchwork or dialogue of 
interacting voices. According to Weiner, the words seemed to come to her as if “external to 
herself.”61 Yet she insisted that the messages she received were quite involuntary and 
unconscious. She claimed to have no conscious control over the words that appeared before her 
or, later in her life, the voices and hallucinations that she experienced. They were part of the 
fabric of her own being, generated from a part of herself to which she had no conscious access. 
She came to engage these printed voices, these others within herself, in a dialogue.  
 The published record of these conversations constitutes a poetry that both engages and 
goes far beyond the mere neurological oddity of its genesis. Weiner was a poet before she 
experienced the onset of schizophrenic symptoms, and her use, or in a sense, her collaboration 
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with the involuntarily produced words is an artistic achievement of acute intellect and artistic 
sensibility. Moreover, her work makes a salient philosophical point about the nature of the self: 
the poetry shows the disruption of the unitary self at the same time that it continually constructs a 
self out of many selves by engaging these multiple voices in conversation. Hers is quite literally 
a poetics of intrapsychic multivocality. 
 My use of Weiner to illustrate a poetics of multiple selfhood that I am describing as a 
strategy, as in the case of Harryman, is not entirely accurate, since she has no control over the 
words that appear to her, insisting that they are unconscious. Without denying the pathology of 
Weiner’s condition, for which she doubtlessly suffered, I would point out that our own thoughts 
are not somehow magically generated by a rational consciousness, but are generated from 
regions of the mind that are not accessible to consciousness. We know how we might respond to 
a stimulus before our conscious mind becomes aware of our possible actions, words or thoughts. 
Recalling Damasio’s admonishment regarding the myth of the autonomous and inner-directed 
self, “we are hopelessly late for consciousness.” By the same token, we might challenge 
Harryman’s strategy as a consciously determined and rational working out of voices. Harryman 
makes use of a rich jumble of dreamlike material whose structure and meaning hover like auras 
around the congeries of characters and events. Short of proposing a schizophrenic continuum, it 
is possible to see a relation between the dialogical poetry of Weiner and Harryman. Both 
recognize that the self has many voices that are in constant dialogue among themselves, on 
conscious and unconscious levels. 
 In order to understand something of how Weiner’s poetry looks and works, I will 
examine a page from her book-length work Clairvoyant Journal, bearing the date “3/10.”62 The 
poem is worth presenting in full in order to see the full effect of its concrete image 
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(see Figure 3). In Clairvoyant Journal, Weiner indicates the words she sees in both capital letters 
and italics. These words sometimes overlap one another and interrupt her “own” words, the ones 
in her conscious inner dialogue, establishing a conversation among the various visual “voices” 
and Weiner’s conscious voice.63 Weiner’s poetry seems obsessed with the process of its own 
construction, and with the examination of the bits and pieces of language that construct 
communication but that might disrupt it as well. In her journal, her self as site of multiple voices 
– both conscious and unconscious – is revealed in its multi-faceted moods: the voices are in turn 
humorous, demanding, despairing, frustrated, joyful, and playful.  
 One of the most obvious things, both visually and verbally, about the text of Clairvoyant 
Journal is the incessant interruptions of the voices. Hardly does one thought become articulated 
before another thread take its place. The interruptions are differentiated from the stream of 
Weiner’s conscious thoughts, “just trying to get through the day,”64 and are visually indicated in 
the alternation of normal typography with upper case and italic words. Sometimes, a word 
interrupts another word, literally cutting across it on the page, as in “get exciJUNKtement.” And 
Weiner (and her multiple inner voices) often deals with this interruption by commenting on it, as 
in the first statement of this journal entry: “How can I describe anything when all these 
interruptions keep arriving and then tell me I dont describe it well.” There is a playfulness about 
this statement, for the italics voice interrupts her very statement about interruptions, filling in a 
crucial word in her sentence. Thus, although the voices interrupt, they also complete, fill in gaps. 
And when Weiner’s conscious voice tells herself to “Try praying,” and she does so by beginning 
the Lord’s prayer, “Our father who art . . .,” the italic voice jumps in playfully, as if assuming the 
voice of God, “be right over.” 
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 At times, Weiner’s journal-voice comments on the words that she sees, which are often in 
the form of imperatives and instructions. One voice insistently tells her to “GO TO 
COUNTDOWN” (“got that for days and yesterday it didn’t stop”). She goes to Bloomingdale’s, 
tries on a pair of “maroon velvet pants,” which at first she doesn’t buy. But the voice won’t leave 
her alone, so she returns to buy them (“it’s better than seeing GO TO COUNTDOWN for the rest 
of my life peace so they fit well”). The mundanity of the voices in constant dialogue regarding 
the little rituals of everyday life – shopping, calling or visiting friends, seeing art galleries, fixing 
household objects, doing the laundry, making tea, and so forth – situate the words of the poem 
within the minute-to-minute goings-on of a life. And although Weiner was an extraordinary 
person with very unusual abilities, the events that she documents through the incessant chatter 
within her mind are often of the most banal kind. The scolding voice that tells her “Hannah 
behave yourself stupid silly”65 or that insists that she buy a particular article of clothing, or that 
nags her to make that phone call to a friend, bring to mind our own dialogues within ourselves, 
the voices within our own psyches. They remind us that we are not alone within ourselves, and 
that we are constituted by the voices and attitudes of all of our combined experiences, including 
the voices of others, and perhaps if we would listen more closely to those voices, we would 
discover a far less organically integrated self, and instead one that is continually in the process of 
constructing itself. It is as if in Weiner’s microscopic, blow-by-blow diary of the mind, all the 
thousands of synapses involved in the minute decisions and activities of the mind are exposed for 
their complex circuitry, and we see, not a self, but many selves bantering, pushing and pulling, 
vying for expression. 
 Charles Bernstein points out the political implications of Weiner’s emphasis on the visual 
manifestation of the language that comes to her, through typographical differentiations among 
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the voices and threads, and the dialogical nature of her poetry. If we all engaged with the many 
words that each of us daily sees before us with the kind of critical dialogue in which she engages, 
we might take the meaning and implications of what we read much less for granted. Weiner 
works on “the language that fills, and often enough, controls our lives . . . ([Weiner] says ‘group 
mind’).” By actually seeing the elements of her work before her, they are thus rendered 
“physicalized, palpable”; when we see language thus in operation, “we can start to free ourselves 
from a compulsive obedience to it,” but only if we simultaneously critique the authority of the 
words before us.66 
 By recording her mental chatter, Weiner renders the hundreds of little dramas of her inner 
conversations visible and materialized. She shows the non-linear aspect of these boisterous and 
insistently digressive conversations by inserting responses and interjections between the lines, as 
in her observation that “Joan’s / head says LAUGH as she / laughs” and the spoonerism 
“QUINK THICK / LY.” Sometimes she records the visualized voices diagonally across the page, 
as in “IT WRITES ITSELF.” Through such unorthodox placements of the multiple voices that 
populate the pages of her journal, Weiner insists that we question our linear reading habits, 
which, she suggests, may be alien from our mental processes. We must be prepared to read a 
page in Clairvoyant Journal in the way that we may not always be aware that we think: attuned 
to the chaotic swirl of mental voices that interact to produce subtle and multiple meanings. 
 In reading Clairvoyant Journal, one may also become aware of the ways in which the 
debris of our culture litters our mental landscape and dominates our thoughts. Note, for example, 
the word “MONEY” in large boldface letters, which ends “3/10,” and which exerts a pull 
throughout the entry. Weiner counters obsessive materialistic desire by counting backwards (“10, 
9, 8, 7”), which corresponds ironically to Bloomingdale’s “countdown” sale. When we see 
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language at work in such a palpable fashion, we can begin to question its more baneful 
pressures.67 
 The work of Kristeva can serve as a useful theoretical counterpart to the multivocal 
poetry of Weiner and clarify, from a psychoanalytic perspective, notions of a disunified self in 
dialogue with the conceptualization of a whole or unified self. A key concern in Kristeva’s work 
is to dismantle notions of a unitary self and instead posit a “pulverized” signifying self. Her 
psychoanalytic theory of avant-garde poetry can productively engage with experimental poetry, 
particularly in regard to its interest in multivocality and reflexivity. The investigation and 
questioning of linguistic habits by contemporary experimental poets explains much of the 
metalinguistic emphasis in their work, which is often engaged in a dialogue regarding the 
validity of its own existence and mode of expression. As Ron Silliman succinctly states, it is a 
“philosophy of practice in language.”68 In experimental poetry, the transmission and reception of 
knowledge is understood to be a radically decentralized and uncertain exercise. Kristeva’s theory 
provides a psychoanalytic account of the disjunctive nature of such poetry as well as its 
preoccupation with reflexivity. Generating a dialogue between Kristeva’s theories of language 
acquisition and Weiner’s poetry demonstrates ways in which Weiner’s multivocal poetry 
exemplifies the contradictory and heterogeneous functioning of what Kristeva terms the semiotic 
chora. 
 Kristeva’s theories of the avant-garde are relevant to the criticism of contemporary 
experimental poetry and poetics, particularly in relation to thinking of the heterogeneous nature 
of the self in terms of linguistic disruption. Her monumental work on the conjunction of avant-
garde poetic practice and the process of language acquisition, Revolution in Poetic Language, 
coincided with the emergence of the emergence in the early 1970s of the American language 
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poets.69 As I mentioned in Chapter One, an early matrix for the sophisticated theoretical 
development of contemporary experimental poetics was L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E (February 
1978 – October 1981), a journal dedicated to the discussion of a poetry whose practitioners share 
with Kristeva many concerns regarding poetic expression and its political implications. Since 
that publication began, many books have been written to chart and describe the historical 
phenomenon of language poetry and to elucidate its theoretical premises. 
 Yet despite Kristeva’s claims for the psychoanalytical underpinnings of radical poetic 
expression, her theories are not often mentioned in analyses of the philosophical and political 
implications of language poetry, and if so, often as a footnote to the theoretical materials that 
influenced the language poets in their quest to throw off entrenched linguistic habits.70 Perhaps 
the reason that experimental poets and their theorists have tended to shy away from 
psychoanalytic approaches to the poetry and to embrace deconstructive and reader response 
theories is their rejection of the practices of what Bernstein calls the “official verse-culture of the 
university writing programs,”71 which tend to stress finding ones unique voice and authentic self 
(Plumly’s mandates for good poetry, discussed earlier in this chapter, are exemplary of this 
tendency). Psychoanalytic theories of language acquisition inevitably rely on analyses of the 
triadic relationship among child, mother and father. They tend to portray the Oedipal narrative as 
the infant individual’s heroic struggles to understand and come to terms with the mighty parental 
figures who loom above and who, as seemingly omnipotent sources of pleasure and discomfort, 
oscillate between behaving as the infant’s allies and foes. Such narratives sometimes emphasize 
the development of the individual as a discrete personality. Perhaps for apologists and theorists 
of experimental poetries, such analyses seem uncomfortably close to the family romance that 
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mainstream poets so often psychologize in their poetry from the stance of the authoritative 
narrative voice.72 
 Far from positing a development of a unified self, Kristeva’s theory of the divided self 
focuses on the transformations that occur in an individual when as an infant he or she acquires 
the ability to use language to represent phenomena. Thus her theory constitutes in part a narrative 
of the initiation of the individual into linguistic signification; the subsequent repression of the 
infantile state, which is ordered by bodily drives, through the linguistic ordering of the 
phenomenal world into hierarchies and divisions (as between subject and object); and the 
reemergence of the pre-representational state in disruptions of the habitual symbolic ordering. 
Other theories that posit a divided self focus not so much on ontogenetic narratives but on the 
synchronic state of cognition. These theories most often seek to displace or at least balance 
notions of a homunculus at the helm guiding cognitive activity, and posit instead cognitive 
systems that are inherently nonunified and decentralized and that function in reciprocal and 
interdependent ways. 
 One of the risks of Kristeva’s account of the divided or multiple self is that of any 
narrative: its construction is in part dependent on the shape and teleology of previous stories. 
Kristeva’s version accepts much of the terminology and givens of her predecessors, Freud and 
Lacan, including the controversial concept of the Oedipal stage of development.73 Kristeva’s 
conceptual assumptions, as well as her focus on the development of the individual in society, 
might lead to a neglect of the historical contextualization of the psychological and linguistic 
ontogenetic phenomena she seems to accept as being pervasive and universal. One might 
misleadingly assume that initiation into symbolization is inevitably an initiation into cultural and 
social authoritarianism, a condition which must be liberated by the ecstatic irruption of the pre-
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representational and drive-motivated chora or unconscious. The state of representation is no 
more tyrannical than the state of non-representation is liberatory. These states are capable of 
contributing to either socio-political condition, and in varying proportions and degrees. Some 
skepticism and caveats are thus in order in a consideration of Kristeva’s contributions to a theory 
of experimental poetry. 
 Before proceeding with further analysis of work by Weiner, it will be useful to have a 
basic notion of Kristeva’s method in her narrative tracing the origins of semantic disruption in 
avant-garde poetic expression (or in any expression, for that matter, that disrupts semantic 
certainty and any notion of a unified self). In spite of the caveats just mentioned, Kristeva’s 
positioning of the account of linguistic disruption within a narrative of individual development 
also constitutes its strength for my purposes. Her concern to trace the origins of poetic language 
ontogenetically and to describe the diachronic unfolding of syntactic disruption facilitates the 
dialectical motion of reciprocity between terms that I am describing from a number of 
perspectives in the present work. Her diachronic method shows the disruption of the symbolic as 
a processual and interdependent motion between terms over time, rather than as a relatively 
steady-state description of non-linear, nonhierarchical, and distributed cognitive systems. She 
thus explains the disruption of boundaries between representational and nonrepresentational 
impulses as a motion of continual circulation of impulses necessary to one another, and indeed 
contained within one another. I am suggesting that this mutually interdependent relationship of 
impulses within the self, and the dialectical movement in the signifying process is related to 
reciprocity and interdependence between subject and object explored in the previous chapter. 
 Although much of her work deals with the relationship between the pre- and post-
linguistic stages in human development, it is above all in Revolution in Poetic Language that 
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Kristeva proposes a psychoanalytic explanation of how disruptive, avant-garde poetic practice 
comes into being. The semiotic chora,74 which was repressed after the subject’s entrance into the 
realm of the symbolic, reemerges and destabilizes those conditions that symbolic language 
instituted: the illusion of the unified subject, the division and hierarchical positioning of 
subject/object and signifier/signified through socialization and syntax, the representation of the 
world by the word or symbol, the investment in mimesis and verisimilitude, and the subject’s 
taking of positions and forming of judgments. Poetic language emerges when “those drives that 
the thetic phase was not able to sublate . . . by linking them into signifier and signified”75 cannot 
be contained, and become posited as autonomous in relation to the thetic and the symbolic. Thus 
in its attack on the symbolic, avant-garde poetic language places the divided subject in 
process/on trial [en proces].76 
 The double meaning of which Kristeva so aptly takes advantage in the phrase en proces 
expresses both the putting-on-trial of the illusion of the post-thetic unified subject, and the idea 
of the reemergence of process in the semiotic, as opposed to the structural basis of the symbolic. 
The subject distorts and takes apart syntax in order to expose the “defensive construction” of 
language that “protects the body from the attack of drives by making it a place in which the body 
can signify itself through positions.” Kristeva thus conceives of the reemergence of the semiotic 
as “an influx of the death drive, which no signifier, no mirror, no other, and no mother could ever 
contain.”77 
 In terms of Kristeva’s scheme of language acquisition, the functioning of language as an 
invisible conduit between signifier and signified corresponds with the symbolic, which tends to 
privilege the signified and to mask the instability of its meaning. The functioning of language as 
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a medium with its own materiality and expressive energy independent of its fungibility in regards 
to the meaning it is intended to convey, corresponds to the pre-representational semiotic drives. 
 But words never exclusively belong to either the symbolic or the semiotic, for there is 
 
a necessary dialectic between the two modalities of the signifying process which 
is constitutive of the subject. Because the subject is always both semiotic and 
symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either “exclusively” semiotic 
or “exclusively” symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness 
to both.78 
 
Since the semiotic chora is “a space in itself” and by nature does not take positions or form 
judgments, it is unable to “challenge meaning’s closure.” Only a “dialectical oscillation between 
the semiotic and the symbolic” can produce a new language that is capable of pulverizing 
signification.79  
 It is important to recognize the heterogeneous nature of the semiotic, whose essential 
character is negativity or, Kristeva’s preferred term for this state, rejet (rejection).80 It is a space 
in which the fort-da81 game is replayed over and over, and eventually reaches a crisis in the 
eruption of the signifier as representative of the object and in the individuation of the self: 
 
By dint of accumulating ruptures, and through this heterogeneity, which use the 
presignifying engram produced in the absence of any object isolated in itself, 
rejection becomes stabilized. Its tendency toward death is deferred by this 
symbolic heterogeneity: the body, as if to prevent its own destruction, reinscribes 
[re-marque] rejection and, through a leap, represents it in absentia as a sign.82 
 
Paradoxically, although the motion of rejection in the semiotic is the basis upon which the 
symbolic builds its own illusions of selfhood, this same “rejection is also at the root of its 
destruction (172).” This contradiction is also at the heart of a double movement that is the means 
by which a poetics maximizes its radical political edge: that in which the poetics both disrupts 
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habitual discursive practices and ontological constructs and uses the habitual, symbolic mode to 
articulate its critique of the dominant modes of thinking of being in the world. Such contradiction 
underlies the relationship between the symbolic and the latent or emergent semiotic through 
poetic language: “poetry becomes an explicit confrontation between jouissance and the thetic, 
that is, a permanent struggle to show the facilitation of drives within the linguistic order itself” 
(81). Such contradiction inheres in the relationship between poetic practice and the violent act of 
sacrifice or sacred murder. The thetic sacrifices the semiotic and instates the symbolic: “what is 
violent is the irruption of the symbol, killing substance to make it signify” (75). The sacrifice 
reenacts this repression of the semiotic, yet this reenactment also enables reentry into the 
jouissance that was denied by the symbolic. It is as if the reenactment of the sacrificial moment 
of the thetic, the reenactment of the “confrontation between jouissance and the thetic” creates 
something of a gateway to the unconscious, which the sacrifice resembles (78). By “reproducing 
the process of [the] production of [symbolic functioning]” (75) through sacrifice, as through 
poetic practice, “the subject crosses the border of the symbolic and reaches the semiotic chora, 
which is on the other side of the social frontier” (79). Thus poetic language ends up sacrificing 
the symbolic order within that very order; poetic language asserts its political challenge “within 
and against the social order”; it is, paradoxically, “the precondition of the survival and 
revolution” of the symbolic order. As Kelly Oliver aptly explains Kristeva’s concept of the 
heterogeneity of words, 
 
[I]t is the dialectical oscillation between the semiotic and the symbolic that breaks 
and redefines the limits of language because a space in itself, the semiotic chora 
cannot challenge meaning’s closure. Only a new way of speaking can do that. 
And this new way of speaking comes only through acknowledging that the 
signifying process is necessarily a heterogeneous process.83 
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 It is just this dialectical relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic in Kristeva’s theory 
that enables one to account for moments in contemporary poetic texts that accomplish this 
double movement of the shattering of discourse, experience, and subjecthood, along with a 
critique of the dominant practice and conception of these constructs. 
 Such assumption of mastery by the speaking self also posits that self as a unitary whole, 
an impervious construction with a distinct individuality. If we have a notion of the self as a 
unified whole, a totalized system of body, drives, symbolizations, and so forth, we then 
relinquish the idea of a self that may not transgress itself to become reflexive. Vantage points 
from which to posit or imagine language or desire referring to itself need not be thought of as 
taking place outside a discrete self. To have such a vantage point need not imply objectifying the 
self or achieving an absolute position exterior to language or drives or body. To understand the 
concept of enacting such a position, one must have a notion of the self as performing many 
selves, as the sujet en procès. The key word is “enact,” as distinguished from “represent,” for, as 
Oliver emphasizes, 
 
poetic language discharges rather than represents drives. In this way, the 
repressed makes its way into the Symbolic: the unconscious drives become 
conscious, but they do so in a way that is analogous to the psychoanalytic process 
and not merely a form of mimesis; poetic language enacts a transference between 
drives and language rather than an imitation of drives in language.84 
 
The chora releases drives into consciousness and allows the enacting of dialogue within the self; 
it “dissolves identity.”85 One could equally apply this movement to that of experimental poetry, 
which, to quote Bob Perelman, “critiques the norms of voice and self.”86 However, in a recent 
interview, Perelman also acknowledges the “continuous tension” between the impulses that unify 
and shatter identity, envisioning the flux of identity in experimental poetry as a “contest between 
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various centers”: “[I]dentity is something you can never overturn once and for all, any more than 
you can establish it. It is a continuous tension that sometimes threatens to close down and 
harden, but can sometimes open up.”87 Perelman – and many other contemporary experimental 
poets – are less interested in “re-establish[ing] a binary” by merely upholding the unraveling of 
identity, or the presenting of unraveled identity, as an essentialist ideal. In the 1970s, such ideals 
were more commonly proclaimed, in reaction to the dominant ideal of the academic workshop 
poem of the 1960s and 1970s, which typically stressed individual self-expression and a centered 
authorial voice. However, as Perelman wisely states, “Writing focused on textuality doesn’t 
preclude any sort of readerly identification – or disidentification. There’s always a continuum to 
reading, from accurate registration to all kinds of resistance, critique, disobedience.”88 The 
processual and dynamic tension between the banding and disbanding of the voices of a self in 
Weiner’s work exemplifies well the intrasubjective dialectical process I am describing in the 
present chapter. 
 In order to show this facet of Weiner’s clairvoyant poetry and demonstrate how 
Kristeva’s psychoanalytic theory might be helpful in analyzing it, I will examine a concrete 
poem from Little Books / Indians, which, lacking a title, will be referred to by its first line, “I 
sjust.”89 As with the previous poem, it is worth presenting this one in toto, since its effect as a 
concrete poem is dependent upon seeing the whole (see Figure 4). In this work, Weiner claims to 
have seen all the words and letters that she writes and arranges. The concrete form of the untitled 
poem we are looking at creates (mimics) syntax through its structure – like a diagramed sentence 
– as it simultaneously destroys it: the very form of the contradictory state of the semiotic I have 
been discussing. The purpose of sentence diagraming, which was a common grade school 
exercise during Weiner’s youth, is to highlight the logical structure of sentences, showing their 
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abstract connectedness and relationships. The exercise is a sort of linguistic geometry in which 
the particularities of a sentence become idealized and hierarchicalized in structural relationships. 
The noun and verb occupy the most important places, and all the other elements of the sentence 
exist in a formal relationship of subordination to their foundational dichotomy. 
 However, the fragmented words and interrupted sentences of Weiner’s mock-diagram 
work against the idea of ordered and hierarchicalized syntax and place that syntax under extreme 
pressure to produce multiple meanings and disrupt its normative structure. In Kristeva’s words, 
the irruption of the chora does not produce the suppression of the sentence but instead, its 
infinitization. For example, the first, fragmentary, group of letters, “I sjust,”: can be read several 
ways: 1) “I is just” – “I” is just, ethically in the right, a “just” construction. But who, or which 
“I,” is “speaking” these words? Because we have no clear idea of a unified self or voice 
speaking, the very source of the words becomes problematic, and the idea of an ethical, unitary 
self is questioned. 2) “Is just.” In this reading, we have the predicate but no subject. However, 
the subject is embedded within the construction, since the “I” of “Is” stands apart. Is the subject 
present or not? The answer is ambiguous and contradictory. 3) “I (s)just.” The “s” could be read 
as silent, a dead letter or a pleonastic letter, like the appendix of one’s body that no longer serves 
any function. This letter reminds us of the materiality of language, the “thinginess” of the letters 
and words that are not inevitable but instead come together in particular ways by habitual and 
socialized usage. It is these habits of language that Weiner disrupts. 
 Weiner’s fragmented diagram is also rendered highly self-conscious: the very theme that 
the words explore is the sentence, and sentence structure; the thesis is a debate, never resolved, 
between the imperative to “finish the sentence” and the equally demanding injunction, “donst 
continue,” and “dont continue with this sentence.” Another voice reminds her of the “structure / 
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stupid” at the same time that the very idea of received structure is destabilized within the 
framework of the poem. The structure not only of sentences but of letters is also explored: the 
words “STRUCTURE” AND “SENTENCE” appear without the T’s crossed, followed by the 
incomplete note, “cross my ts / across the” The habit that is formed by the act of having read the 
words “sentence” and “structure” several times during the poem assists us in reading the 
fragmented letters as uncrossed t’s instead of as capital I’s. But the effect is unsettling, and 
reminds us of the materiality of language – from its syntax to the smallest units of its 
composition, its letters, and even the parts of letters – and the possibilities of its radical 
disjunctures and instabilities. 
 The acquisition of the ability to articulate syntactically belongs to the thetic break 
between the semiotic chora and the symbolic stage. The division between subject and predicate 
“represent[s] the division inherent in the thetic.”90 In fact, syntax and the thetic are inseparable, 
and this indivisibility “implies that signification . . . is a process in which opposable ‘terms’ are 
posited as phenomena but can be identified as the two faces (denotation-enunciation) of the 
thetic break” (55). Syntax is predicated on the absence of the subject: he or she gets left out in 
the transformation from drive to signifier within the rupture into heterogeneity of the symbolic 
(55). When, as in poetic discourse, the semiotic chora brings about the reemergence of the 
subject and disrupts “the thetic position by redistributing the signifying order, . . . the denoted 
object and the syntactic relation are disturbed as well.” “The possibility of both verisimilar 
denotation and communication” are still ensured, for grammatical markers and divisions are 
maintained. However, 
 
the completion of the grammatical sequence does not take place because the 
division is not completely rejoined in a NP-VP, modified-modifier, etc. whole. 
This ellipsis or syntactic non-completion can be interpreted as the thetic break’s 
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inability to remain simply intra-syntactic – a division within a signifying 
homogeneity. A heterogeneous division, an irruption of the semiotic chora, marks 
each ‘category’ of the syntactic sequence and prevents the ‘other’ from being 
posited as an identifiable syntactic term (subject or predicate, modified or 
modifier, etc.). In this realization of the signifier, particularly as it is seen in poetic 
texts, alterity is maintained within the pure signifier and/or in the simply syntactic 
element only with difficulty. For the Other has become heterogeneous and will 
not remain fixed in place: it negativizes all terms, all posited elements, and thus 
syntax, threatening them with possible dissolution. (56) 
 
In other words, the breach between self and other, subject and object, the subsequent 
representation of the opposed entities by signs, and their reassimilation within syntactical 
structures are subject to attack by the irruption of the semiotic chora’s drives, because the 
signifying process is not homogeneous, but instead inherently heterogeneous. The process was 
born out of a heterogeneous condition of conflicting drives, and the possibility of its 
destabilization, fragmentation, and infinitization always remains language’s radically disruptive 
potential. Grammatical non-completion and ellipses allow the terms of the syntactical units to be 
linked together and recombined ad infinitum (56). 
 The interruptions and fragmentations of voice in Weiner’s poetry signify the death of the 
unitary self (think of Weiner’s frustration at not being able to describe anything because of the 
continual interruption of the “voices”), but also the positing of its reconstruction (through the 
coming together of many voices interwoven in conversation). One of the effects of the presence 
of multiple voices is that the subject as an impossibly unified construct seems to be 
simultaneously constructed and deconstructed – she is everywhere and nowhere, and constantly 
rehearses her appearance and disappearance. This resembles the process of drives and stases that 
constitute the semiotic stage. Kristeva posits that during the acquisition of language and the 
entrance into the symbolic, “the production of [the] subject [is] a process, an intersection – an 
impossible unity.91 Negation,92 which characterizes the post-semiotic subject, “serves, along with 
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syntax, as the strongest breakwater for protecting the unity of the subject and offers the most 
tenacious resistance to the shattering of the verbal function in the psychotic process.”93 On the 
other hand, “the semiotic chora is no more than the place where the subject is both generated and 
negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that 
produce him.”94 Furthermore, 
 
In schizophrenia and in the poetic language of the modern text, negation and 
syntactic structure find their status transformed and their normativeness disturbed: 
they become textual phenomena that bespeak a specific economy of drives, an 
expenditure or a shattering of the “drive vector,” and hence a modification of the 
relation between the subject and the outside. Negativity, stopped and absorbed 
within the negation of judgment, therefore shows through only in modifications of 
the function of negation or in syntactic and lexical modifications, which are 
characteristic of psychotic discourse and poetry” (124). 
 
Weiner’s poetry manifests the semiotic functioning of the alternating charges and stases that 
posit social structure and negate it. The social is predicated on the separation of self and other; 
and on the distinction of voices. Weiner’s poetics posits the self as other – the place where 
(perhaps) repressed aspects of the self continually erupt, a place in which the self has not yet 
been (irretrievably) distinguished from other, and thus is other. The internalized other(s) 
continually shatter the continuity and wholeness of self and discourse, but also create the means 
by which they may continually come together. Thus the contradictory and heterogeneous nature 
of the semiotic emerges in the multiple voices that constitute Weiner’s speaking subject (or 
subjects). 
 Since the disruptions enacted by experimental poetic texts maximize the possibilities of 
language, allowing a seemingly endless proliferation of meanings, such texts maintain their 
capacity to subvert the position of the subject as signifying practice. Experimental poetics has 
always operated against the symbolic. Thus it will always maintain the potential to change our 
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relationship to self and language, and to the dominance of the rationality and transparence of our 
linguistic expressions. Kristeva’s theories of the heterogeneity of the semiotic and symbolic, and 
of the dialectical interacting between “rejection and identification,”95 theorize the condition and 
constant rehearsal of contradictoriness and multivocality in experimental poetics. 
 Like the psychoanalytic theorizing of Kristeva and Benjamin, as well as many 
contemporary cognitive scientists, the works of both Weiner and Harryman begin with the 
premise of intrasubjective plurality, which is generally presented as a necessary and valued 
condition. Indeed, these poets’ recognition of the multiplicity within the self makes the presiding 
homunculus of Plumly’s poetics seem rather lonely. Yet Weiner and Harryman do not stop with 
a reductive celebration of that plural condition, but instead create texts that present a continually 
circulating dialogue between the impulses toward a multiple self and the desire for a unified or 
integrated self. The dichotomies within the self, whether these poets express them as power 
relations, as in master and slave; or as semantic relations, as in the tension between symbolic 
representation and its destabilization; or as the relation between the multivocal self and the 
conceptualization of subjective coherence and unity, remain unresolved. Their utopia consists of 
a dynamic dialogue in which each side recognizes the intrinsic value of its interlocutor other. The 
result is not a conflicted or unhappy self, but one fully engaged in its own plurality, and thus one 
more able to recognize the other as a subject in his or her own right. 
 Dialectical movement in intersubjective relations will receive a fuller treatment in 
Chapter Five. In the next chapter, I will turn to the subject’s experience of time and the creation 
of narrative in the poetry of Scalapino and Hejinian. 
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READING THE MINDS OF EVENTS: 
LESLIE SCALAPINO’S PLURAL TIME 
AND LYN HEJINIAN’S ONGOING LIFE 
 
In a stream of reassuring 
argument the memory 
forms a flight of steps 
swinging out over the 
 
Void ...1  
   Norma Cole 
 
Narrative is neither an oppressor to be obliterated nor 
the validating force of all literary impulse.2  
 
   Carla Harryman 
 
 One of the primary arguments against experimental poetry is that it attempts to do away 
with that most diachronically ubiquitous of human linguistic activity, the telling of stories. 
However universal it may be, the activity of selecting events, linking them in a relationship of 
causality, and giving them significance through narrative structure and commentary, is fraught 
with social and political implications. Hayden White, for example, demonstrates compellingly 
some of the tropes that historical narratives tend to fall into, and Michel Foucault reminds us of 
the relations of power that always shape the reconstructions of past events. By the nature of their 
project of questioning mnemonic, cognitive and linguistic habits, experimental poets have 
generally been skeptical about attributing truth-value to narratives. However, to conclude that on 
the whole these poets abandon or disparage narrative would be at best a reductive exercise. In 
this chapter, I will demonstrate that experimental poets Lyn Hejinian and Leslie Scalapino 
acknowledge the natural and even necessary human proclivity to shape narratives and at the 
same time engage this conceptual habit in a dialogue with its contrary, the understanding of 
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narratives as events in themselves that can never be considered as faithful recreations of 
phenomena that exist no longer. 
 The works of Scalapino and Hejinian are well suited for my analysis of the dialectics of 
narrative in contemporary experimental poetry. First, the work by Scalapino that I examine is 
stylistically very different from the work by Hejinian that I analyze. Moreover, the two works by 
Scalapino that I analyze are from different periods in her writing career and reflect a stylistic, if 
not philosophical, change. The various approaches of Hejinian and Scalapino to complicating 
questions of time, memory and narrative involve juxtaposing different kinds of narrative and 
anti-narrative material. Moreover, the texture of referentiality and linearity in each work is 
markedly different. Nevertheless, Hejinian’s project in My Life of interrogating autobiographical 
conventions and Scalapino’s project in “The Woman Who Could Read the Minds of Dogs” and 
New Time of investigating the roots of memory in the perceptual process share a similar 
philosophical basis. I wish to demonstrate that widely divergent approaches can accomplish the 
kind of dialectical interrogation of time, memory and narrative that I describe in this chapter. 
 Let us look briefly at two works by Hejinian, in order to understand how works with very 
different approaches to referentiality, or to put it a different yet related way, narrative linearity, 
can harbor very similar dialectical strategies underneath their more superficial differences. 
Hejinian has written works that are almost as disjunctive as any in the literature of twentieth-
century avant-garde poetry. Consider the following opening four lines of Writing Is an Aid to 
Memory: 
 
apple is shot nod 
                          ness seen know it around saying 
                                        think for a hundred years 
  but and perhaps utter errors direct the point to a meadow3  
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The effect can be discombobulating, even after many readings. A dedicated close reading, 
however, will yield some clues as to ways one might approach such a dauntingly dissociative 
text. The first line, “apple is shot nod,” a possible allusion to the legendary Swiss rebel William 
Tell, contains the seed of the problem of uncertainty of meaning that is explored throughout the 
remainder of the work. The passive construction of “apple is shot” leaves out the characters of 
the drama: who shot the apple, and from whose head? And who nods? The observer of the apple-
shooting, the reader of the statement, or, more playfully, William Tell’s son, now that it is safe to 
do so? The pithiness of the opening statement gives arch, nodding approval of an achieved 
target. Yet this nod, which seems to convey, “Target hit. End of story.” is belied by the absence 
at the heart of the story’s thumbnail sketch, and by the meandering and collage-like 
argumentation that follows, which questions one’s ability to “know it around saying,” even if one 
were to “think for a hundred years.” The “utter errors” inherent in linguistic expression and in 
thought, indicate a system in which words do not merely “point” to their objects with a terse nod 
of certainty, but refer instead “to a meadow of possibilities.” 
 The suffix “ness” also presents a puzzle of uncertainty and absence. It is the first of many 
word fragments – mostly endings, such as “sopher’s,” “spondent,” and “tinuous” – sprinkled 
throughout the work.4 Peter Quartermain points out that these truncations both suggest multiple 
whole words that might connect with the parts, and present the reader “with the resistant 
materiality of the word.”5 In normal usage, the suffix “-ness” transforms an adjective into a 
noun; its use in the poem as the nominal object of “seen” creates a grammatical pun. The suffix 
is what it normally does. Moreover, “ness” is almost the phonetic reverse of “seen.” This near-
palindrome creates a mirror image of “seen” in “ness,” making concrete the self-reflexiveness of 
the text in its exploration of the dialectics of meaning. And lastly, if not exhaustively, “ness” is 
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also a noun meaning a cape or promontory that projects into a body of water,6 or perhaps a 
peninsula of groundedness jutting into the sea of meaning it has occasioned. The multiple 
meanings that even a single suffix engenders creates a semantic richness and diffuseness that 
nonetheless can be interpreted as coalescing around the theme of meaning. 
 Thus, Hejinian shakes the stability of meaning and linearity in a very fundamental way, 
and yet she does give a nod of acknowledgment to the fact that her words are not totally 
arbitrarily selected but will have connotations in common for many readers. For example, the 
image of the apple being shot are likely to evoke for many readers the story of William Tell. 
Words have a very practical, mundane effect, but on the other hand, the old dream of analytical 
philosophy, in which words might refer more precisely to their target objects, is everywhere 
unraveled in Hejinian’s text. The arrow hits and yet does not hit, the apple of referentiality, both 
at the same time. 
 Now consider the opening sentence of Hejinian’s My Life: “A moment yellow, just as 
four years later, when my father returned home from the war, the moment of greeting him, as he 
stood at the bottom of the stairs, younger, thinner than when he had left, was purple – though 
moments are no longer so colored.”7 Here the reader swims in an entirely different sea of 
reference and narrative. The sentence is complex in structure, and it describes the complex 
psychological (or neurological) condition of childhood synesthesia, in which the senses are 
blended. Yet the words, meanings, and syntax are recognizable. They tend to make some sense 
without an extraordinary effort on the part of the reader, despite the initial uncertainty of the 
slightly torqued syntax of “a moment yellow,” and even though three stages in a person’s life are 
differentiated in one sentence: 1) before the father’s return from war (yellow), 2) the father’s 
return from war (purple), and 3) the present moment of autobiographical writing (no color). But 
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the idea of a subject followed by the development of the subject and a resolution of its questions 
or events proves to be illusory. The “yellow” of the first, brief, clause is the sentence’s subject – 
it ostensibly provides a key to what the writer’s preoccupations in subsequent sentences. Yet in 
the remainder of the sentence (as well as in the ensuing and, for the most part, syntactically 
coherent sentences), the digression leads us irrevocably on to other referential pastures, equally 
complex. 
 Nevertheless, the reader might become aware of a subtle narrative percolating in the 
yellow-to-purple synesthetic transformation. The yellow of cowardice becomes the purple of the 
purple heart. And these two, later, merge into the neutral no-color of the present, perhaps into a 
more zen-like state of judgmental emptiness of the adult. Or perhaps the childhood synesthesia 
of attributing color to moods or emotions associated with events has simply been outgrown. 
 The coherence of this first sentence in My Life, however, belies the disjunctiveness of the 
whole pattern of the weave of sentences, as the statement on the progress of synesthetic 
experience yields to the following seemingly unassociated sentences: “Somewhere, in the 
background, rooms share a pattern of small roses. Pretty is as pretty does. In certain families, the 
meaning of necessity is at one with the sentiment of pre-necessity.” The cluster of 1) memories, 
2) a worn adage, and 3) a sociological commentary on family life follow one another with no 
pretense to shaping a linear reconstruction of events in a life. Yet Hejinian’s work constitutes not 
a denial of narrative, but instead both a questioning of its status as faithful recording of events 
and causalities and a recognition of the profound interdependence and indeterminacy of those 
events (and one’s memories of them) and causalities. It is a play between the elements of 
narrative and those that disrupt its linear tendencies. 
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 One could chart a similar range from relative disjunction to relative coherence in the 
work of Scalapino. In the analyses of two of her works later in this chapter, such a range is 
evident. Her earlier work in particular, such as Considering How Exaggerated Music Is, tends to 
be more syntactically coherent, whereas her later work, such as New Time, tends to be more 
disjunctive. Yet it is not the case that in the former work, Scalapino is embracing narrative, 
whereas in the second, she is distancing herself from its literary conventions. As we shall see, in 
both works – albeit in different ways – she is toying with notions of temporal hierarchies, and 
with the relationship between an event, the memory of it, and the written record of it. 
 The reemergence of a strong avant-garde poetic community in the 1970s reinvigorated 
the debate regarding the status and function of narrative. Taking a more extreme position, some 
theorists and practitioners (actually, both apologists for and detractors of avant-garde poetry and 
poetics) argue that narrativity should be a watershed by which to distinguish avant-garde from 
mainstream poetry. Steve Evans, for example, claims that avant-garde poetic practice necessarily 
positions itself against narrative, which is seen as a structural apparatus that impedes the freeplay 
of cognitive processes: 
 
. . . radical linguistic practice has worked to contest not only the way specific 
narratives participate in the reproduction of social reality, they have contested 
narrative itself. In refusing the attenuation of human sense-making that comes of 
equating it exclusively with “telling stories,” such practices interrupt the norming 
of cognition. They re-introduce negativity into a life-world from which it has 
otherwise been expelled. And they expose the ideological commitment to 
narrative for what it is – a restriction of the horizons of the humanly thinkable.8 
 
According to Evans, radical avant-garde practice is thus by nature anti-narrative. However, this 
rather reductive position is as ideologically committed to rebellion against narrative as poets 
such as Stanley Plumly and Frederick Turner are to the conventions of a relatively seamless and 
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linear plot and transparent linguistic vehicle. The reader taking such a stance will presumably 
only seize on those practices that tend to disrupt narrative, that resist the formation of a linear 
succession of events that might “make sense” of events and risk falling into a conventional plot 
predetermined by received texts. If one were to take such a position in reading, say, Hejinian’s 
Writing Is an Aid to Memory, one might suppress as “cognitive norming” any gesture toward 
temporal, thematic or causal linking, any trajectory that might suggest a coherent relationship 
between the parts or a goal to the whole. One might suppress, for example, the disjointed but 
somehow philosophical melodiousness of the opening phrases. One might insist upon the 
paratactical rubble of the work and perhaps take one’s jouissance only in the play of sounds and 
disconnected signifiers, “delight[ing],” as Hejinian states, “in our sensuous involvement with the 
materials of language.”9 
But if the pleasure that may be experienced in the semantic and narrative discontinuities 
of a work – the “euphoria” it creates “by its freedom from social narratives”10 – is not to 
disintegrate into an exercise in plurality that suggests little cultural contextualization, both reader 
and text must also actively suggest the formation (and undoing) of positions, meanings and 
narratives. Otherwise such exercises might lapse into what Hejinian calls (echoing sentiments 
from statements by Barrett Watten and Bob Perelman) a “withdrawal into numerousness”; they 
might lose their political edge by “risk[ing] a directionless pluralism, one we may claim as a 
politics but which stops short of activating relationships within that plurality – and lacking 
participation in that forming of relationships, “possibility” is likely to turn into what I believe to 
be a dangerous immanentism.”11 In order to counteract the centrifugal forces that might 
otherwise cause the work to “disintegrat[e] into its separate parts – scattering sentence-rubble 
haphazardly on the waste heap,” Hejinian recognizes the need to “create the conjunction between 
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ideas.”12 This conjunction is accomplished in various ways, for example, through syntactical or 
structural correspondences among clusters of sentences, or through the repetition of words, 
phrases, or whole sentences. Regarding the latter technique, however, Hejinian agrees with 
Gertrude Stein’s caveat that “there is no such thing as repetition”13 because each time the same 
word resurfaces in a text, it is tinged with a slightly different emphasis or meaning. This is not 
only because of the different context of a recurrence, but also because one is a slightly different 
person with a slightly altered memory from moment to moment. She also acknowledges that the 
cohesive forces in her work do not negate the disjunctive forces, and she is concerned that the 
semantic richness that arises from “the sizeable gaps betwen [sic] the units . . . . remains crucial 
and informative.”14 I will have more to say about the tension between the centripetal and 
centrifugal narrative forces in Hejinian’s work in my analysis of My Life below. 
 In spite of the gaps in an experimental poetry, no matter how sizeable, it is simply 
unrealistic to posit a non-referential creation of, or response to, the most discontinuous of signs. 
Even the most unimaginative of readers is likely to attempt to activate relationships among the 
most extremely disjunctive of word sequences. “It is impossible,” in fact, “to discover any string 
or bundle or words that is entirely free of possible narrative or psychological content.”15 And the 
meanings of sequences generated even by random processes will not be infinite but will probably 
fall within a certain range: “While word strings are permissive, they do not license a free-for-
all.”16 The process of the cultural contextualization of a text is a relative and transitive matter, 
with many interdependent factors at play. It is in the creative activation of relationships among 
signifiers that a reader becomes aware of the process of the production of meaning and narrative 
as an activity dependent on many factors, having to do with both the individuality of the reader 
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and his or her cultural milieu. Meaning is therefore realized as a dependent construction and not 
an immutable imperative that is the essence of either word or world. 
 Like Hejinian, many contemporary experimental poets demonstrate a dialectical 
understanding of the process involved in the reading of their work, while acknowledging a wide 
variability in what different readers will find in a particular experimental work. Perelman, for 
example, points to the process whereby readers might fashion the paratactical sentences of the 
“New Sentence” mode of disjunctiveness at the level of the sentence (of which the sentences in 
Hejinian’s My Life may be taken as exemplary) into his or her own narrative, teasing forth the 
tenuous relationships between disjunctive terms and bridging the gulfs with exogenous material, 
thereby becoming the co-producer of narrative meaning.17 Here he quotes and analyzes the 
opening of his poem “China”: 
 
We live on the third world from the sun. Number three. Nobody 
tells us what to do. 
 
The people who taught us to count were being very kind. 
 
It’s always time to leave. 
 
If it rains, you either have your umbrella or you don’t. 
 
What from one perspective may look like a sign of radical disconnection may 
from another be a gesture of continuity. For some, there may be utter gulfs 
between these sentences; others, however, may find narrative within any one of 
them. In the context out of which I was writing, each sentence of “China” seemed 
to me almost transgressively relaxed, long-winded novelistic.18 
 
If one person’s narrative is another’s rubble of signifiers, then the reading of a work is a 
profoundly social event, determined not only by what the writer offers through his or her words 
or sounds, but also by the expectations of the reader who approaches them. If one expects to find 
narrativistic connections in “China,” it will be easy enough to find justification for the position 
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that they exist, although one would find considerable difficulties proving a correlation between 
the kind of narrative in that poem with the plot structure of a nineteenth-century British novel. 
And if one expects to find gaps and discontinuities in a nineteenth-century British novel, one will 
likely find them. Of course, the gaps will be more apparent in a work that is, in Roland Barthes’ 
terminology, more “writerly” (scriptible) than “readerly” (lisible).19 The readerly text does not 
lend itself well to hermeneutic plurality; it is a “product” rather than a “production,” and it is 
“committed to the closure system of the West” and “devoted to the law of the Signified.”20 The 
writerly text, on the other hand, “make[s] the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the 
text. . . . [T]he writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world 
as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, 
Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity 
of languages” (emphasis in original).21 Barthes correctly points out that narrative disjunction is in 
proportion to its writerly qualities, and that this relationship is one of degree: “[F]or the plural 
text, there cannot be a narrative structure, a grammar, or a logic; thus if one or another of these 
are sometimes permitted to come forward, it is in proportion (giving this expression its full 
quantitative value) as we are dealing with incompletely plural texts, texts whose plural is more or 
less parsimonious.”22 However, in the analyses of poetry that follow, I will demonstrate a 
reading strategy that does not simply place an ultimate or essential value on narrative 
disjunction, but instead encourages the identification of a reciprocal dialogue and tension 
between narrative and its disruption. 
 The process of narrative discovery in a work of experimental poetry involves hints and 
offerings by the writer, as well as active framings and content contributions from the reader. 
Moreover, many interdependent conditions influence the event of reading, including the events 
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in the reader’s own life. Text, reader, and the cultural and historical circumstances of the reading 
will all influence one’s experience of a text. As Perelman points out, Walt Whitman’s famous 
object concatenations were perceived differently – more dissonantly – by his contemporary 
readers, whereas today they seem to many readers to express Whitman’s grand gestural sweep of 
all-inclusiveness.23 What puzzled one culture at one time will delight the same culture at a 
different time in its history. On a smaller scale, the same is true for the individual reader, who 
will approach the same text differently at different times, since he or she will bring to the text 
accumulated changes in memory and experience, as well as the mood of the moment:24 “. . . I is 
not an innocent subject, anterior to the text, one which will subsequently deal with the text as it 
would an object to dismantle or a site to occupy. This ‘I’ which approaches the text is already 
itself a plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely, lost (whose origin 
is lost).”25 Because of the potentially infinite complexity of these factors surrounding an act of 
writing or reading, the question of the relative linearity or disjunctiveness of a text must always 
remain, to a degree, open and debatable. 
 With this limited caveat, then, for a writer or a reader to place either of the terms of a 
dualistic equation in a hierarchical position, in which one term is placed at the service of the 
other term or becomes inferior to the other term, or in which the terms cease to mutually inform 
or interrogate one another on a fairly equal footing, is to steer toward an essentialist position. On 
the one hand, to dismiss the narrative impulse as limiting the potential infinitude of meaning is to 
suppress the quite natural and conventional human desire to find temporal connections between 
terms. If, on the other hand, one denigrates the desire either to bring narrative conventions to 
awareness in order to realize their existence as a nominal category and not an inherent quality in 
the text or in the world, or to weaken the temporal and causal links between terms so that the 
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path itself and its digressive meanderings become more important than an overall semantic goal, 
then one risks assigning immanent qualities to linguistic and experiential constructions. Both 
positions tend to apprehend an essence either in disruption or linearity, in meaning or 
nonreferentiality. A middle way between these two positions would be to allow both to exist 
simultaneously in a dialogical and non-resolving relationship. As Perelman states, referring to an 
often-cited debate between Fredric Jameson and experimental poets,26  
 
[d]enarrativization is a necessary part of the construction in these wider paratactic 
arguments. But in both cases, this process needs to be seen for the combined 
reading and writing practice that it is: renarrativization is also necessary. If we try 
to separate out the results of these practices, we are left with fictions, 
metaphorical condensations, reifications, the purely autonomous New Sentence 
on the one hand and the rubble of snapped signifying chains on the other.27 
 
Each extreme position neglects the dialogical element that engages opposed terms in a reciprocal 
exchange, each questioning the other’s position, alternatively bolstering and undermining the 
status of each as a (fictitious) essential textual property and as an (equally fictitious) empty 
category. This reciprocity between terms is what might be referred to, after Buddhist philosophy, 
as a middle way in experimental poetry, which acknowledges an endlessly undermining and 
reinforcing of opposed positions. It is not the same, however, as reaching a compromise between 
the two positions. Indeed, such a middle way is potentially more radically illusion-busting than a 
simple and reductive ideology of denarrativization, which halts the conversation between terms, 
instead of allowing a perpetual and dialogical motion between terms. And it is in the reading of 
opposing terms as mutually informing and endlessly circulating that may allow a reader to come 
to a better understanding of the philosophical issues at stake in experimental poetics. 
 The dialogical middle way in the question of narrative does not suggest a status of 
narrative, which would, as Carla Harryman points out regarding her poetry, “presuppos[e] a 
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hierarchy of literary values. . . . Narrative is neither an oppressor to be obliterated nor the 
validating force of all literary impulse.”28 Harryman prefers “to distribute narrative rather than 
deny it,” for 
 
[t]he enemies of narrative are those who believe in it and those who deny it. Both 
belief and denial throw existence into question. Narrative exists, and arguments 
either for or against it are false. Narrative is a ping-pong ball among blind spots 
when considered in the light of its advantages and defects. 
 Narrative holds within its boundaries both its advantages and defects. It 
can demonstrate its own development as it mutates throughout history. This is its 
great advantage. I.e., in accomplishing its mutability, it achieves an ongoing 
existence. 
 Narrative might be thought to be a character, and its defects lie in his 
“potential to observe his own practice of making falsehoods.” If this narrative is 
imitating anything, its intention is to convince the audience to enjoy the imitation, 
whatever its lack of truth or reasonableness. 
 Those who object to this artifice are narrative’s enemies, but they, too, are 
part of the story. They are subjects in the hypothetical world of a story. “I” too am 
a subject of narrative; I see enemies all around.29 
 
For Harryman, the artifice of literary narrative is coterminous with the artifice of narrative within 
human lives: both characters and real-life subjects are conventionally constructed. In this sense, 
narrative exists, yet one cannot properly argue for or against it because doing so would 
presuppose a hierarchical relationship between the two terms. Harryman’s writerly narrative 
eludes its essentializers and its skeptics: it exists outside of such monological arguments, 
paradoxically because it is in perpetual argument with itself and thus cannot ossify into either 
position. In the following analyses of works by Scalapino and Hejinian, then, I will demonstrate, 
not a denial or suppression of narrative in their work, but an active investigation into the 
premises, conventions and hierarchies within narrative ideologies. I will also show their 
acknowledgement of both narrative and its disruption as literary forces, and their engagement of 
these forces in dialogue. 
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 Among contemporary poets in the United States and Canada whose works have 
developed in the avant-garde tradition, Scalapino occupies an ambiguous place. On the one hand, 
she seems to embrace many of the principles generally accepted to varying degrees by poets who 
would describe themselves as experimental or avant-garde. On the other hand, as I mentioned in 
Chapter One, she has challenged other ideas that she believes are regressive.30 Furthermore, her 
work is among the most accessible and referential of poets who consider themselves 
experimental or avant-garde. But she shares with many of her colleagues in experimentation a 
dedication to the questioning of boundaries between dichotomies, and to the revelation of the 
constructed nature of human experience. 
 One of Scalapino’s primary concerns in her poetry, critical essays, and cross-genre 
works, is to question conventional ways to think about the relationship among the phenomena of 
event, time, memory, oral and written narrative, and experience.31 Her work manifests a 
relentless determination to deconstruct narrativistic categories, and to expose dualistic and 
essentialist ways of thinking about time and memory. Scalapino uses narrative to question the 
putative immanences within its framework, as opposed to simply denying outright narrative’s 
linkage of events in a causal sequence. 
 Unlike much contemporary experimental poetry, Scalapino’s work is more apparently 
referential and syntactically normative (or at least much of it is not so disjunct that one cannot 
discern conventional sentence structure). People, events and objects often seems to be situated in 
a specific time and place, even though that locus may not be described with many details. 
Indeed, the tone of her poetry can seem flat and stark, particularly to those not used to reading 
her work or familiar with her philosophical project. It seems to lack dimensions that might give it 
a texture, feeling, or depth to which one is accustomed in reading more conventionally 
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descriptive or narrative writing. In her poetry, people sometimes seem faceless, activity takes 
place without psychologized or emotional drama, poetic sequences often omit a definite temporal 
or spatial orientation (instead, everything seems to exist and occur in relation to everything else), 
and the boundaries between self and other, public and private, past and present are everywhere 
transgressed, questioned, and blurred. The iteration of actions or images in varying contexts also 
gives the work a radically unfamiliar quality. 
 It is just this feeling of an unfamiliar mental terrain that Scalapino constructs, in order to 
demonstrate the illusions of hierarchy that conventional structuring of language can create, and 
how this hierarchy influences the interpretation of one’s experience. For example, conventional 
narratives and ways of thinking about time tend to place events along a temporal echelon of past, 
present, and future, and to impose a structure of causality on events and phenomena. These 
temporal and causal conventions structure events and thought so that “activity and time per se” 
become “a condition of tradition,” and thus “both time and activity are a ‘lost mass’ at any 
time,”32 and experience is drained of the kind of intelligibility that Scalapino associates with the 
non-hierarchical and simultaneous presentation of past, present, and future. 
 Scalapino is attempting to practice a writing that imitates experience, as opposed to 
representing it according to a preestablished order, and that allows the multiple layers that create 
the memory of a single event to exist simultaneously without structuring them in a arrangement 
of prominence, causality, or in a psychologized drama. She deconstructs the simplest events as 
instances of “social and interior constructions”33 in order to show their impermanent nature, once 
they are no longer taken outside of present experience and attached to a construction of temporal 
order, either within a narrative or linked by allusion to other histories. She avoids the emblematic 
and descriptive framing of experience and resists the coalescing of experience into ordered 
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wholes. Instead, her writing allows events (including memories themselves as events) to exist 
dependent upon one another, while avoiding the temptation to reify or essentialize experience. 
For when events, perceptions, or thoughts are given intrinsic existence, it can seem deceptively 
natural to bring them into a conventional order whose relationship to the phenomenal world 
seems transparent and inevitable, and even preordained. Scalapino chooses a more difficult kind 
of writing that critiques such ordering into hierarchical dualities of inner and outer being, and 
private and public experience. She critiques the effects of such ordering through a demonstration 
of its radical absence in her writing, and through a blurring of conventional categories of 
existence and action in time. 
 An analysis of Scalapino’s early poem “The Woman Who Could Read the Minds of 
Dogs” will further demonstrate her concern with the relationship of perception and memory to 
the recollection and writing of historical events, a theme that she continues to explore in 
subsequent books.34 This poem consists of eighteen short sections, some of which are connected 
thematically. Although some are not so obviously connected in theme, they are all related in the 
kinds of associative mnemonic experience they explore. A close reading of the poem’s first 
section, entitled “on itself. His red hair was standing up) ‘I just began to weep,’” reveals how 
intertwined events and memories function within the poem to produce a sense of temporal 
disorientation, and how the poem’s syntactical and stylistic idiosyncrasies work in concert with 
the content (Figure 5).35 
In “on itself. . . .,” temporal reciprocity occurs between the event of narration, the 
memory of that event of narration, and memories of other events. In Scalapino’s poem, the 
temporal and experiential interchange is effected by the poem’s syntactical complexity and 
elliptical twists. The superimposition of several narrative strands creates momentary confusion 
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and produces a plurality of time frames that questions the nature of historical events as discretely 
communicable phenomena. 
 Like many of the individual poems in “The Woman Who Could Read the Minds of 
Dogs,” “on itself . . .” presents a narrative within a narrative. In the first of these, the speaker 
relates a story told to her by a friend in which he, driving with his first wife and circling around 
the block trying to find the entrance to a hotel parking lot, sideswipes three parked cars in the 
process. After this, he “just began to weep.” The speaker then relates a second incident, in which 
she sees a man in a motor boat going around in circles. During the second incident, she 
experiences a resurgence of the friend’s story as she sees an event that reminds her of the car 
narrative. The primary common element in the two stories is the circular motion of the boat and 
car. 
 Scalapino not only juxtaposes these two events, but also conflates them through 
syntactical structures that disorient the reader’s sense of their discrete nature. In order to 
demonstrate how the syntax works to create a distinctive sensibility in regard to time, memory 
and experience, it may be helpful first to analyze the layers of time that overlap and spill into 
each other. There are five identifiable layers, in which (in chronological order): 
 
1) a man and his first wife circle around a block in a car 
2) the speaker hears the man tell of his experience in the car 
3) the speaker sees a man circling in a boat 
4) Scalapino writes the poem 
5) the reader reads Scalapino’s poem 
 
The list does not include events of remembrance, in which, for example, the man remembers his 
experience in the car, the speaker remembers the man telling of his experience in the car, etc. 
Such events of memory exist in potential infinitude. 
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 Setting aside the title for the time being, the poem opens with the third time frame in 
which the speaker, standing on the jetty of a marina, sees a man in a boat going in circles: “Much 
later, after I had ceased to know the man who had once / described to me how    ,      driving his 
new car . . .” (emphasis added). The poem immediately switches to its two prior events: the man 
tells the speaker of circling in the car with his first wife, and prior to that, the event of circling 
around the block takes place. Midway through the poem, the speaker returns to the marina 
incident: “as I said,     it was much later when I was standing / on the jetty of a marina . . .” In a 
parenthetical exegesis toward the end, Scalapino juxtaposes the three in simultaneity: “‘Well’, (I 
remembered the man I had known saying about himself / – as I watched the man in the motor 
boat turning it slowly / on itself. His red hair was standing up) ‘I just began to weep’.” By the 
withholding of syntactic closure, and the suspension of the emotional gesture toward which the 
poem seems to be leading (“I just began to weep”), the whole poem seems like one long periodic 
sentence. The long subordinate and independent clauses, parenthetical interruptions, and 
grammatical solecisms are not resolved until the very end. However, unlike the formal result that 
might be expected of a sentence that is structured hierarchically, the effect of this periodic 
sentence that is more than the resolution of its parts is not order but temporal disorientation; 
one’s sense of time, place, and point of view is momentarily dislocated. 
 If the dispersed sense of time and the syntactical ambiguities reticulate experience and 
memory rather than centralize it, they also move toward a convergence, if not resolution. First, a 
simultaneity of events is suggested by the overlapping of the imagined time, the recalled time, 
and the current time. Second, there is a convergence of coinciding elements within the narratives; 
its topology resembles the converging of tributaries into one commingling and transformed river. 
Following the description of the man in the boat, the impetus of a linear narrative would 
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logically be expected to continue in the context of the speaker and that man. The final gesture of 
weeping, although belonging semantically and originally to the man circling in his car, is 
attributable also to the speaker. If one disregards the parenthetical remark and the quotation 
marks in the last three lines, which refer to the context of the man in the car: 
 
“Well”,     (I remembered the man I had known saying about himself 
   – as I watched the man in the motor boat turning it slowly 
on itself.  His red hair was standing up) “I just began to weep”. [Emphasis 
added.] 
 
the syntactical inertia indeed impels us toward a weeping speaker, and by transference, to 
Scalapino and to the reader. The repetition of “standing” in reference to both the speaker and the 
man (“I was standing / on the jetty of a marina and watching a man standing up in / a motor boat 
. . . His red hair was standing up”) further implicates the speaker and the man in the boat in the 
same gesture, therefore facilitating the transference of “weeping” from the man to the speaker. 
Nevertheless, although weeping constitutes the emotional crux of the poem, the temporal 
disjunctures and clausal ambiguities result in the text’s resistance to the stabilization of the locus 
of the weeping and to the centrality of that emotional response. 
 These simultaneous movements of divergence, reticulation and convergence generate 
much of the tension and instability of the poem. They also suggest metaphorically the schism 
between event and narrative; the associative infinity that, through the fractured (and fracturing) 
self, destabilizes the discrete historical event we know through conventional wisdom; and the 
coincidence (as in the simultaneity of “weeping”) of recreated events through that association. 
 Scalapino is concerned to demonstrate a rupture between phenomena and our perception 
and memory of them, and ruptures between successive remembrances of a particular past event: 
“Perception itself is phenomena,”36 and Scalapino is careful to distinguish between an event and 
 170 
the perceptual interpretation of that event. She is also concerned to demonstrate the same 
principle regarding writing as phenomena. A consideration of the implied time frame of the 
writer further demonstrates this phenomenon of contradictory motions. First, the writing of 
narrative inherently exhibits the rupture between the writing and the event narrated: “The camera 
lens of writing is the split between oneself and reality. Which one sees first – view of dying and 
life – is inside, looking out into untroubled ‘experience.’”37 Writing creates both a distancing 
from and a transformation of experience, in which the writer makes visible what was concealed. 
Scalapino’s writing of history involves the interplay among moments remote in time, as well as 
between those moments and the associations spawned by them in the speaker’s mind (and by 
extension, the reader’s mind). Such interplay, in a potentially infinite network recreating the past, 
is made accessible and public. The mind as creator of events and the writer as recorder of a thus 
pluralized history constitute the true narrative, for “No events occur. Because these are in the 
past. They don’t exist.”38  
 Then there is the time level of reader, who also participates in and reconstructs the events 
of the narrative. In a phrase that echoes reader response theories, Scalapino writes “Reading as 
imposing syntax, is creating reality as imposition on a formation of one’s thoughts and actions,” 
and again, “reading impos[es] a reality on us.”39 For Scalapino, the reader recreates recorded 
events as they collide with his or her own remembered narratives, transforming them in the 
process into narrative phenomena in their own right. 
 The actual and mnemonic events in “on itself. . . .” do not seem to lead to climax and 
closure as is often the case in conventional narrative, but rather these events suggest an infinite 
network of possible junctures and intersections of narratives. The coincidence of narratives 
suggests a circuity in events that “come up as the same sound pattern.”40 Scalapino’s poem 
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reveals and expands meaning through the network of juxtaposed narratives. And through 
correspondences in thematic material, she explores the interplay of experience, memory, and 
written history. Scalapino would claim that events do not exist – other than as they are recreated 
and associated in the mind. 
 She also addresses the inevitable lament that if events do not exist, then humans are 
forever alienated from any meaningful experience of reality. This would be the case, however, 
only in a philosophy founded on the possibility of epistemological certitude. Scalapino 
recuperates experience by positing observation or “attention of itself as an activity,”41 which is 
different from approaching experience with a drive for accurate or certain knowledge, and 
viewing the result of experience as a body of perceptional and mnemonic data that one possesses 
as a storehouse of one’s own experience. Instead, one attends to the process of observation, an 
event of attention, “watching as being itself action.”42  
 In her more recent writings, Scalapino acknowledges that she has been greatly influenced 
by traditions of eastern philosophy, and in particular by the writings of the early Indian Buddhist 
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the emptiness of all conceptual, nominal, and conventional categories is evident in Scalapino’s 
thinking about the dispelling of conceptual illusions.44 Since his philosophy is relevant both to 
my premise of a radical dialectics in experimental poetics and to Scalapino’s work, it will be 
   	        	( 	  
	 	  	 		
critique of ontological and epistemological categories.45  
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Conventional or nominal truth refers to the human conceptual framework. This is the quotidian 
reality that is shaped by social consent, the reality of common sense observation whose 
categories and referents seem accurate enough to our human judgment. We accept this everyday 
truth in order to get on in the world without spending an undue amount of time making simple 
decisions. Conventional existence, in this philosophy, is dependent upon the referential nature of 
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extremely useful, and while existing on a practical level, does not correspond to an independent 
reality.46 Ultimate truth, on the other hand, is reality free of subjectivity, free of the linguistic 
constructions through which we interpret our perceptions of objects and events. It is independent 
of the perceptual and conceptual reality that always mediates human knowledge of the world. It 
denotes “the way things turn out to be when we subject them to analysis with the intention of 
discovering the nature they have from their own side, as opposed to the characteristics we impute 
to them.”47 This truth can never be known from its side, but only through our perceptions of it. 
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illusion regarding the inherent existence of any category of reality, including emptiness itself. 
Emptiness cannot be upheld as a reality that is less empty than human categories, an essential 
void that stands beyond the pale of conventional reality. It is, like all other categories, itself 
empty, part of the nature of conventional reality. And it is the emptiness of emptiness that for 
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and that in fact that explains their paradoxical unity. He demonstrates that the two realities are in 
a subtle, paradoxical and dependent relationship to one another. 
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yet he goes to great pains to demonstrate the emptiness of those conventions. And even 
emptiness has no inherent or independent existence, but is itself empty. To see an object as 
empty (of inherent or essential existence) is to see it as dependently arisen and as conventional 
reality. Any object “depends upon the existence of empty phenomena,” therefore “emptiness 
itself is empty.”49 +	
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interwoven with the doctrine of the deep identity between the two truths of conventional reality 
and ultimate reality. Our interpretations of the world are ultimately empty of essence, and yet 
because emptiness is itself also a dependently arising phenomenon, it is also empty. 
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not intend to imply that reality is nothing at all, an absolute void without matter or shape. 
Instead, “the actuality of the entire phenomenal world, persons and all, is recovered within that 
emptiness.”50 When he speaks of the lack of existence, he speaks of what we might call 
“essence” or “inherent existence,” that is, an existence with properties apart from human 
attribution of a bounded entity with properties, as if there were a direct correspondence between 
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paradoxically, dependent upon a full understanding of the latter. His critique of inherent 
existence insistently breaks down all conventional and nominal categories, which impose 
hierarchies and attributes that humans often come to believe as fixed and stable. His philosophy 
is one of radical impermanence and emptiness, yet it is also profoundly concerned with morality. 
    	(    	 
  	   	 ic. The doctrine of 
emptiness is closely interwoven with the doctrine of the identity of the doctrines of the two truths 
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or realities, and within this doctrine is recovered a strongly soteriological and moral ground. For, 
  	(     	 sential or inherent nature, how could one hope to effect the 
change necessary to become enlightened? 
  $  		 $  	   	 	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complex and subtle argumentation in the twenty-seven verses of the M 	. 
For my purposes, one of the most important features of his philosophy of the middle way is the 
holding of two contradictory truths at one time (their radical difference), and the simultaneous 
erasing of the boundaries between them (the 
 
	!   	 
 	  ) 
reality” on a pedestal as the more important of the two realities, but instead seems to keep them 
in perpetual tension, mutually informing one another in a relationship of balanced dependence 
and dialogue. 
 - 	( 
	    	  	
  	 	
  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engages in a critique of essentialized thinking about phenomena, and invites us to consider the 
ultimate emptiness of our constructions and interpretations, and to realize that “all phenomena 
and perception are groundless.”51 The poetry that she values 
 
articulates a critique of ‘one’s assumptions’ (one’s observation, or of perception 
itself as cultural) by perceiving or rendering perception as being without basis. At 
the same time, this examination of subjectivity in fact can work as a critique and 
revelation of our culture. 
 In other words, by undercutting the observer, one has a perspective of 
place that is both spatially ‘interior’ and ‘outside’ – a relativity.52  
 
For Scalapino, “the observer” to be undercut is the idea of the individual’s unique perspective on 
reality and his or her unawareness of that perspective as socially and individually constructed – 
	  
       	   	( sense, is empty of inherent or 
transcendental quality. “The deconstruction of our view of reality is oneself in one time not 
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maintaining either one’s own subjective view or the social or phenomenological interpretation of 
occurrences. Nor is this ‘not holding a view.”53 One must maintain, instead, a “perspective of 
place” that is simultaneously interior and exterior, aware of the mediation of one’s perception yet 
also attempting “to find out what’s there, as occurrence.”54 Perception may indeed be empty, 
“without basis”; however, its critique is paradoxically arrived at through the very nominal 
categories called empty. And thus this very practical vehicle of the critique is not devalued in 
relation to ultimate reality. 
 For Scalapino, neither the phenomenon itself nor its apprehension by the mind has 
inherent existence.55 She attempts to demonstrate this in her writing through her treatment of 
narrative, which dismantles sequential events by showing that narrative as well as one’s sense of 
the division of time discretely into past, present, and future has no basis outside our conceptual 
framework.56 On the other hand, her work does not try to demonstrate the inferiority of narrative. 
To the contrary, she paradoxically, investigates narrative through narrative, and imagines a 
presentation of phenomena unfolding in time that is radically different from the conventionally 
linear ordering of events that are held together by the glue of causality and intentionality. Thus 
she criticizes “[t]he contemporary poetic-polemics association of ‘narrative’ as being only 
convention – ‘experience’ thus denigrated, not regarded as exploratory,” for this position “in fact 
does not allow scrutiny of one’s own polemic.”57 If an avant-garde poet sees his or her task as 
being only the dismantling and denigration of conventional constructs of time and narrative 
sequence, then one denies from the outset the very thing that is crucial to the dialectical 
development of one’s critique. What is needed is a dialogue between the natural and human 
impulses to link events in a narrative sequence and the recognition of the emptiness of that 
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linkage from the standpoint of extrasubjective reality – 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critique, according to Scalapino, must also include self-scrutiny. 
 An examination of passages from two of her works will demonstrate her “middle way” of 
conceptualizing events occurring in time and the processes of remembering and recording them. 
New Time, a recent book-length work by Scalapino, effectively demonstrates some of the notions 
that have been a constant concern in her poetry and poetics.58 In this work, she also makes 
expressively clear the political implications of one’s attitude toward such categories as history 
and narrative. This work is a long meditation on how time might be thought if one were to 
dispense with many of the hierarchies that one takes for granted in one’s experience of actions 
and thoughts, and in the writing of these events. If one is to dispel one’s illusions of the inherent 
existence of memories and their correspondence to actual events in a continually receding 
present moment, then one must realize the extent to which language shapes one’s interpretations 
of perceptions.59  
 For Scalapino, writing itself is an action, an event, that is as remote from a past event as 
one’s memory of it. According to her, writing about an event does not have a causal relationship 
to the event itself, which also has no inherent existence, since it is in the past. Writing about an 
event (like thinking about an event) is an event itself, a new time in its own right, a present 
experience that attempts to recall a nonexistent event, yet is tinged with all other events 
perceived since the experience of the event that prompted the writing: “Remembering 
everything, all layers at the same time, writing is the mind’s operations per se and imitation of it 
at the same time.”60 Herein lie two meanings of “new time”: it is at once a new way of 
conceptualizing time, as well as a guide for a more zen-like experiencing of the “new time” of 
the present moment. 
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 In her discussion of her play The Present, Scalapino describes this phenomenon of 
writing as a means of revealing the mind in the act of structuring reality, yet also as a means of 
creating its own reality. In the play, the characters speak as well as enact their actions. These 
verbalized and acted movements are followed later by “sequences of observation or discursive 
commentary,” which are “spoken and also shown as handwritten phrases on slides.” The 
separation of the passages of action and those of conceptualization causes these obverse 
phenomena “to collapse becoming one – always being separate. It is ‘as if’ we’re seeing and 
reading mind structuring.” The events are simultaneously related (they “becom[e] one”) and 
individuated (“always being separate”).61 The boundaries between event, conceptualization, and 
writing (narrative) are collapsed at the same time that each of these phenomena is held to be a 
discrete event in its own right. Conceptualizing events by verbalizing or writing them tends to 
cause one to blur the boundaries between narrative and event, as if one is reliving a phenomenon 
that somehow still exists through the recreation of it. The artifice of narrative obscures the 
speaking and writing of an event as events themselves: “Writing not having any relation to 
event/being it – by being exactly its activity. It’s the ‘same thing’ as life (syntactically) – it is 
life. It has to be or it’s nothing.” Writing is both an imitation of the motion of the mind (and 
indeed, of perception itself) constructing and categorizing and associating events, and an event, a 
motion, an activity, in its own right. Scalapino’s writing 
 
inverts the insight that social constructions are always necessarily mediated 
through language . . ., suggesting instead that these vehicles of mediation are 
themselves the central constituents of experience – hence the text becomes the 
act. Scalapino asks that the reader acknowledge that the text doesn’t simply 
represent reality for us (albeit in an ideologically governed way) but produces a 
reality on its own terms. (emphasis in original)62 
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Scalapino writes the mental terrain as experience and reveals the process by which we construct 
that terrain. This process renders us more consciously aware of the rupture between event and 
interpretation or imitation in writing, as well as of the phenomenon of writing as life.63 
 Below, I will examine a brief passage from New Time. This work will receive more 
extended treatment in Chapter Five, in which I look at at the relation between public and private 
realms of experience. In using the same work in these two chapters, I wish to demonstrate how 
Scalapino’s dialectical process works on different dualistic concepts within the same poem. In 
this chapter I will also analyze a longer work, “bum series,” from way. This work, with its 
concern for private and public realms, could also have been analyzed for the purposes of Chapter 
Five. Scalapino’s dialectics works on several different levels, challenging ways in which humans 
conceptualize their experience of phenomena. 
 New Time, like many of Scalapino’s previous works, is in the form of a series of short 
blocks of text. Each block in the series consists of one or more paragraphs. Here is the first 
block: 
 
 there’s still on the rim of night (having been in it) which is (in night) there 
as his horizontal lying rest in snow – breathing in breath ‘at’ the light day 
 
 overwhelming the mark being ‘by’ his ‘action’ – there – only. one’s – only 
breathing in breath – not night or day. 
 
 past cold, the man kneeling in snow – outside, one – which is horizontal 
waiting – in ‘falling snow’ overwhelming of the mark, the other being in it – only. 
as being the only overwhelming of rim. 
 
 that he’s – ‘running’ – by being forward ‘lying’ which is waiting (outside): 
‘by’ – on the ground in rim of snow dropping on sky and floor only.64  
 
In this brief and rather disorienting episode are encapsulated some of the thematic materials that 
are to undergo many permutations during the course of the sequence (giving the impression of an 
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infinity of possible recontextualizations). The whole does not have a conventional climactic 
narrative shape, but instead proceeds incrementally and elaborationally. Its line of development 
is not a trajectory moving towards a goal, but an investigation in a psychologically flattened field 
in which neither the outside realm of discursive, socially sanctioned language nor the interior 
language of individual subjectivity are allowed to settle into anything resembling a conventional 
descriptive or historical account. Instead, interior and exterior states of being are allowed to 
become blurred, to commingle and to critique one another so that the language of neither 
individual psychology nor the larger political and social realm can be reified or seen as having an 
essential or separate existence. Nor can the recounting of events be construed as uncomplicated 
history. Instead, the writing posits itself as phenomenon, and tends to resist at every successive 
reading any stable interpretation, but whose structure and syntactical displacements complicates 
dualities of time, perception, and history, and destabilizes hierarchical formation. 
 The setting, point of view, and action in time can only be described in plural and 
provisional terms. The time of day shifts, so that taken as a whole, the passage does not clearly 
seem to take place at night or day, dawn or dusk. Or rather, it is all of these and thus also none of 
them. It is a place and time “on the rim,” taking place during “not night or day” but instead in a 
state between darkness and light, night and day, action and rest, subjective and objective, inside 
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determinable coherence, yet continually “overflowing the mark,” its significance overdetermined 
at every turn as various themes and events are continually recontextualized and perceived in 
different time frames. This also recalls Scalapino’s description of “a relativity” in which both 
inside and outside, past and present, can occur simultaneously. Scalapino acknowledges the 
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hierarchy imposed by interpretation and conceptual categorization, and posits a new time that 
neither exists as a reflection of the past or a reference to the future, or a description or 
interpretation of an event that no longer exists: “[New Time] is ‘about’ time in that a new time 
occurs outside as being the present moment ‘then,’ which is separate from either the text or the 
interaction between the people (and separate from the interaction between one’s reading and 
one’s present mind) but arising ‘between’ these.”65 In this rather difficult passage, Scalapino 
theorizes an in-between state of apprehending the new time. This temporality is not any of the 
discrete time frames associated with an event, or with its recording as written text, or with its 
performance for an audience, or with its reading by an individual. It is not the occurrence of any 
of these phenomena alone as somehow representing any other occurrence, yet it is also all of 
them. It is a temporality outside them (not restricted to a point of view) and also between them. It 
is a temporality not separate from the event. 
 In the text, dawn and dusk are interchangeable; their relatedness consists in the fact of 
their having both once been in the present, and their recurrence as a phenomenon of the writer’s 
and reader’s experience of the text, occurring with no basis for intrinsic reference: “Dawn is at 
the same time as dusk ‘as’ present time. Syntax ‘there’ (of the text) is relational as if a ‘time’ of . 
. . muscular physical motion. . . . It is a ‘time’ not as speech or sound per se – but as the reader’s 
experience of simultaneous relating and dis-connection only. There is ‘to be’ no basis.”66 
Scalapino posits timeframes (dawn and dusk) as syntactical constructions, and shows their 
relation to the actual “muscular” events of physical movements as one of dissociation. Yet they 
are also related in the mind in the experience of the reader. The experiences of “relating and dis-
connection” are, paradoxically, simultaneous, with no hierarchical positioning between them. 
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 Scalapino posits a radical critique of rationality at its earliest, most elemental inception – 
the moment of perception and the incipient work of the brain to interpret perceived phenomena, 
including that of reading a text. Indeed, “Perception itself is phenomena,” just as the perceived 
event is a phenomena: 
 
My focus is on non-hierarchical structure in writing. For example, the 
implications of time as activity – the future being in the past and present, these 
times separate and going on simultaneously, equally active . . . suggest a non-
hierarchical structure in which all times exist at once. And occur as activity 
without excluding each other.67 
. . . . . 
 (My) intention – in poetry – is to get complete observing at the same 
instant (space) as it being the action. 
 There’s no relation between events and events. Any. They are separate. 
Events that occur – (regardless of their interpretation – ). (But also that they are at 
once only their interpretation and only their occurrence.)68 
 
The repetition of “only” in the opening of New Time suggests just this separation of events 
through the emptiness of their causality. In other words, events are separate because no matter 
what spin we put on the causal relationship between them, they are, according to N  	(
category of “ultimate truth,” free of subjectivity, perspective, linguistic construction, 
interpretations, and intentions. But as Scalapino hastens to add, since the reality of our 
interpretations and nominal attributions are not to be denied or negated, and since we are have 
only perception and thought with which to judge existence, events are simultaneously our 
interpretation of them. Scalapino’s is not a nihilistic universe, but one in which perception has 
been radically de-hierarchicalized and critiqued in order to realize its merely apparent essential 
correspondence with exterior reality: 
 
A phenomenon hasn’t inherent existence – as it is not based on a single moment 
of a mind, nor on successive moments of a mind, as such moments arise 
dependently (don’t exist inherently, not being that phenomenon itself – though 
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appearing to be). In other words, the apprehension or the ‘moment’ of the mind 
appears to be the phenomenon itself, which the mind itself is seeing. Neither 
exists inherently.69  
 
The “onlyness” of events, which I take Scalapino to mean the emptiness of causality between 
events, is similar to N  	( 	
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independent existence. Our perceptions may convincingly persuade us of their identity with their 
object, of their direct and correspondence with an independent reality. However, 
 
An existent entity (mental episode) 
Has no object. 
Since a mental episode is without an object, 
How could there be any percept-condition?70 
 
Our perception posits no direct correspondence to phenomena; instead, our perceptions give the 
illusion that what we are seeing gives us knowledge about the actual object, knowledge which 
corresponds directly to that object. What we perceive is, in effect, is the mind seeing its 
interpretation of what is out there. According to this view, our experience is dependent upon the 
interpretations of perceptions, which are dependent upon the structure and functions of our body, 
including its production of language, and its interactions with other bodies and phenomena.71 
Nothing within or without human existence has permanent, inherent, essential, or independent 
features or qualities. The aim of a conceptualization of perception based on dependent co-
origination is to yield a view of reality freed of the illusions of a model of direct correspondence, 
and simultaneously to posit the ultimate emptiness of the separation and hierarchicalization of 
such dualistic categories as inner and outer, public and private, subject and object. For each term 
of a duality is contained within the other; indeed, in a sense is the other and is dependent upon 
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the other, without, however, necessitating a causal link between them in which the one somehow 
inherently brings about or influences the other. It is this link that is empty: the non-relation 
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identity between what at first introduction to this philosophy must seem like the ultimate 
dualistic relationship between the doctrines of conventional and ultimate reality. 
 For Scalapino, writing that attempts to capture one’s memory of experiences in 
descriptive detail or narrative and causal links can perpetuate illusions about the ways that we 
actually perceive, encode, and recall phenomena. Her project is instead the persistent 
disillusionment of notions regarding any notion of permanent or essential nature of experience, 
memory, and perspective. Our interpretation of phenomena depends upon our perception and 
memory, and Scalapino goes to these roots of cognition to investigate how we formulate, and 
come to believe in, mnemonic illusions. Her process demonstrates the constructed, impermanent, 
and creative nature of memory. To alter Heraclitus’ maxim slightly, she demonstrates that one is 
never able to step into the same mnemonic river twice. This phenomenon is what Scalapino 
refers to when she says that 
 
A segment in the poem is the actual act or event itself – occurring long after it 
occurred; or acts put into it which occurred more recently. They somehow come 
up as the same sound pattern. 
 The self is unraveled as an example in investigating particular historical 
events, which are potentially infinite.72 
 
The text itself is an event that reenacts the prior event it records, and intersects or collides with 
other “acts which occurred more recently.” Indeed, events related by the speaker become 
interrelated moments that exist in potential infinitude in the mind. Such recreated and recreating 
events are exposed through the unraveling of the self in the writing of these moments. 
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 Thus Scalapino does not nihilistically negate the convention of narrative, which would be 
effectively a dualistic position that would not admit of a dialogue between conventional or 
nominal reality and an imagined reality empty of the subjective creation of categories and 
temporalities. Instead, her work engages both realities in a dialogue that acknowledges both 
narrative convention and its illusions. Her work leads the reader to become hyper-aware of the 
artificiality of the tenses and causalities that one constructs in narrating events, and of the 
illusory nature of the project of reproducing events linguistically, so that one feels that the words 
somehow intrinsically correspond with or attach to a phenomenon. To recall an event is, 
according to Scalapino, its own event. This notion is a truism for cognitive science. As Richard 
E. Cytowic states, 
 
memory . . . is a creative process during which the state of the brain’s electrical 
fields change. The sensory cortices generate a distinct pattern for each act of 
recognition and recall, with no two ever exactly the same. They are close enough 
to cause the illusion that we understand and have seen the event before, although 
this is never quite true. Each time we recall something it comes tainted with the 
circumstances of the recall. When it is recalled again, it carries with it a new kind 
of baggage, and so on. So each act of recognition and recall is a fresh, creative 
process and not merely a retrieval of some fixed item from storage.73  
 
Even though humans often have the illusion of thinking of memory as a simple process of 
retrieval of stored information, and that each time a memory is recalled it is a faithful repetition 
of the first time it was recalled, this is not the case. As far as memory is concerned, there is no 
such thing as repetition. And this phenomena of the fundamental non-identity of events and 
memory goes to the heart of Scalapino’s revision of notions of narrativity. 
 Considering her emphasis on the radical impermanence as well as the emptiness of 
essence at the heart of any narrative endeavor, it is fitting that her work never arrives at a stasis, 
but instead is constantly engaged in producing a paradoxical relationship between its narrativistic 
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and anti-narrativistic impulses, that is, between passages that describe phenomena and those 
elements that disrupt such description. Scalapino is not engaged in a denial of story. Indeed, 
within her works she tells many stories. Rather, she is concerned in her work to level the field 
that includes an actual event and the narrative that describes it so that they occupy more or less 
equal regions on a plane, so to speak. Each is a phenomena in its own right, and each has 
properties of impermanence and the lack of an essence that can be fixed temporally or 
semantically. And neither is subordinate to the other: narrative is not subordinate to the event 
that it attempts to mimetically reproduce, and the event is not subordinate to a notion of the 
lasting monument of its description. Instead, Scalapino shows the two terms to be mutually 
dependent: they are in constant dialogue with one another, interrogating one another’s position 
so that neither is seen as predominant or superior to the other. 
 One point that is crucial to the consideration of Scalapino’s project of questioning our 
conceptual habits of structuring time is that cognitive science prioritizes motion before time. No 
matter how we express ideas of time, they are always dependent upon the particular kind of 
metaphor used, and it is misleading and fallacious to reify what were conceptual metaphors in 
the first place. In her works, Scalapino often isolates motion and merges time frames, as if time 
were not an outwardly reified entity passing along a linear continuum (a metaphorical 
conceptualization), but something created and recreated inwardly, in a blooming, buzzing 
confusion of present, past, and future. 
 Scalapino’s poetics attempts to reverse the impulse to reify and to give priority to ordered 
and hierarchicalized time (tradition), and to make motion and the experience of time subservient 
to tradition. Such a cultural imperative tends to impoverish experience, which in a conservative 
worldview must be understood as a condition of the conceptualization of motion and events. 
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Also lost in such a view is the articulation of the public and private spheres so that the possibility 
for action and present experience to be recovered outside of conventional conceptualization 
remains alive, allowing community interactions to take place in a greatly enriched field of 
possibility, without the necessity to integrate dualities, but also with an understanding that the 
drive to order and prioritize them is not a determinant of an order of truth that exists outside of 
us: 
 
Activity is the only community. The conservative gesture, always a constant (any 
ordering, institutional and societal) is to view both activity and time per se as a 
condition of tradition. As such, both time and activity are a “lost mass” at any 
time. “For just as modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience 
has likewise been expropriated.”74  
 
I will return in Chapter Five to Scalapino’s notion of activity as the basis of community or social 
interaction. I will also examine more closely a crucial issue at stake for Scalapino, the recovery 
of experience, including, and in particular, the experience of the public realm and the blurring of 
the boundaries between public and private realms. To close my analysis of temporality and 
narrative in Scalapino’s poetry, let us examine “bum series,” a section within her book-length 
poem way (see Figure 6).75 
 In this work, perspectives and time-frames are confused, so that if the reader is expecting 
a psychologized narrative describing how the “bums” came to live – and die – on the street, or 
how the “I” enters the causal sequence of events, such expectations are everywhere deflected. 
Events and relations, and not time, are primary. Scalapino fashions a temporal poetics in which 
time does not consist of a series of discrete beings or things occurring in a sequence of measured 
moments and happenings among which can be traced a narrative held together by the glue of 
causality. Objects, persons, and events do not possess discrete or inherent existence; instead, they 
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always arise in a relationship of dependence, or rather interdependence. They are recorded in a 
web of motions and events that we only seem to perceive as the phenomenon itself. Not only are 
boundaries between subjectivities and tenses blurred, but the more conventional narrative and 
descriptive ordering is actively destructured and flattened, and instead shown as a series of 
related or dependent phenomena. 
 For example, the bums and the speaker are outside in the cold at the same time. However, 
in the first stanza, it cannot be determined grammatically which she is referring to in the clause 
“though usually being there when it’s warmer.” Subjectivity is ambiguous rather than discrete; 
however, the events and entities and persons in the work are not totally fungible or of equal 
value. The title focuses attention on the morally charged primary event of the series, the death of 
the bums. Furthermore, the bums and their deaths are brought into relation with several other 
events, consciousnesses, and entities, including cranes, freighters, a man in new wave attire who 
works in a garage, the “dumb” speaker, oil rigs, and the “present president.” The event that was 
invisible to the community, the death of the bums, is brought into ordinary, matter-of-fact 
relation to surrounding people, events, and things, and to the sphere of political and economic 
power. The very invisibility of the event is a barometer of the community’s malaise: its 
snobbery, uncaring attitude, and ignorance. The poem enacts the relations among the various 
persons and entities, yet resists their dramatization, which would assign a causality and 
hierarchical ordering to events. Self-sufficiency seems absent in the series. Instead, all 
movements, events, and entities exist and function in relation to others. The writing enacts the 
“public figure” and “the freighter and / their relation,” “[the relation] of the man with the dyed / 
blonde hair and / new wave attire – and / the freighter,” “[the relation] of our present / president . 
. . to the freighter,” the relation of the “social struggle” of the bums “to the freighter,” the relation 
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of “the person of / new wave attire . . . to / the freighter,” and so forth. The writing also 
demonstrates that the relationship of self to self is a complicated one, conditioned by the 
interpretations of others and one’s interpretation of one’s own identities. “[T]he man in the new / 
wave attire” exists, not inherently or independently, but “as the relation / of him / being another 
person,” and “as / the freighter” and also as “his and its relation.” 
 However, some entities and events seem to be in an inverse or negative relation to others, 
notably the “present president” in relation to the bums and their social struggle, although the 
bums seem not to be very aware of the “social struggle,” a stock phrase which is a social and 
linguistic construction describing conditions of suffering, oppression, and social malaise. To the 
president, the bums are “abroad,” not in his own country and therefore in a vacant locus, always 
elsewhere and never included. Or rather they are included (living within the city limits, haunting 
its streets, and in the potential care of the state and community) as an exclusion (relegated to 
exist and perish outside that care). In a protectionist state, they exist outside of the rope that 
separates those who belong from those who do not merit the paternalistic beneficence of the 
state. Thus the president is in an inverse relation to the bums “when there’s a social struggle in 
their whole setting, which is abroad.” But the bums themselves seem unaware of the social 
struggle, involved instead in the struggle for existence and survival on the streets. Not to “have 
desire – of the present” is to remain “dumb,” ignorant of social struggle and social 
interrelatedness. Although the speaker confesses her ignorance, she also has the possibility not to 
remain as “unrepaired” as the car, not to remain in a senseless time, unable to experience the 
presence or to sense – in the sense of both understanding and perceiving – the interrelatedness 
and dependent nature of existence. She, like the bums, “almost froze” at the same time as the 
bums, “and realized I / could die from it.” Then she both doesn’t care, and also realizes that it’s 
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not possible for her not to care, since she and the bums cannot have inherent existence 
atomistically separated from each other. “[W]hen that’s senseless,” when not caring makes no 
ethical sense, her ignorance has been repaired, as the car may be repaired. However, the car has 
not been repaired at the time that the bums die from the cold, and so, as if in sympathetic 
vibration with even so remote an entity as a broken-down car in the same setting, they are, even 
in their death, experiencing “grinding and / movement in relation to it.” The ending brings home 
the critical issues at stake for Scalapino in a darkly and starkly comical moment. 
 Scalapino doesn’t so much shock us into the recognition of the bums’ relation to the 
various parts and to the whole of the community, as she does make us feel discomfort at the 
metaphysical rug of time and description and their hierarchical accoutrements being pulled from 
under us. And it is in this zone of unease, in which we no longer have the comfort of temporal 
and causal handles, of hermeneutical certainty, or of the truth-correspondence of perception and 
cognition with some extrasubjective reality, that we find ourselves adrift in the free-floating 
strangeness of a world of phenomena and events in dependent relation. Discrete things and 
happenings do not ineluctably and irretrievably recede into a past that we continually try to 
recapture and reclaim through historical representation of a selective narrative with causal links. 
Instead, Scalapino uses writing to invite critique of the experientially alienated self, the self 
incapable of experiencing movement and event, bound instead to a dualistic, atomistic, and 
mechanistic conception of existence. In “bum series” she presents the possibility of a “dumb” 
existence lost to the universe of becoming, prioritizing lost time and reifying time and its 
passage. She also, however, presents the possibility of a disillusioned existence in which the 
present event is given priority, and in which inner and outer clocks only seem to correspond to 
reality. The speaker has awareness and the possibility for self-critique that the other “snobs” do 
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not seem to have. In the writing, then, is the possibility of greater self-awareness and the 
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view of reality is opposed to what cognitive scientists call the illusion of the “homunculus,” 
which is to say the discrete, disembodied, rational mind that is independent of other homunculi 
and that believes in the capacity to capture the past with a truth that somehow corresponds with 
external reality. 
 Hejinian, who has engaged in several collaborations with Scalapino, including the book-
length poem Sight,76 shares Scalapino’s concern with both the recovery and critique of narrative 
and experience, and not simply with negating or denying them as a reactionary illusion. Her 
“ostensibly autobiographical”77 work My Life demonstrates some of her philosophical ideas 
regarding narrative, memory, and time. At the beginning of this chapter, I began an analysis of 
small sections of this work, showing how one might begin to approach the disjunctive sentences 
with an awareness of the subtle and intricate associations among the ideas. In the following 
analysis, I will demonstrate more specific ways in which the dialogical relationship between the 
opposed terms of narrative and narrative reflexivity is achieved. 
 The first edition of My Life was published in 1980, when Hejinian was thirty-seven years 
old; it consisted of thirty-seven sections of thirty-seven sentences each, paralleling her age. The 
new edition, published in 1987, adds eight sections and eight new sentences to each previous 
chapter to equal her then-current age of forth-five. While it is true that the sections ostensibly 
correspond to the years of the author’s life, and that, as Marjorie Perloff notes, “in the course of 
the narrative, the references gradually shift from childhood to adolescence to adult thought and 
behavior,” chronological progression is undermined by references to adulthood in the earlier 
sections and to childhood in the later sections, so that “each is a collage made up of numerous 
 191 
interpolations – memories and meditations, axioms and aphorisms.”78 One the one hand, the 
correspondence of chapter number to the age in the author’s life that it ostensibly represents does 
set up a formally mimetic structure: the form suggests a division by the years of one’s life: each 
section, in form if not in content, represents the interval of time from one birthday to the next. 
On the other hand, the weak link between section number and the actual events that occurred at 
the corresponding age in Hejinian’s life throws in question the notion of the discreteness of any 
event or of any time span. The arbitrariness of the apportionment of years acknowledges the 
artificiality of superimposing discrete time periods on the continual and open-ended flux of 
overlapping developments and events in one’s life. Yet the work does not, therefore, produce a 
more closely mimetic version of what might actually have been taking place cognitively, 
temporally, mnemonically, and so forth, in Hejinian’s life. To be sure, the nonlinear progression 
of sentences produces a “languaged self”79 that does tend to eschew a mimetically conceived 
descriptive writing, even of the type of so-called “writing on the brain” that attempts to 
represent, through a stream of associations, cognitive or mnemonic processes. As Kornelia 
Freitag points out, “[t]hat the number is constituted by the age of the author does not lead to 
more intimacy but rather to a foregrounding of the artifice of the textual body.”80 Furthermore, 
“the text is not so much structured as to lead logically from one sentence to the next but to 
recontextualize and to decontextualize the sentences and phrases in a way that makes a swift and 
superficial reading impossible – it doesn’t ‘make sense.’”81 The artifice of the disjunction among 
the sentences blocks the easy consumption of the material. 
 I would also state that there is a kind of intimacy within the very artifice of the work. 
First, intimacy through description and through temporal and thematic focus creates a feeling of 
intimacy. Second, the element of arbitrariness and and the purposeful disjunction in the 
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juxtaposition of sentences creates a feeling of artifice. These two ideas are antithetical. Yet in My 
Life they are engaged in a dialogical process that allows each to be recognized (if only by 
contrast with the other) while at the same time not allowing the ascendancy of either at the 
expense of either. Intimacy of description, undermined, exhibits gaps that demonstrate its 
instability, yet also its richly generative potential, through that very undermining. Disjunction, 
undermined by conjunctions found within relatively discrete units, allows the forging of bridges 
that demonstrate possible stabilizing tendencies, yet such forging does not accommodate 
permanent or inherent meaning or temporal successions. There is a reciprocal and dialogical 
process between rubble and conjunction, between causality and the lack of relation between 
events, that allows the existence of both and prevents the ascendancy of either. The text doesn’t 
inherently construct a particular sense, although it invites the making of multiple senses. Its 
semantic progression alternatively stitches and unravels sense, never allowing a sedimented 
meaning to take precedence, but instead remains constantly in a shape-shifting motion. The 
text’s meaning both comes into and departs from being. It resists both the illusion of narrative 
stability as well as the denial of cohesive forces. 
 Each section of the book consists of more or less unlinked sentences describing incidents, 
thoughts and observations that create a patchwork texture of utterances, many of which are 
recognizably descriptive of events in a person’s life. In this sense, the work’s title and content 
bear a positive relation to the genre of autobiography, although it is a highly unusual kind of 
autobiography. Far from attempting to structure a chronological sequence of events in telling the 
story of her life, Hejinian seems to claim that chronological ordering is foreign to the way that 
memory actually works: “What follows a strict chronology has no memory.”82 The circuits of 
memory do not have the well-ordered sequence of a plot with its pattern of rising and falling 
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tension that builds toward a climax, or that develops toward a subject’s increased understanding 
of the world and of her or her place within it. In order to pattern a more “strict chronology,” the 
autobiographer must select particular incidents and suppress others, charting one’s experience so 
that its moral or philosophical paths of development become more or less consistent or clarified. 
Diffuse and interconnected time and event are pared down and modeled into a trajectory that 
suits one’s retrospective understanding of the shape of one’s life. In My Life, Hejinian attempts 
to avoid the assumption of an individual self at the center of a timeline, and moreover, of a 
sequence of events and reflections that lead, under the aegis of more or less well-defined moral 
premises, to a subject’s development of consciousness. 
 According to Lisa Samuels, My Life “is the story of a languaged self, a written ‘I,’ rather 
than the autobiography of an experiencing human.”83 Or rather, as I believe, it is the conjunction 
of Hejinian’s attempt to write her experience and of her simultaneous exploration of the 
implications of such an attempt. My Life is an account of experiences: she tells of events in her 
life as well as of events within her own consciousness. However, her account is radically 
different from the conventional construction of narrative chronology. The disjunctive succession 
of apparently unrelated sentences somehow document the thoughts and experiences of a life that 
is not linguistically defined within a trajectory of events, retrospectively understood as having an 
inexorable shape and direction, and leading to an altered understanding of one’s self in relation 
to the world. 
 However disjunctive the work seems on the surface, a close reading of the work shows 
subtle relationships of ideas in the flow of sentences. Either by chance or by intentional design, 
or both, there exist intricate links that relate one sentence to the next, so that in reading the work 
one becomes aware of a meandering but subtly and intelligently associative flow of 
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consciousness. Hejinian’s poetic history of her consciousness in My Life is, to be sure, a 
construction of a particular kind that plays with, but does not relinquish entirely, the conventions 
of narrative. Time and event, instead of being in the service of the shape of moral or 
philosophical development, as in the bildungsroman, are redistributed so as not to betray an 
overriding teleological structure. But even though the texture of the work as a whole is relatively 
homogeneous, there does exist a pattern to its organization that contributes to the dialectics 
between the work’s linear and nonlinear impulses. 
 Several critics have pointed out various kinds of patterns in the work. For example, Craig 
Dworkin compares the semantic texture of the work to the design of patchwork quilts, especially 
those quilts that have a design, as opposed to the relatively random patterns of crazy quilts. He 
extends the connection between semantic and textile disjunction to encompass a wider context of 
women’s production and feminist values. Regarding the thematic structure and interplay in My 
Life, Dworkin recognizes the recurrence of particular themes: “war, vacation, birthday parties, 
the weather, getting things out of the carpet, windows, colors, birds.”84 He correctly points out 
that these themes are “recognizable, finite, and frequently connected.”85 In other words, there is a 
constant push and pull between semantic disjunction and the creation of linear connections 
among certain themes, even though a particular theme might not recur again until several pages 
after its previous mention. Furthermore, he correctly points out that the narratives generated by 
such connections “are constructed of subtly associated segments; they work more by evocation 
than explicit connection among thoughts [which] are discontinuous but not unmotivated.”86 
Dworkin also locates other thematic categories such as the one in which Hejinian “transforms 
fragments of worn-out, quotidian, common language into an extraordinary, unique and individual 
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text.”87 For example, he observes that “[a] clichè like ‘down and out’ . . . appears in the phrase 
‘the tiniest idea became a “nagging thought” until I could write it down and out.’”88 
 Critics have also noted and analyzed the significance of the repetition of particular 
phrases throughout the text. For example, at the head of each section, which “represents” in a 
loose sense each year of her life, Hejinian places a title, which then is repeated in various 
contexts in the body of each section throughout the remainder of the book. For example, the first 
chapter is entitled, “a pause, a rose, something on paper.” This phrase is repeated many times 
throughout the book, but each time in a different context and sometimes with added words. For 
example, in section twenty-five, the title phrase becomes “A pause, a rose, something on paper, 
of true organic spirals we have no lack.”89 Freitag notes a thematic resonance among the section 
titles of My Life, which she describes as “[t]he negation of a direct account of the past and of a 
direct access to meaning.”90 She astutely notes that when the phrases and sentences that 
constitute the section titles recur in the body of the text, they undergo a semantic alteration 
through recontextualization. And Perloff refers to the titles-cum-leitmotifs as having “an oddly 
reassuring effect. . . . In the course of My Life these phrases become markers, signposts around 
which much that is confusing in one’s life can coalesce.”91 
 Dworkin, Perloff, and Freitag all note the correspondence of sentences containing 
particular themes with other thematically similar sentences across the spatial gaps that separate 
their occurrence in the text. Similarly, when viewing a patchwork quilt one seeks out and 
mentally highlights those patches that are of the same fabric, in order to perceive the overall 
pattern to the quilt’s design and to find some reassurance in the disorder. To their analyses I 
would highlight a different kind of tension within the text, one that brings to the fore a dialogue 
between seemingly contradictory drives in the text: the push and pull between referential and 
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non-referential drives, and between narrative and non-narrative drives. One way to demonstrate 
this is to show various types of leitmotifs or threads running through the text, and to analyze 
ways in which these threads (or patches, to borrow Dworkin’s analogy) play off one another in a 
reciprocal and interdependent engagement. 
 Particular categories or threads of thought are woven, apparently more or less at random, 
but also more or less evenly distributed, throughout the work. For example, one thread evokes 
the strangeness of ordinary language, in the manner of Ludwig Wittgenstein.92 Hejinian quotes a 
remembered common saying or expression that seems straightforward enough in the context of 
ordinary usage. She isolates the expression, often by enclosing it in quotation marks, and 
defamiliarizes it by couching it within a broader cultural context, or simply pointing to its 
metaphorical quirkiness. One example is “We can ‘plan the weekend.’”93 The idea that one can 
plan a weekend as one might plan a party points to the irony of that particular linguistic 
construction, as if one can bring a period of time into existence by writing it onto one’s calendar. 
Particular examples of certain threads sometimes intersect with other threads, so that this 
sentence is also an instance of another kind of thread in which Hejinian records ways in which 
her family quantified and ranked the objects of experience. As Perloff observes, “what emerges 
is that this is a family that makes discriminations between ‘better’ and ‘worse’ things, that is 
concerned with hierarchy, propriety, and order . . . and that the narrator recalls registering a 
certain puzzlement about these things.”94 The motif of the “better” and “worse” categories is 
repeated several times in My Life, in sentences such as “The better toys were gathered in the 
playpen,” and “The better dishes (the good china) were kept in a special closet.”95 Throughout 
My Life, Hejinian plays with categories and highlights their status as subjective constructs that 
can be scrutinized and not taken as having a universal or essential truth. 
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 Sprinkled throughout My Life are a number of Hejinian’s Wittgensteinian observations 
regarding ordinary language (for a list of several examples, see appendix B). To examine one 
instance of this particular thread, Hejinian remembers that “[m]y father would say I’ve a ‘big 
day’ tomorrow” (50). The use of size to describe the importance of an impending event is a 
common metaphorical construction, and makes a physical property that one experiences in daily 
life correspond to something that has no such property. And consider the sentence, “It is a way of 
saying, I want you, too, to have this experience, so that we are more alike, so that we are closer, 
bound together, sharing a point of view – so that we are “coming from the same place” (21-22). 
The comparison of commonality of thought with a physical location in space indicates Hejinian’s 
recognition of the use of bodily experience to describe a state of affairs that is more abstract. 
 In Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson point to hundreds of such 
examples of metaphors that have a basis in everyday physical experience, and that we use to 
describe phenomena in a way that brings abstract concepts (agreement, time importance) down 
to a physical level. These authors emphasize the bodily mediation of categories in ordinary 
metaphors that we use, often unaware of their embodied origins. “Important Is Big” is one of the 
categories of primary metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson list in their enumeration of linguistic 
conflations of domains (such as knowing with seeing) that are formed in childhood, and that lead 
to the largely unconscious formation of numerous metaphors used in everyday life. In the case of 
the primary metaphor “Important Is Big,” subjective experience (importance) is paired with 
sensorimotor experience (size). The example “Tomorrow is a big day” has its genesis in the 
primary childhood experience of “finding that big things, e.g., parents, are important and can 
exert major forces on you and dominate your visual experience.”96 The recurring “ordinary 
language” motif in My Life indicates one aspect of Hejinian’s fascination with the vagaries of 
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language: her acknowledgement of the metaphorical underpinnings of language, and its source in 
rudimentary bodily experience. Her cognizance of such peculiarities has shaped all of her poetic 
endeavors as she reveals the hidden meanings and often experiential origins behind 
commonsensical and ordinary linguistic usages.97 
 Sometimes these linguistic quirks echo in other parts of the book, as when Hejinian notes, 
“She could only give a little shrug” (9), which one might recall when later reading “One makes a 
shrug but gives a shit.” This and other kinds of interrelatedness among the fragments of 
experience in My Life give the whole work a richness and resonance that is reminiscent of the 
way that memory functions. As one continues to experience, one relates new perceptions and 
thoughts with prior ones, in an ongoing process of sorting, cataloging and comparing. 
 My larger strategy in highlighting these various threads is to show how, in the context in 
which they occur in the body of the text, they play off surrounding sentences, such as in the 
following example: “My father would say I’ve a “big day” tomorrow. Words are not always 
adequate to the occasion, and my “probably” sounded hopeless. It’s real, why, so, it’s wrong.” 
The sentence acknowledging the “big day” metaphor is followed by another sentence describing 
the speaker’s response of uncertainty, in which the emotional shading of “probably” is 
highlighted by placing it in quotation marks, echoing a similar emphasis in the first sentence. 
The idea of the adequacy of language to express affective gradations also retroactively reflects 
on the adequacy of words to refer in a literal fashion to abstract concepts such as “importance.” 
The associative relationship between these two sentences, whose theme is the adequacy of 
language precisely to translate emotions and thoughts, reflexively underscores the artifice of 
linguistic expression, as well as the embodied basis of linguistic expression. If, as the next 
sentence suggests, her response of “probably” is “real” (the word’s neural and vocal production 
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are materially based), it might also be “wrong” (the word does not correspond directly or literally 
to the emotion). Hejinian playfully couches this observation in a somewhat old-fashioned 
expression using the interjection “why,” which signifies mild surprise or hesitation, further 
extending the general theme of the strangeness and figurative basis of ordinary language. Note 
that it is possible in all three sentences to imagine their source in actual events in someone’s life, 
so that Hejinian’s description of an autobiographical experience (having responded to someone’s 
query with an unconvincing “probably”) also become the occasion for her more intellectual 
musings on the artifice of language and its relation to experience (which she is, self-consciously, 
attempting to describe). Thus an open-ended and unresolved dialogue ensues between the 
projects of 1) describing incidents in life, and 2) showing the artifice of that description. Hejinian 
does not denigrate the project of description by showing language to be artifice, and neither does 
she elevate description at the expense of questioning the realities of the categories assumed by 
such description. Instead, she allows each term in the dichotomy to interrogate the other in a 
dialogue that highlights each as real and each as posing a set of problems from the other’s 
perspective. The debate serves to enrich and question, and not to exalt or annihilate, the other 
term. 
 Another type of thread can be found in the reflexive sentences woven throughout the 
work, which often comment on the process of recording a life or on the nature of memory (for a 
list of several examples, see appendix C). For example, “Life is hopelessly frayed, all loose 
ends” (15) reflects on the quality of lived experience outside the retrospectively imposed 
trajectory of a more conventional autobiographical narrative. It is the very lack of a reconstructed 
overall shape that Hejinian attempts to represent in the assortment of loose ends in her 
autobiographical work. 
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 Some of the examples of reflexive commentary occur as if an isolated rumination, for 
example this one: “But the argument decays, the plot goes bit by bit” (71). Others occur within 
the context of a memory such as the following description of the multiple versions of a single 
story told by various members of her family: “There were more storytellers than there were 
stories, so that everyone in the family had a version of history and it was impossible to get close 
to the original, or to know “what really happened” (21). Most speak to the impossibility of 
capturing experience, of remembering it, speaking it, or writing it as an exact or faithful record 
of the original experience, so that “[i]t is impossible to return to the state of mind in which these 
sentences originated.” Thus they also reflexively refer to the writing and organization of My Life 
itself. At the heart of the work is the simultaneous construction and deconstruction of narrative, 
which is aptly formulated in the above statement, “If there is a story at all, accounted for, a 
settled thing to have experienced, it’s nothing of the kind.” If there were such a thing as a stable, 
absolute, or inherent quality of experience that can be definitively “accounted for,” then it is also 
must be the case that “it’s nothing of the kind.” In other words, there is a contradictory condition 
at the heart of this autobiography, which presupposes the telling of a life, yet simultaneously 
presupposes the impossibility of doing so. 
 The two threads or categories of which I have given particular instances are examples of 
Hejinian’s consciousness of the slipperiness and ambiguity of language and of its inability to 
capture experience in any complete or stable fashion. These statements deconstruct notions of 
inherent or essential qualities in language or memory. Another kind of thread runs counter to this 
warp of self-reflexiveness, and attempts to record, in a rather conventionally descriptive way, 
particular “spots of time” in experience, to use a Wordsworthian term (for a list of several 
examples, see appendix D). One example of such memories of concrete things or events is the 
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following: On her walks she stepped into people’s gardens to pinch off cuttings from their 
geraniums and succulents (7). Others have a more surreal or dreamlike quality, as in the 
following two: “I found a penny in a calla lily” (51), and “The nightmare was of a giant 
bluebottle fly which buzzed, ‘I’m all there is’” (54). These recorded memories are often 
complex, strange, intriguing, and open-ended. They constitute descriptive threads in some of the 
frayed selvages of life’s experience. But compared with the selfconscious kinds of statements of 
the first two categories, they are relatively straightforward as conventional description. Whether 
mundane or extraordinary, these descriptions share a wealth of concrete details and striking 
images.  
 When the warp of reflexivity is juxtaposed with the weft of described experience, they 
often inform and develop one another in surprising and delightful ways. For example, the 
following sentences occur together in the twenty-eighth section of My Life: 
 
The young women sat in front of the apartment building in the mornings, arranged 
on three levels of steps, like chorus boys on risers. A painting is a flat reflection. 
A fence is a belt, gives one confidence. When I say compulsion and characterize it 
as numb, I am thinking not of the satisfactions it invented for me as one 
compelled but of the impenetrable dutifulness of my will (71). 
 
The first sentence creates a decidedly three-dimensional portrait of women sitting on successive 
steps. The second sentence, “A painting is a flat reflection,” seems to comment on this 
description in order to remind us that it is, after all, a representation, lest we become so absorbed 
in its vividly realistic depiction that we forget its somewhat flatter existence as a word-painting 
or as a mental or mnemonic picture. The copulative grammatical structure of the second sentence 
is echoed in the third sentence: “a painting is . . .” echoes “a fence is . . .” and introduces the idea 
that boundaries can be psychologically comforting. Yet the confidence produced by boundaries 
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is also questioned as an illusory product, just as, in the sentence that follows, “When I say 
compulsion and characterize it as numb, I am thinking not of the satisfactions it invented for me 
as one compelled but of the impenetrable dutifulness of my will,” the pleasures created by one’s 
compulsions are understood as inventions of the inescapable (and thus “numb”) emotional 
backdrop of the will. Moreover, in the sentence “There was a garden, a hole in the fence, a 
grandfather who had no religion – one can run through the holes in memory, wearing a wet hat, 
onto the sidewalk covered with puddles, and there are fingers in them” (30), Hejinian has 
previously referred to “a hole in the fence” (like the “holes in memory”). She has also referred to 
“fences keeping cyclones” (59), an odd and ironic rephrasing of the expression “cyclone fence,” 
which is a chain-link fence designed to weather storms. The fence is resistant to the storm 
because it allows its winds to pass through – it keeps rather than resists the winds. These images 
attest to both the impermanence of memory with its holes, and its ability to create new and 
surprising linguistic formulas. Thus, Hejinian seems to be pointing out that language and 
memory have both a conventional and nominal existence as well as a radically impermanent and 
nonessential nature – a rather similar dialectical movement to the one observed in the work of 
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 In order to show how these threads often resonate next to one another over a more 
extended passage, let us examine another sequence of sentences from My Life: 
 
Overhead a small plane drags a banner, it is summer, its engines revving and 
whining – for years I suffered nightmares in which just such a plane would lose 
control and plunge spinning through the roof of the schoolroom, blazing the 
cobalt, red, green, and yellow of the Hammond World Atlas. I in my chronic ideas 
return. Stalin medallions dangle at the windshield in trucks throughout the 
republics – why do they do this. The language of inquiry, pedagogy of poetry. 
One doesn’t want to be seduced by the sheer wonder of it all, whereby everything 
is transformed by beauty. There is a bulging lake and sunlight juts from it like a 
rock, as laughter for its practitioners. Past midnight, exhausted, fainting, and very 
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old, the gray ice – Halley’s beaver – was swimming in the sky toward the deep 
forest on the distant ridge, its tail partially submerged. The flow of thoughts – 
impossible!98  
 
In this passage, we can trace the alternation of relatively descriptive sentences with metapoetical 
sentences. In the sentences in the first category, the writer sees an airplane dragging a banner, 
remembers her fear of airplanes crashing into her school (ironically targeting a map in her 
classroom), wonders at the cultural phenomenon in Russia of placing political idols on 
windshields (much as Christians in the United States might hang a crucifix from a rear-view 
mirror), and describes a dreamlike lake and sky. In the metapoetical category are the statements, 
“I in my chronic ideas return,” “The language of inquiry, pedagogy of poetry,” “One doesn’t 
want to be seduced by the sheer wonder of it all, whereby everything is transformed by beauty,” 
and “The flow of thoughts – impossible!” 
 The sentences in the passage above are thematically linked, so that there is a subtle and 
complex interaction among them, and a dialogue between description and reflexive commentary. 
For example, the recurring nightmare, “chronic ideas,” and the widespread custom of deifying a 
dictator are all related by the themes of repetition and pervasiveness. The author returning with 
her chronic ideas is also a comment on the use of repetition in the text, as if this perhaps has 
something to do with her formation (and transformation) of identity. The sight of an airplane 
banner reminds her of a fear earlier in her life of an airplane crashing. The recurring themes in 
My Life are like “chronic ideas” that recur and thus shape her as a person. However, that “I” is a 
different self from the earlier one: she no longer has the nightmares, for one thing. Also, due to 
intervening experiences (such as seeing the airplane banner), she now recognizes the theme as a 
recurring one and is able to inquire into the nature of her habitual thoughts so as not to allow 
them to become too settled, too negatively “chronic.” “Chronic” has the connotation of 
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pathological recurrence, and thus leads well into the description of seeing many Stalin 
medallions at truck windshields. There is also a connection between an airplane crashing on a 
map and Stalin’s violent plans for world domination. Hejinian asks why people continue their 
old habitual glorification of Stalin with these little tokens, which are also like “chronic ideas” 
that need to be inquired into. The “language of inquiry, pedagogy of poetry” is a concise and apt 
statement of Hejinian’s poetics, and works in subtle opposition to the preceding description of 
the apotheosis of Stalin, whose term of dictatorship was marked by the opposite of the spirit of 
free inquiry. The poetics of inquiry allow the dislodging of thought habits, and allow one to ask 
of oneself, as of others, why continue old, settled habits of thought? 
  The sentence about “inquiry” is followed by a concise argument on aesthetics. If one has 
an open, inquiring sensibility, one might find and become lured into believing in the inherent 
quality of beauty in the world. If beauty is an illusion, is there any harm in being “seduced” by 
it? This bit of philosophizing on aesthetics is followed by prose – a surreal and dream-like 
description of a lake and sky – that indulges in the very feeling for beauty that was just 
questioned. Their juxtaposition engenders a dialogue between the two notions, a dialogue that 
circulates the ideas but does not resolve them, suggesting the possibility – and the negation – of 
each. 
 The sentence with which I more or less arbitrarily closed the section above, questions the 
notion of a “flow” of thoughts and, by reflexive analogy, the textual flow in My Life. In ordinary 
usage, “flow” connotes a smooth, continuous motion, but not necessarily one whose particles are 
linked by strong logical, linear or causal connections. It does suggest a fluid and directed 
movement. Several sentences in My Life mention the impossibility of the autobiographical or 
descriptive project, as in the following: 
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It is impossible to return to the state of mind in which these sentences originated 
(30). 
 
It being impossible to complete the thought, the idea of infinity or eternity elicited 
a sort of desire, the sexual side of thought (33). 
 
These statements refer to the impossibility of recording an event in a way that faithfully and 
precisely mimics the original state of affairs at the time of the event, or of describing phenomena 
without evoking a multiplicity of meanings that deviate from the attempted descriptive capture. 
 On the other hand, what is equally impossible is freeing oneself from the conventions, 
reinforced by cognitive imperatives, of finding commonalities and continuities in experience: 
“Continuity, not so much of ideas as of assumptions, or attitudes, a style one simply can’t break 
away from” (27). Continuity or flow is a “style” – an ingrained human predilection – that is 
impossible to “break away from.” This state of very human affairs coexists with another reality, 
which is the impossibility of flow, which is to say that apart from our human projection of 
continuity, there is no such inherent continuity, no repetition except that which is cognitively 
assumed, in the world. This is what Hejinian refers to when she states that “It is impossible to 
discover any string or bundle or words that is entirely free of possible narrative or psychological 
content.” It is in our nature to discover links between even the most disparate of terms. 
  	   	  
 		     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 
of truth or realities. Conventional reality (that which assumes connection, correspondence and 
repetition) encompasses the deep-seated human conceptual framework, that which names and 
points to things and categorizes. This is an eminently practical framework of reality; indeed, it is 
a framework that is necessary for biological survival, and one that we take for granted in 
everyday life, much as we take for granted the metaphorical constructions in language that are 
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based on embodied experience, as in Hejinian’s defamiliarized metaphorical expressions above. 
It is also illusory to believe that cognitive categories or qualities inhere in objects to which we 
impute such characteristics. Thus the “flow of thoughts is impossible,” even though that flow is 
“a style one simply can’t break away from.” Both subjective and outer-subjective realities exist 
at once, and are maintained in a non-resolving dialogue with one another. 
 There are links among the thoughts and descriptions of My Life, but they are not obvious, 
and the onus is on the reader to discover them. The returns on such “impossibility,” however, are 
richly rewarding, because the dialogue that is generated by the disjunction between the narrative 
and the anti-narrative, the description and the anti-description, maintains a perpetual and never-
resolving friendly debate. Neither side ever gets the upper hand, and there is no resolution to the 
discussion. Instead, the dialogical motion is maintained in perpetual and paradoxical motion. 
 Like the work of Scalapino, Hejinian’s work flattens out the temporal and descriptive 
dimensions of conventional autobiography in order to show their simultaneous conventional 
existence and their constructed nature – 		    	( 

   	 	

one’s memory of experience are simultaneously woven into recognizable patterns and hopelessly 
frayed. The work is like a garment whose shape and details are being constantly altered through 
the very act of remembering its appearance. We might imagine it as possessing an overall design 
(or several designs), but in fact we are incapable of experiencing it in a consistent way since any 
understanding of it at a given moment will have been altered by intervening experience. Hejinian 
demonstrates this principle by showing the transformation of recurring ideas or images in their 
new contexts. In the work, the threads of the weft and warp are constantly unraveling and being 
retied with other threads. To stretch the sartorial metaphor a bit further, the garment of My Life is 
like the emperor’s new clothes, an autobiography everywhere suggesting its reflexive knowledge 
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of itself as constructed and impermanent, and not directly reflecting any essence of experience, 
perception or thought. At the same time, it is a richly intertextual garment, reveling in the 
colorful interconnections among its (constantly unraveling) threads and (continually shifting) 
shapes. It does not settle into a preference for either the mode of invisibility or that of 
conventional or nominal existence, but explores the interconnections between the two through 
the dialogue among the various threads that refer to one and the other. The temporal flow of the 
author’s life does not have a hierarchical shape, but is instead deliberately flattened out to show 
the frayed and loose ends of life, in which there may indeed be various trajectories representing 
various goals or events, but with many intervening occurrences outside of and within the 
author’s consciousness. 
 Hejinian’s and Scalapino’s project of paying close attention to one’s perception of 
ongoing motions and events in an attempt to recover experience not yet steered into temporal 
categories and trajectories is closely related to the project of recovering experience in a reality 
that is constantly being shaped (often without one’s consciousness of it) into categories of 
intersubjective relations, and private and public realms of experience. Both projects aim to open 
the field of possibility for experience, both individual and social. In Chapter Five, I will examine 
ways in which works by Scalapino and Mei-mei Berssenbrugge interrogate divisions in 
intersubjective relations, and between public and private realms, and propose a dialectics that 
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SELF AND OTHER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
IN MEI-MEI BERSSENBRUGGE AND LESLIE SCALAPINO 
 
There has been a gentle exchange of bodies.1 
  Lyn Hejinian  
 
It is in the world that we rejoin one another.2 
  Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
The separated being is satisfied, autonomous, and nonetheless 
searches after the other with a search that is not incited by the lack 
proper to need nor by the memory of a lost good. Such a situation 
is language.3 
  Emmanuel Levinas 
 
 This chapter is a continuation and extension of the discussion begun in Chapter Two, 
which investigated the nature of the subject and object relationship in the poetry of Mei-mei 
Berssenbrugge and Lyn Hejinian. In that chapter, I explored in their works the nature of a non-
dualistic relationship between the self and the objects of its perception. The subjects in their 
poems do not act upon passive objects in their field of perception, or assume a colonizing 
position in relation to objects understood to exist for one’s use. Instead, a relationship emerges 
between subject and object that is more mutually active and interdependent. The perceiving 
subjects in their poems acknowledge their shared physical commonality with the not-self, while 
simultaneously respecting the separation between self and not-self that is necessary to a 
relationship of reciprocity. They recognize that there is a dialogical basis in the act of perception. 
Their poetry demonstrates a reciprocal relationship with the objects within the subject’s field of 
perception by acknowledging that both are implicated in the act of perceiving. However, the 
subject and object’s boundaries are not so blurred that they are in danger of resolving into a 
totality. They engage in a dialogical relationship in which the perceiving self acknowledges both 
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its separateness from the object (the irreconcilability of subject and object into a totality) as well 
as its commonality with the object (the shared materiality and perceivability of subject and 
object). Their work acknowledges the mutuality and commonality of subject and object, but not 
in order to subsume the object into a conceptual whole, since the integrity of both self and object 
are respected. 
 The non-dualistic relationship between subject and object that I have described is 
dialectical. It will be helpful at this stage to reiterate some of the features of the dialectical 
movement that I have identified in contemporary experimental poetry, since I will be extending 
this movement to intersubjective encounters, and to the connection between private and public 
realms of experience. The dialectical relationship is fundamentally dialogical: opposing terms 
engage in an open-ended and non-resolving conversation. The terms neither nullify one another, 
nor do they attempt to subsume one another into a totality. Instead, the coexistence of – and 
dialogue between – contradictory or opposed terms terms multiply the semantic possibilities of 
the conversation. In this chapter, I will extend the investigation of the subject and object 
dichotomy to the social dimension by analyzing the dialectical and reciprocal relationship – first, 
between self and other in the poetry of Berssenbrugge, and second, between the private and 
public realms in the poetry of Leslie Scalapino. 
 In the discussion that follows, I will be discussing the dialectical relationship between the 
following three sets of terms: 1) the relationship between self and other, by which I refer to the 
experience of one person by another and the patterns and meanings that this experience and 
relation engenders, 2) the relationship between categories of interiority and exteriority, by which 
I refer to the relationship between a reductive subjectivity that posits a self incapable of knowing 
the experience of an other, and an intersubjectivity that acknowledges the commonality of lived 
 217 
physical experience,4 and 3) the relationship between public and private realms of experience. 
The works of Scalapino and Berssenbrugge demonstrate an acute awareness of the philosophical 
and political implications in the ways in which culture constructs and conceptualizes the 
relationship between these terms. Their works demonstrate dialogical, interdependent, reciprocal, 
non-totalizing, and non-resolving relationships among the terms of intersubjective experience. 
 In her 1978 poetic essay “Kate’s Talk,”5 Berssenbrugge offers insights into her poetics of 
experience and reveals the importance of the ethical, sensual, and emotional dimensions of her 
work. Berssenbrugge is concerned to show the relationship between sensual experience in the 
world, interactions with persons, and the feeling that attaches to one’s experiences. She begins 
by locating a moment in one’s present experience “when knowledge in the body starts to cross 
over into knowledge that you can say,” and describing the richness of this moment’s layers: 
 
I will try to elucidate the feeling of tunings of the richness of the events in your 
experience, as degrees of meaning of your experience. 
 
I am going to try and do this by creating a patchwork or collages out of words to 
imitate the experiential patchwork, the patchwork of our senses, and the meaning 
we attach to those patches, which I will call a feeling of meaning, or in daily life I 
want to call it a feeling of richness. 
 
For Berssenbrugge, one’s “experiential patchwork,” consists of moments of sensual perception 
and the emotional significance of this perception, in which emotional significance and meaning 
become attached to one’s percepts. According to Berssenbrugge, the more closely one’s 
emotions and the meanings one attaches to experience are in harmony, the more sensually 
attuned one will be with persons and objects. And this, for Berssenbrugge, is closely related to 
the experience of generating meaning in poetry: 
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Is it how close you are to being a creature that enables you to experience with 
sensuality, 
 
or is it the refinement of a moral sense, so that the person’s feeling and sense of 
meaning are congruent with each other? 
 
And this is really talking about the way a poem means something. 
 
Berssenbrugge’s own poetry attempts to identify the “patches” of feeling and meaning that 
coincide and attach to moments of experience, and the way in which experience and knowledge 
“seem to reveal each other translucently.” And the richness of one’s layers of cognition are for 
Berssenbrugge intimately related to one’s interactions with persons: 
 
A greater perception is what you can know more of, becoming more open to a 
richer level of experience, 
 
which is why one’s capacity for awareness is inseparable from being with other 
people 
 
as if interaction with the person, whether it be in the present or in memory, were a 
growing point, and direction, the direction towards a perception, twinkling lights 
below the trees in town, from your vantage point above. 
 
Memories, emotions, and perceptions interact in a subject to produce the “opaqueness” or the 
“richness of saturation or density in our experience of a moment or of an event.” This richness of 
subjective experience is multiplied through interactions with others. 
 The excerpts from “Kate’s Talk” quoted above do not reveal much of the collage effect 
of experience and time that Berssenbrugge attempts to render in the whole poetic essay. In order 
to enact the overlapping of perception, memory, feelings, and thoughts, she describes, then 
interweaves, different moments of complex experience. For example, she juxtaposes the 
experiencing of hearing a branch scraping against a window with that of hearing “the sound of 
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bus wheels.” This is followed by the juxtaposition of the experience of seeing a person walking 
toward one and one’s thoughts and memories of that person: 
 
A person comes to you, while you are thinking. She is there 
with you in your thought, and she is also struggling to leave 
her body, 
 
like a patch of the sound of bus wheels next to a branch that 
is moving back and forth outside your window. 
 
You can’t help seeing sections of wall behind it, as if your 
memory or your sense of meaning about the person were an 
embodiment of the person, 
 
so that the end result is that you see through the branch the 
expanse of wall behind the branch, 
 
when the spray of yellow leaves moves. 
 
One’s actual perception of the approaching person, and one’s whole range of associated 
thoughts, memories, emotions relating to that person, are inextricably intertwined to create a rich 
patchwork of experience: one experiences the physical person as well as the opaque cognitive 
backdrop. Similarly, one might hear a branch scraping against one’s window and have the 
associated experience of hearing the sound of a bus. A relatively insignificant experience does 
not take place in a cognitive vacuum, but is accompanied by an inevitable wall of meaning, that 
is, if one is sufficiently attuned to the richness of experience. In other words, one’s cognitive 
processes seem inseparable from one’s perceptions: they mutually inform one another, 
“reveal[ing] each other translucently” and multiplying the meanings that radiate from one’s 
experience. Berssenbrugge does not treat language, emotions, cognition, and memory as a 
mediation that is a barrier to a direct experience of reality. Rather, the richness of experience 
arises from reality, and has its basis in reality, since subjective experience is itself part of that 
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reality. Furthermore, the richness of experience is positively related to the impermanence of 
material reality and of lived experience: 
 
Patches of each of these things that you pay attention to, assemble 
 
in October light with a richness that comes from the light emitting from each little 
red box of a deteriorating plant cell. 
 
Perceived reality is evoked here as autumn leaves whose decay is experienced as the color red. 
The spectacular coloration of leaves in autumn is an apt emblem not only for the richness of 
experience, but for the impermanent nature that it shares with the perceived world. The semantic 
richness “comes from the light” that is reflected from each “deteriorating plant cell.” Perception 
and the objects of perception (whether things or persons) share a basis in materiality as well as 
an ephemeral nature. 
 The meanings that one attaches to experiences and feelings generate associated 
experiences and meanings in one’s memory, which color and transform the object of present 
experience: “. . . there is a patch of feeling, and patches of the causes of the feeling adjacent to 
each other, which seem to reveal each other translucently.” Berssenbrugge is not saying, 
however, that the meanings, categories, and so forth, that we attach to experience are somehow 
embedded “out there” in the things we perceive. Instead, she emphasizes the material basis of 
our perception and cognitive processes, which arise from the reality with which we interact, and 
insists upon the dependence of the richness of experience on the acknowledgment of our 
experience as well as the objects (and other subjects) experienced as impermanent. To posit 
subjective experience as a barrier to a more direct communion with the world is to desire an 
illusory perceptual capture or possession. Indeed, what “prevents your feeling of meaning from 
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starting to assemble into glowing patches” is the desire for possession and permanence, whether 
of another person or of time: 
 
What has this got to do with a feeling of death, that seems 
to be such a distinct substance? 
 
or in regard to appearances, What is it about another person 
that you think you have, that you think you can lose? 
 
this may have to do with clinging to an idea about time, 
 
which prevents your feeling of meaning from starting to 
assemble into glowing patches. 
 
In Berssenbrugge’s poetics, one’s interactions with others enhances one’s “capacity for 
awareness.” This capacity is stalled by the desire not to lose one’s experience or the objects of 
one’s experience to time and impermanence. The desire to cling to one’s ideas about others and 
to memories mutes the ongoing and continual process of creating meaning from experience. The 
belief that knowledge can endow persons and objects with inherent qualities and stable 
meanings, and thus can fix them outside of time, creates the rhetoric of history and impoverishes 
experience. 
 For Berssenbrugge, the plurality of a subject’s experience does not require bringing 
objects or persons into a totalized system or subsuming them into the scope of one’s own 
subjectivity. In her poem “Irises,” Berssenbrugge acknowledges the coexistence of two mutually 
opposing yet interacting states, in which 1) each being is integral to itself, and 2) social 
interaction allows the transcendence of the separateness of individual beings without annihilating 
the integrity of the other: 
 
In a world which transcends the confines of her transient being, she can reach 
and bring existences within the compass of her life, without annulling 
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their transcendence.6  
 
This philosophical and poetic statement contains three occurrences of the prefix “trans-,” 
suggesting motion across or beyond, and change. Such a world of relationships posited in these 
lines cannot be static because of the constant motion between contradictory realms: “transience” 
is dependently linked with “transcendence.” Also, “transcendence” is identified with two 
opposing ideas: the separation of the individual being and going beyond that separation to “bring 
existences within the compass” of one’s being. In this world, the transcendence of individual 
being is maintained without being annulled, and the transcendence of the confines of individual 
being is faciliated. The second section of “Irises” opens with the following statement: 
 
This person is incorrigible in how things seem to her, that the body is responsible 
for actions we share with brutes, for example, reflex, light reflected from a wolf in 
the eyes of a sheep exciting flight.7  
 
In the first clause, an unidentified person (an other) stubbornly clings to her own particular way 
of perceiving the world. Her subjectivity is a unique perspective, transcendent in its alterity. The 
second clause, which does not syntactically follow the first, describes the common emotional 
basis that humans share with animals. Theses two ideas are logically linked in opposition, which 
Berssenbrugge underscores by the syntactical warp between the two clauses. However, the ideas 
are engaged in a dialogue with one another without argument, but simply as realms revolving in 
separate orbits around a common center. Uniqueness of beings and commonality among beings 
do not annihilate one another. The end of this section contains a statement of the coexistence of 
contradictory realms, and the need for a mind sufficiently “wispy” to embody such a philosophy: 
 
. . . The more wispy the mind, as at the edge of the greenness 
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of a dogwood blossom, the more fit to catch sight of such an invisible entity as 
“parallel,” 
its distinct substance capable of having all mountains thought away and still being 
around.8  
 
Wispy edges do not form discrete boundaries; “wispy” cognition would presumably not tend to 
conceive discrete boundaries. Such thinking would therefore be less susceptible to absolutist 
thinking and more likely to “catch sight of” or accept the coexistence and dialogue between 
opposing terms. The example that Berssenbrugge gives is a paraphrase of the ancient Buddhist 
parable regarding the stages in the journey toward enlightenment.9 First, one experiences objects 
without really considering their basis in a mediating perception. Then, when one is enlightened, 
one’s previous naivete about the world is disillusioned, and one becomes aware of the illusionary 
constructs that we create when we experience, and of the radical impermanence of all. Finally, 
one is able simultaneously to comprehend both the materiality of the world (mountains are once 
again mountains) and the illusion of a direct, unmediated experience of it. One is able to accept 
the coexistence of both perspectives. 
 The phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty substantially informed the 
discussion in Chapter Two of the poetic challenge to cultural survivals of the Cartesian subject-
object dualism. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of this dualism urges a return from the objectification 
of the world by an “information machine,” “to the ‘there is’ which underlies” our thought, to “the 
soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body.”10 He advocates a 
return to the sensual world that forms the basis for a commonality of existence, and an embodied 
and reciprocal participation in the act of perception. Merleau-Ponty extends (and complicates) 
the subject and object problematic to the realm of intersubjectivity, in which he interrogates the 
conceptual boundaries that have effected a schism between self and other: “[A]ssociated bodies 
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must be brought forward along with my body – the ‘others,’ not merely as my congeners, as the 
zoologist says, but the others who haunt me and whom I haunt; the ‘others’ along with whom I 
haunt a single, present, and actual Being . . .”11 Merleau-Ponty always returns to a profoundly 
embodied conception of self and other as a prerequisite – a grounding – for the “associat[ion] of 
bodies” in which subject and other haunt one another in a way that goes beyond the mere 
recognition of similarity of one’s individual perceptions of the world. For Merleau-Ponty, there 
is an interpenetration of beings that more profoundly connects humans than the fact of our 
biological relatedness. Merleau-Ponty might challenge the insistence of some cognitive scientists 
and philosophers on the essentialist position regarding qualia, which is to say the irreducible 
quality of subjective experience, which cognitive philosopher David Chalmers calls the “hard 
problem” of current cognitive philosophy. To privilege individual subjective experience at the 
expense of the commonality of experience (or vice versa, for that matter) is a mistake, for both 
are necessary and interdependent facts of existence: 
 
I can count on what I see, which is in close correspondence with what the other 
sees (everything attests to this, in fact: we really do see the same thing and the 
thing itself) – and yet at the same time I never rejoin the other’s lived experience. 
It is in the world that we rejoin one another. Every attempt to reinstate the illusion 
of the “thing itself” is in fact an attempt to return to my imperialism and to the 
value of my thing. Therefore it does not bring us out of solipsism: it is a new proof 
of solipsism.12 
 
Merleau-Ponty addresses the problem of the imperialistic ego by positing a commonality of 
being in the world that nonetheless maintains the otherness of the object by implicating it in the 
act of experience. However, it is another important philosopher in the phenomenological 
tradition, Emmanuel Levinas, who more thoroughly complicates and critiques the relationship 
between self and other. Levinas’ starting point in his philosophy is the alterity of subjectivity, 
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while Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the “flesh” of the world that is the shared being and experience 
of self and not-self. However, this difference does not alter their usefulness in theorizing a 
challenge to dualistic thought through the non-resolving dialogue between contradictory terms. 
As we shall see, Levinas each also posits dialogical movement between the alterity of the 
individual subjectivity and the commonality of the social experience, and he shares with 
Merleau-Ponty the important characteristics of the radical dialectics I am proposing in this work. 
Also, the vocabulary and ideas that preoccupy Berssenbrugge in her writings reveal a strong 
affinity with the thought of Levinas.  
 Levinas’ work is based on what he calls an ethics of the “presence of the Other”: the 
radical alterity and exteriority of the other in relation to a subject. Levinas designates this alterity 
a transcendence of the other. The transcendental sovereignty of the other presupposes the 
irreducible difference or separateness of the other in relation to the self, and is the basis for 
Levinas’ concept of infinity in human relations. For Levinas, the infinite is necessarily achieved 
in the presentation of the other, which exceeds any concept or idea that the self may have about 
the other13: “The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts, and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.”14 
The terms of self and other in Levinas’ ethics do not resolve into a simple opposition that can be 
encompassed in a dialectics of totality: 
 
Neither the separated being nor the infinite being is produced as an antithetical 
term. The interiority that ensures separation (but not as an abstract rejoinder to the 
notion of relation) must produce a being absolutely closed over upon itself, not 
deriving its isolation dialectically from its opposition to the Other. And this 
closeness must not prevent egress from interiority, so that exteriority could speak 
to it, reveal itself to it, in an unforeseeable movement which the isolation of the 
separated being could not provoke by simple contrast.15  
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On the one hand, Levinas states, otherness is defined as exteriority and alterity. There is a 
partition between beings that is a condition of the uniqueness of subjective experience, the 
“something that it is like to be” a particular being16 The otherness of the other is unable to be 
encompassed either epistemologically or ontologically by one’s self, for there is always an 
overflow in the presentation of the other, in which an “inexhaustible surplus of infinity overflows 
the actuality of consciousness” of one’s self.17 This infinity stems from the radical alterity of the 
consciousness of the other – from the ultimate inaccessibility and incommensurability of an 
other’s subjectivity from one’s own perspective: “[t]he presence of a being not entering into, but 
overflowing, the sphere of the same determines its ‘status’ as infinite.”18 Levinas expresses the 
tension between the utter closedness of the other and the egress from the other’s interiority that 
allows his or her presence to be experienced and appreciated by one’s self, as a paradox: 
 
. . . the knower neither participates in nor unites with the known being. The 
relation of truth thus involves a dimension of interiority, a psychism, in which the 
metaphysician, while being in relation with the Metaphysical, maintains himself 
apart. But we have also indicated that this relation of truth, which at the same time 
spans and does not span the distance – does not form a totality with the “other 
shore” – rests on language . . . . 19 
 
The condition of absolute separateness between self and other and the simultaneous condition of 
communication between them is a paradox in which “[i]n the separated being the door to the 
outside must hence be at the same time open and closed.”20 It is language, aboriginally 
communicative, that bridges the chasm between self and other and that allows a glimpse of the 
infinity presented by the other in a face-to-face encounter. 
 The paradox of coexisting and contradictory conditions that Levinas describes in 
interpersonal encounters is reminiscent of Berssenbrugge statement of the simultaneous 
transcendence of beings confined to their own subjectivities and being able to “reach / and bring 
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existences within the compass of her life, without annulling / their transcendence.” The “wispy” 
quality of mind allows one to bring into the range of one’s life the lives of “parallel” beings, 
which although “invisible entit[ies]” in their alterity, can yet be experienced and can enrich one’s 
perception of the world: the mountains can be “thought away” while at the same time “still being 
around.” As we will see, Berssenbrugge uses the structure of the paradox in other works to break 
the hierarchicalizing and totalizing structure of dualistic terms. 
 Berssenbrugge’s poem “Empathy”21 offers a nonlinear and poetic philosophical parsing 
of an intersubjective encounter (see Figure 7). In this poem, Berssenbrugge attempts a poetic 
enactment of communication between a self and other. The encounter is rife with paradoxes and 
complexities. As Berssenbrugge makes clear in her prefatory statement to the poem, what is 
casually or unconsciously communicated (“the insignificant or everyday gesture,” and “the error 
and tension” in communication) is just as important, if not more, than what is overtly conveyed. 
 As one proceeds through the poem, it becomes apparent that the concepts of intelligibility 
and unintelligibility are being contrasted. On the one hand, communication between the female 
subject and the male other is full of uncertainties: the subject cannot capture what necessarily 
overflows the means of capturing it. The “state of confusion” in their communion “is never made 
comprehensible by being given a plot.” Their communication is pervaded by a “feeling of 
mysteriousness” and “problem[s] of interpretation.” Their “speech and thought” are like a 
“hysterical question” that is never resolved despite attempts to construct them rhetorically. Their 
speech is also “a constant notation of parallel streams of thought and observations,” parallel lines 
that never meet despite “her feeling of identifying with him.” 
 The uncertainty in communication includes the subject’s knowledge of herself, for “the 
innermost nature of her wishes is as much known and unknown to them as the reality of the 
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external world. / It is as incompletely presented by what she can see as is the external world / by 
communication with someone she wishes for.” The subject and the other are “in the dark,” both 
literally and figuratively. 
 On the other hand, there is in a real sense communication taking place, oral expression 
that has meaning, however plagued with mysteries and uncertainties, between the interlocutors. 
Berssenbrugge describes communication as being subject to all the transiences and instabilities 
of matter and being, but it is “a starting point for uncovering a story through translation from 
wish into desire.” 
 Paradoxical formulations pervade “Empathy” and contribute to the rejection of a 
hierarchical formulation in which one term might enjoy precedence over the other. The 
paradoxes concern the subject’s communication with an other, which is marked by a tension 
between two tendencies. First, the subject encountering and interacting with an other experiences 
the limitations of its own consciousness to totalize and assimilate the presence and 
communication of that other into one’s own subjective domain. That subject acknowledges the 
“incomplete present[ation]” of the “external world,” including the consciousness of an other, to 
one’s senses. On the other hand, knowing these limitations and illusions, the subject still desires 
to be connected and to identify with an other, and to “make meanings stick,” to find a plot within 
the “state of confusion.” In other words, “[t]he speaking becomes fixed, although there is no such 
thing as repetition.” Although speech events can never be exactly repeated because they are 
temporal events in a constantly changing scenario, in another, more practical sense, speaking can 
become fixed by “uncovering a story” or tapping into familiar plots, as one translates “from wish 
into desire.” 
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 The subject accepts her belief of the other’s communication, but doesn’t feel the need to 
prove the practical veracity of what he presents to her, since with enough repetitions of actions 
and words, one comes to accept certain patterns: “an appearance in the dark will not deceive 
after enough appearances / and everywhere, sooner or later, there will be a hint of a tree or space 
above a lake.” Despite the mysterious uncertainty of communication, one does in a sense come 
to know an other through “enough appearances” in the darkness of that mystery, for “everyday 
gestures or tensions accrete an intimacy she can recognize.” 
 In another paradoxical formulation, Berssenbrugge writes that speech is “a kind of oral 
thought at once open and precise.” This wording strikingly recalls Levinas’ metaphor for his 
paradoxical state of the opposed and coexisting terms of the separated being still able to 
communicate with an other: the door separating interior from exterior is both open and closed at 
the same time. According to Berssenbrugge, speech as communication with an other is both 
open, that is, open to a multitude of meanings, and precise in the practical sense of being able to 
convey useful information. 
 The lighting in the settings of each of the three parts of “Empathy” also contributes to the 
importance of nonresolvable terms in dialogue with one another. In the first section, the female 
subject (who is sometimes referred to in the first person, and sometimes in the third person) is 
walking along a dark path with a male companion. Darkness, however, is not a simple metaphor 
for the uncertainty of their communication. It is not a one-sided symbol for the “state of 
confusion” that is “never made comprehensible by being given a plot.” The connectedness of 
subject and other is not one-sidedly reduced to an artificial plot imposed on their relations. It also 
“reveals ways in which she construes what she perceives / according to an internal connection 
which will announce its conflict in the plot.” The language that gives meaning to experience 
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arises from the relation between self and other. As Berssenbrugge states in “Kate’s Talk,” the 
other enriches one’s experience: “one’s capacity for awareness is inseparable from being with 
other people / as if interaction with the person . . . were a growing point, and direction, the 
direction towards a perception.” Similarly, the dark setting of the first section is double-edged: 
even in the “pitch dark,” things are still visible, such as the roses and the “road through the 
woods.” Despite the “confusion” and “mysteriousness,” it is also true that “an appearance in the 
dark will not deceive after enough appearances.” The northern lights that appear during their 
walk are similarly two-sided: they can simultaneously be understood to a degree, and also 
epistemologically opaque. Although its “circumference is inferrable,” its other, more remote, 
spatial and temporal dimensions remain unknown and perhaps unknowable: its “outermost 
region lacks any known form of registration, / such as before that and before that.” 
 By contrast to the dark and intimate road in the woods, full of mysteriousness and 
confusion (in spite of the assertion of a degree of certainty and visibility), the stadium in the 
second section is a brightly lit public space. From the subject’s perspective, the stadium is 
concave, yet it resembles objects that are convex, from the normal perspective of a subject: a 
honeycomb and a geodesic dome. Thus the stadium has one shape from the subject’s perspective, 
but it metanymically resembles other objects with the opposite kind of shape, turned inside out. 
In details such as the shape of the stadium, Berssenbrugge introduces a complexity and 
instabililty regarding the nature of objects and relationships. 
 In the stadium, the subject and her companion sing a song, the simple certitude of whose 
antiphonal statements are betrayed by an underlying feeling of instability and even hysteria. The 
ordinary order of question (where are you?) and response (I am here) are reversed, so that the 
declarative statement (“I am here”) is followed by the question that would logically precede it 
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(“where are you”). Although the brightly lit setting might imply a greater certitude regarding the 
relations and communication between self and other, instead that certitude is everywhere 
destabilized. In the first place, it is ironic that in a brightly-lit place one singer asks the location 
of the other. The question has shades of the metaphysical as well: the question of the individual’s 
location in space is also a question of the autonomy of the individual, her degree of separateness 
from or identity with an other: “[I]n light so bright she sees her eyelash as a golden line 
reflecting on the inside of her sunglasses,” she feels “a sense of scandal at invoking a real 
person” with whom she would feel empathy. Also, there is “a problem of interpretation” in 
speculative thought. Despite the illumination, things are not so clear, and repetition of any event 
is an illusion: there’s “no such thing.” The flip side of this negativity also has its place in the 
oddly unilluminating bright light of the stadium. Stories are, after all, uncovered; thought is, after 
all, found to be precise. 
 In the final section, a contrast is presented between light that is fragmented and intervallic 
(a “time lapse photograph of lightning” and “an interval of colored light on the plain”) and a 
more steady and focused light illuminating the parts of objects or of the self (“real and constant 
luminosity of the parts”). The tension between the two kinds of light reflects the tension between 
two positions. On the one hand, the desire for a definitive understanding of self and other, in 
which “everyday gestures or tensions accrete an intimacy she can recognize,” for attaining 
empathy for an other “for what is good in life / from his point of view,” for a real or whole self 
with an essential core that can achieve communion with an other (“a real self who will remain 
forever in the emotion of a necessary or real person”). On the other hand, the recognition that 
wholeness, like “those collages that verge on trompe l’oeil,” is discovered to be illusory on close 
examination. 
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 Desire for communion with and empathy for the other constitute the fulcrum for 
Berssenbrugge’s complex drama of the infinite signification that desire engenders and the 
rhetorical limitations in our constant plotting of time and event. The plotting of a series of events 
in a story is roughly comparable to the song, with its oversimplified antiphonal refrain. The song 
is contrasted with the “presentation of the song,” the actual performance of the song by the two 
persons. The former is marked by artifice; it is “a starting point for uncovering a story through 
translation from wish into desire.” It is not, however, the same as desire, which is marked by an 
infinity of signification, the basis of which is the linguistic communication between the two 
singers. In the words of Levinas, “the essence of language is the relation with the Other,” and 
“[s]ignification is infinity, that is, the Other. . . .” [207] For Levinas, as for Berssenbrugge, 
language is enacted not in an individual consciousness, but emerges from the relation between a 
subject and an other, and that places the subject in question: “Language is not enacted within a 
consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in 
question. This event is irreducible to consciousness, where everything comes about from within . 
. .”22 The desire of Levinas’ ethics is one that is “for a land foreign to every nature,” (34) that is, 
for the other. Further, “It is a desire that can not be satisfied. . . . The metaphysical desire has 
another intention; it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness – 
the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.”23 For Berssenbrugge, finding a way to empathize 
with an other, to feel “empathy for what is good in life / from his point of view,” means finding a 
way that does not totalize self and other into a unity in which each gains identity from its 
opposition to the other, or when one’s desire to merge with an other might produce the undesired 
effect of “construct[ing] a rhetorical story again.” Rather, “her feeling of identifying with him is 
like a quick flash or a signal”; it, too, is fleeting, impermanent. The rich meaning generated in an 
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encounter with an other is “never made comprehensible,” with the conceptual strategies of 
hierarchical structures, since “at each instant [the other] overflows the idea a thought would carry 
away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means 
exactly: to have the idea of infinity.”24 This generous overflow of signification is not possible to 
be contained by conceptualizations or identifications, which are impermanent, or comprehended 
by the experiencing self. Instead, this surplus of meaning arises from the intersubjective 
encounter. 
 In keeping with the poem’s frequent testimony to both the uncertainty of communication 
and the conviction that it has taken place, Berssenbrugge ends with a statement that suggests the 
coexistence of terms at the opposite ends of the spectrum of communication and meaning. There 
is no hierarchy of one term over the other, no subsuming of one term by the other. There is also 
no “happy medium” of these opposed realms, no gray area in which the extreme ends of the 
terms are annulled and resolve into a compromise position in which the terms blur to the point of 
relative indistinguishability. Instead, Berssenbrugge offers an acknowledgement that 
communication and meaning are both real in a practical sense, and illusory in the sense of being 
eternal or stable, or of having an essential quality inhering in the what one believes one means. 
The terms remain opposed yet in dialogue and unresolved: 
 
Be that as it may, real and constant luminosity of the parts can create 
a real self who will remain forever in the emotion of a necessary or real person. 
To deny this is to deny the struggle to make certain meanings stick. 
 
The terms do not form a totality. Instead, they generate an infinity of signification and creation 
through their ceaseless dialogue. As Levinas has it, “A relation whose terms do not form a 
totality can hence be produced within the general economy of being only as proceeding from the 
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I to the other, as a face to face, as delineating a distance in depth – that of conversation, of 
goodness, of Desire.”25 The terms of the relation are dialectically necessary for one another, but 
they can never contain one another and do not unite into a totality. They are, first of all, not 
discrete realms with certain boundaries, and moreover, they overflow one another. They are in 
constant and unresolved dialogue with one another through the very language with which self 
and other communicate. 
 Much of Berssenbrugge’s work returns again and again to concerns of the perception and 
consciousness of a subject, often invoking memories or encounters with others to complicate her 
eliptical description of being in the world. Although her poetics of intersubjectivity bears some 
remarkable similarities with the ethical philosophy of Levinas, it also suggests a more feminist 
version of Levinas, who makes of the feminine other an instrumental being, providing a 
welcoming presence in the home for the male, yet herself homeless; providing the male with the 
face-to-face encounter, yet herself serving only to assist the male towards his own 
transcendence.26 Berssenbrugge seems always to be aware of relations of power between male 
and female, and of the feminine presence of the subject in many of her poems, as she does in 
“Empathy.” 
 Berssenbrugge complicates rigid divisions and dualistic relations between subject and 
object, and between inside and outside realms ingrained in much of Western culture; Scalapino 
also subjects such dualisms to a radical critique, as we discovered with temporal hierarchies in 
Chapter Four. Their poetry is very different in from one another in formal innovation. Both 
contain disjunctions, but Berssenbrugge’s work is by far more coherent syntactically, at least 
when compared with Scalapino’s later work. What they share, however, is of greater significance 
than any stylistic differences. Both Berssenbrugge and Scalapino attempt not simply to shake up 
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or eradicate categories of certainty or stability, or any term that has historically gained 
transcendental status in the Western philosophical tradition. Instead, they attempt to reinstate the 
submerged term and place it in a continually circulating conversation with the opposed term, not 
so that they mutually determine or identify one another, but so that a surplus of signification is 
generated in the encounter. 
 One of Scalapino’s primary intentions in both her critical work and her poetry is to 
complicate traditionally dualistic relations between subject and object, public and private realms 
of experience, and individual and social experience. She is concerned not only with the moment 
of perception of a biologically discrete individual person, and thus with an atomistic or 
individualistic view of humans, but also with the social aspect of perception, with the ways in 
which interior and exterior, self and other, individual and crowd, are conceptualized and 
hierarchicalized. She attempts to show that the doctrine of separate public and private or 
subjective and objective realms is illusory, a product of dualistic mental categorizations. 
Considering what scientists are discovering about the multi-leveled and complexly interlinked 
relationship between self and not-self, and between nature and nurture in the formation of 
selfhood, such a doctrine is neither inevitable nor realistic. For Scalapino, the public realm has 
suffered because it is constructed as an arena where dissent is relegated to individual or private 
experience. And in leftist thought, individual experience has generally suffered, for to set up a 
hierarchicalized dichotomy at the expense of the private, individual experience is to define a 
priori that life narrative or personal experience as being other than investigative or provisional. 
Experience in and of itself is not authoritative; it is how one interprets experience that gives it a 
particular philosophical or political slant. 
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 Scalapino privileges neither factor in a dualistic equation, which would reinstate the 
dualism, with the relationship of the factors in terms of power or primacy merely inverted, yet 
once again in an inverse relation to one another. Instead, in her poetry she shows these 
dichotomous constructions to be conceptual categories, and profoundly questions rigid 
boundaries between public and private, subject and object, self and other, boundaries that are 
often construed as natural, that is, as existing outside the mental categories that our brains 
construct. Her project of recovery involves the rescue of both the subjective and the objective 
and the demonstration of their interrelationship on different levels of truth, with the resulting 
contradictions allowed to stand instead of being reasoned into a more monolithic facticity. 
 Because of the conventional syntax and thematic coherence that Scalapino’s early work 
often exhibits, at least one critic – Marjorie Perloff – has interpreted her work as being 
descriptive and emblematic of an interior response to exterior reality. In Seamless Antilandscape, 
Scalapino challenges Perloff’s analysis of a particular poem in her poetic sequence hmmmm. 
Perloff assumes that Scalapino’s project is to write an “emblem of the postmodern metropolis,”27 
and sees in the “just barely controlled hysteria of hmmmm” an unintentional effect or tone of its 
representation of the alienating influence of social interaction within urban public space. In the 
poem the speaker is seated next to a woman, who, when the bus lurches, grabs the speaker’s arm, 
pinching it so hard the the pain lasts two or three minutes. The speaker imagines that the woman 
was saying to her, “I wish that I could make you yelp just once.” But to Scalapino, “If it’s seen as 
unintentional[,] that isn’t having the view that perspective itself is impermanence. Or that view 
(or perspective) is harder to see.” In other words, if one views Scalapino’s work as having an 
unintentional tone – of “barely-controlled hysteria,” for example, describing scenes or events in a 
way that renders them emblematic, say, of the urban postmodern condition of despair or angst, 
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that treats them from the viewpoint of a socially constructed given – then one misunderstands or 
misses her critique of perspective itself as constructed and thus radically impermanent. One 
instead recognizes only the superficial resemblance of Scalapino’s text to works that attempt a 
mimetic representation of an alienating cityscape in which one might be paranoid regarding an 
innocent mishap with a stranger on a bus. Such an interpretation will see perspective and 
perception in the text as essentialized, as a product of an individual recreating faithfully a scene 
descriptive of social habit instead of a “breakdown of prior constructions of events.”28 In taking 
such an approach to Scalapino’s work, Perloff brings perspective, the “I’s” perception & 
emotion, to the foreground. She interprets the appearance of seamlessness as an indication that 
the work must be read as an emblematic whole, albeit an imaginatively constructed or surreal 
whole, but nonetheless an emblematic unit conveying a certain meaning emanating from a single 
consciousness. What is “harder to see” is the critique behind the only apparently seamless 
narrative. Scalapino writes that 
 
Tone in hmmmm was actually very intentional – what is laughing? The tone gives 
the reader a surface that is non-readable – disingenuous and facetious and 
sincerity-as-vulnerable really being exactly the same. So it takes ‘one’ outside of 
socially controlled exchange. In other words, to call this surface ‘hysteria’ is to 
limit it by regarding it as nonintentional, which intention was to cut past that 
limiting itself, that barrier of social definition (that is acting as a lid of violence) 
itself.29 
 
Scalapino’s intention is to question perception as having inherent qualities or existence. She 
seeks to lay open to question all conventional categories, and indeed, perspective itself, to reveal 
their structure as convention, and thus subject to impermanence and revision. Her intention is 
also to attempt to recover a “public world” in which conventional descriptions and divisions of 
experience are demonstrated and imitated, with the relationships between their hierarchical 
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arrangements revealed, but not emblematized, dramatized, or psychologized. In Scalapino’s view 
the latter encourage the hierarchical division between the public and the private, with the 
privileging of a (conservative) public world, and dissension from that world relegated to the 
realm of individual experience: 
 
A characteristic of conservative thought is iteration of tradition for its own sake, 
valuable in that it is that. Social conditioning is transcended – there is no “other” – 
rather than perspective itself being seen being created. Without the conception of 
the social as phenomenological, actions that are rebellious in response to whatever 
conditions, are seen as ‘personal’ merely. Articulating outside’s warp imitated as 
being one – is interpreted as one’s being unable to comprehend, couldn’t put 
things together. A syntax that is this dismemberment will be incomprehensible in 
the framework of conservative thought (one characteristic of which: conception of 
the past as entity to be preserved as being the present). In terms of a conservative 
framework, ‘dis-location’ is seen as merely personal aberration or failure to 
comprehend the whole, rather than strategic and phenomenological.30  
 
Scalapino challenges what she sees as conservative trends in experimental poetics, and claims 
that a “polemics-based” poetics (such as Bob Perelman’s) betrays its conservative gesture in its 
suppression of the constructed nature of conceptual categories. 
 
 Phenomenological ‘dis-location’ in writing is strategic and specific, detail 
arising from or noting social conditions or background; which conservative 
ideology regards as without transcendence, transient. Yet such transience is 
change as writing’s subject (in avant garde or radical practices). 
 The view of aberration as failure is an exclusion that is an action, 
rendering what it defines as minor to the condition of nonexistent or irrelevant 
‘over-time.” (As if there were an ‘objective’ cultural basis that becomes or is 
‘history.’) 
 Polemics was to be demonstration (that was the intention) . . . [but] 
polemics-based writing merely imposes point of view and suppresses 
demonstration.31  
 
And later, still critiquing Perelman: 
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 The notion of defining ‘the life’ narrative as inferior is also defining what 
‘the life’ is. 
 Defining is conceptualizing that separation of the public and ‘interior’ as 
power.32 
 
That is, to define the experiential narrative, in which one’s inner thoughts and emotions are 
presented, is to hierarchicalize the private and the public. It is to conceptualize “that separation 
of the public and ‘interior’ as power.” Perelman promotes a kind of social power or efficacy of 
poetry. However, the dichotomizing of the private and public or social institutes a relation of 
power between the two, since it is a hierarchical relation with the private denigrated. Instead, she 
claims that writing, acknowledged as narrative, permits scrutiny of itself, and that leftist thought 
that would denigrate the experiential basis of writing actually betrays a more conservative 
position. 
 Recovery (vis-à-   	
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Scalapino’s central themes: she suggests that because of the predominant Western dualistic way 
of viewing self and other, inside and outside, we often tend to privilege the expression of 
individual perception and perspective. This privileging tends to essentialize and reify individual 
values, conceptual constructs, and linguistic expression, and to forge, with a sense of 
inevitability, their direct correspondence with a reality outside the individual self. Her recovery 
of the public world occurs in that relativizing of individual experience and common social 
existence, in realizing and scrutinizing, as fully as possible, the ways in which we tend to 
essentialize conventional reality and linguistic expression in both public and private realms. Thus 
her recovery of the public does not occur at the expense of individual expression. For, as she 
makes clear, poetry that uses the conventional in order to critique itself as conventional 
 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observation and phenomena (‘single’ particularities, which have no basis in that they have no 
individual existence). That is, observation is deconstructed by admitting of the ‘subjective,’ its 
own lack of basis; therefore it critiques itself.”33 The conventional is not denigrated, but is 
instead an indispensable interlocutor in the conversation of self-critique. Without the expression 
of nominal and conventional categories and subjective judgment, there would be no culture; at 
the same time, without their expression, they could not be placed under investigation as illusory. 
 In her essay “Signifyin(g) on Stein: The Revisionist Poetics of Harryette Mullen and 
Leslie Scalapino,” Elizabeth Frost compellingly demonstrates how Scalapino writes through 
Stein, in sympathy with her project to eroticize language, yet also insists that such language not 
be relegated to a private, encoded, and symbolically opaque or closed sphere of essentially 
private association. Instead, poetic language must also open the doors of the erotic to issues of 
the political and economic implications of the erotic. Intimate relationships constantly shift from 
private expression to a larger context of socio-economic relations. Scalapino thus addresses “the 
pressing question of how individual desire is situated within existing social categories.”34 In 
poems such as way, 
 
Scalapino opens Stein’s’ erotic discourse . . . to the public sphere, one that women 
have frequently been excluded from, and that women poets, in efforts to combat 
the lack of value placed on affect and the “personal,” have sometimes deliberately 
shunned. . . . For Scalalpino, separation of the erotic from socially engaged 
writing is neither efficacious nor desirable in any way: “If eroticism is eliminated, 
that leaves only that social context, which has ‘seen’ it as sexist; there is no area 
existing for apprehension or change. We are split from ourselves.”35 
 
Thus in Scalapino’s poetics the erotic is not excluded from the public sphere, but instead the two 
are shown to be interrelated and interdependent. 
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 Recent studies in cognitive science also points to ways in which categories of individual 
and the social are intertwined and not separable into discrete categories.36 According to Antonio 
Damasio, for example, it is reductive and dualistic to believe, as some scientists do, “that the 
mind can be fully explained solely in terms of brain events, leaving by the wayside the rest of the 
organism and the surrounding physical and social environment – and also leaving out the fact 
that part of the environment is itself a product of the organism’s preceding actions.”37 Moreover, 
there is a “powerful connection” between “social phenomena [and] biological phenomena,”38 for 
although 
conventions and rules need be transmitted only through education and 
socialization, from generation to generation, I suspect that the neural 
representations of the wisdom [that education and socialization] embody, and of 
the means to implement that wisdom, are inextricably linked to the neural 
representation of innate regulatory biological processes. I see a ‘trail’ connecting 
the brain that represents one, to the brain that represents the other. Naturally, that 
trail is made up of connections among neurons.39 
 
Thus, if our brains represent and interconnect the innate and the social so that they cannot be 
discretely separated, then Scalapino’s poetics corresponds with this emerging consensus among 
neuroscientists regarding the inextricable relatedness between the biological individual and the 
social, and between the private and the public. Stein’s poetics, in many ways in opposition to, 
and yet developing within and in concert with a bourgeois democracy, has recently been 
criticized for giving preference to the private, encoded symbolic expression, over and integration 
of the private and public to show ways in which they represent the two sides of the same 
ultimately political and economic coin. To ignore or repress the collective implications of private 
acts and expression is to separate dualistically and artificially spheres of activity and to ignore 
their interrelatedness. Scalapino’s recovery of the public consists in allowing private, individual 
experience, and the structures of collective and cultural influences, to spill over into one another, 
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revealing their intrinsically enmeshed involvement, and the fallacy of their relationship as 
separate entities. In fact, as she demonstrates, the spheres are contained within one another, 
despite the potential for the perceptual and conceptual illusions of their discrete qualities. 
 In Chapter Four, I referred to some words by Scalapino in which she quotes Giorgio 
Agamben, an Italian philosopher who has been influential in her project of the recovery of 
experience: “For just as modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience has 
likewise been expropriated.”40 The inner impoverishment of human experience in the West “does 
not mean that today there are no more experiences,” but that “they are enacted outside the 
individual,” who “merely observes them.”41 Scalapino’s work also investigates the 
impoverishment of the outer, or public realm of experience, the loss of the feeling of 
interconnectedness, as “bum series” makes clear and attempts to remedy. 
Agamben points to the lamentable indistinguishability of the inner and outer, and of 
inclusion and exclusion. He means that when the fact of existence – the biological fact of life – 
 
begins to coincide with the political realm, . . . exclusion and inclusion, outside 
and inside . . . enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding 
bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception 
actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the 
entire political system rested.42 
 
For Agamben, this political state represents a “radical crisis” in which the “limit figure” (the bum 
in Scalapino’s way, for example, discussed in Chapter Four) embodies the conflation of 
“membership and inclusion, . . . what is outside and what is inside, . . . exception and rule.”43 The 
homeless man in “bum series” is “homo sacer,” the sacred man “who,” as Agamben formulates 
the status of such banished beings, “may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”44 Sacred life may not 
be sacrificed, but is expendable, and may be killed without a homicide having taken place. The 
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community has effectively banned the homeless man from participation in its political life, and 
he dies as a result of his exclusion into the outer limits of the community, exposed to the outside 
elements, where he perishes from the cold. The principle of the sacredness of life in such a 
community is a hypocrisy, since the sacredness of the bum’s life does not prevent him from 
dying of his banishment to the fringes of the community: an exclusion that is, as Agamben 
demonstrates, simultaneously an inclusion, since all “bare life” is subsumed within the sovereign 
power of the state. Scalapino’s poem renders the bum, invisible within the cityscape to the point 
that he may freeze to death without collective responsibility or guilt, visible yet not romanticized, 
and his exclusion by inclusion becomes painfully obvious. Furthermore, her interweaving of the 
interior and the exterior takes place on both an epistemological level and a political level, and 
signifies not a crisis but a middle way that recognizes the complex relationship between exterior 
and interior, public and private, and, for that matter, the “inseparable dimensions of all 
experience.”45 
 It is important to distinguish what Scalapino means when she refers to inside and outside. 
When she refers to interior experience, she is not referring to inclusion within a public or 
political realm or power, and when she refers to exterior experience, she is not referring to 
exclusion from that realm. Therefore, Agamben’s regrettable blurring of boundaries between 
material life, and the tendency of the state to subsume that life (thus including life in order to 
exclude it), is different from Scalapino’s more utopian blurring of boundaries between 
individual, private experience and public, collective experience. For Scalapino, the public realm 
is not necessarily identified with the state. In a more liberatory community, she implies, public 
life would not be a static, discrete category, but a fluid one. Moreover, public and private realms 
would be interpenetrating and interdependent and not rigidly defined and exclusive. 
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 Let us now return to the analysis of New Time begun in Chapter Four, in order to see how 
Scalapino complicates notions of inner and outer, public and private. A useful exercise in reading 
(and struggling to make meaning from) Scalapino’s New Time is to trace the multiple entries of 
an image or word – the different contexts in which it appears. It proves exceedingly difficult, 
however, to consider a word, theme, or phrase in isolation. One feels pulled toward a more 
relational and ever-expanding investigation, a sort of spreading from each (muddy) center, each 
of which changes slightly or radically the meaning suggested by the previous context of the 
word. Thus assertions in the poem are subsequently challenged or turned on their heads. Also, 
various themes that appear are continually recombined in subsequent segments of the sequence, 
in kaleidoscopically shifting patterns. The effect of the whole is inconclusiveness of position, 
blurred boundaries between dualisms, and a sense of time that resists structured chronology. The 
process simply does not lend itself to thematic or climactic development. The words and themes 
exist dependent upon one another, yet refuse to fix each other’s meanings, so that the 
interpretation always remains slippery and evasive, resisting the normative, conventional 
relations or attributions of causality that shape a narrative into a psychological drama, and that 
assume a transparency of the act of writing or the act of reading: 
 
As written text (of New Time): the text is phrases separated by dashes which 
simultaneously relate and dis-connect (also, the phrases are simultaneously 
unrelated). The phrases are ‘as’ (the motion of?–by being separated, ‘other than’) 
‘being in the place of’–freezing-red-sky-dusk-that-is-dawn. There is no relation 
‘outside.’ At all.46 
 
The phrases are simultaneously related (in one’s mind) and unrelated (“outside”). There is a 
neuroscientific hypothesis about the human conceptualization of time as an internally regulated 
measuring stick, a kind of internal clock that we use to posit relationships between events. 
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According to this theory, because these timing mechanisms and processes occur at an 
unconscious level, it is very easy to take our subjective experience of time as an organizer of 
events into hierarchies and causalities as natural and inevitable instead of mediated by internal 
events within our physical bodies and thus first and foremost, embodied and constructed, not 
corresponding to any relationships “out there.” The disjunctiveness of Scalapino’s text attempts 
to jolt us into an awareness of the continual conceptual processes that mediate our experience. 
 One might even say that such an exceedingly complex system of recurring words and 
contextual interrelatedness discourages such an exercise as the isolation of one word, since the 
reader feels pulled to follow up on surrounding words and the various contexts in which they 
occur, ad infinitum. Indeed, this is part of the pleasure of the text, the never-ending series, the 
resistance to completion, the free-floating series of investigations that lead, as they resist 
chronology and hierarchy, to other investigations. Themes such as “exhaustion” or “small jobs” 
or “poverty” or “snow” arise and recur throughout the text, just as in one’s life they occur and 
recur in various context – in events, in thoughts, and in writing. A word or theme occurs, and in 
subsequent repetitions becomes enmeshed contextually with other recurring words, confounding 
a sense of logical development, yet introducing a sense of pleasure in the continuity of the flow 
of the series. 
 It is impossible adequately to represent how the whole works through this isolation. 
Isolating a theme in New Time as it occurs over many pages artificially removes a concern from 
the richly interwoven texture of the whole work, and thus also removes that theme from its 
associations and interactions with other themes. Thus there is a danger that we will miss the 
complex interweaving of the themes that occur in the whole work (a work that resists 
“wholeness” but that instead suggests continuation). 
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 However slippery the chronology or unresolved the thematic development in the 
sequence of shifting themes, it is possible to trace overarching concerns in the text, albeit 
concerns that never stabilize into definitive positions. And one concern to which Scalapino 
repeatedly returns is the relation of the self to its own inner life and to the social environment. 
Public and private realms come into conflict as people construct social categories and draw 
imaginary (and construct physical) boundaries around groups, including some and excluding 
others, often to the point of hating, fighting and killing the latter. The historical reality of this 
contention and violence is not denied in the text, nor is it dissolved into an amoral relativity of 
position. Instead, through textual linkages and contrarieties she interrogates social struggle as 
conflicts that may be critiqued through their lack of inherent existence, through their surface 
reality that may be changed once the subjective nature of the categories is realized as false:47  
 
Statements of definition (that perceived as ‘givens’ ‘in-coming’ from the outside 
society, which ‘determine’ social reality) are apprehended as bogus. Because they 
are revealed as subjective, without basis. One is only constructing a reflection of 
these as one’s reorientation of apprehension. The syntax itself reorients one’s 
apprehension (by continual dis-location) and enables that which is exterior to be 
included in a process of its examination, necessarily self-examination.48  
 
Scalapino constructs the public realm as an exposure of its own constructedness, not a tabula rasa 
that is created ex nihilo, but as a set of movements and interactions that are inextricably linked 
with cognitive realities which, as I previously discussed, do not correspond with a reality outside 
those movements, interactions, and cognitive functions. Interrogating the themes of inner and 
outer, we find that the inner cannot be easily separated from the outer, or the interior from the 
exterior. The text reveals them as a network in which dualities break down through an enactment 
of ways in which public and private are contained within each other. And yet the exercise of 
demonstrating their conflatedness is not purely a mimetic act, a sort of writing on the mind and 
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on the mind of society, to show mimetically through the writing how things really are, how the 
mind really is, and how interactions between one and the other really are. The writing does not 
point to an ultimate reality about public and private, about cognitive reality, and group cognitive 
reality. It does enact these dualities in the act of being implicated in one another, and yet the 
writing is also a movement that occurs in the present, in the reader’s interactions with the words, 
generating new ways of thinking time, space, and community. 
 Let us trace some occurrences of the concepts of “inner” and “outer” over part of the 
complex text of New Time. Each block or stanza in the following excerpts contains a reworking 
of these themes in different contexts. These blocks do not occur successively, but over roughly 
the first quarter of book. My commentary follows each block so as to trace the shifting contexts 
and meanings relating to these themes. The thematic and contextual movement of the poem does 
not trace a linear narrative trajectory of the development, crisis, and resolution (or even anti-
resolution) of protagonists. Instead, the text suggests an ever-shifting kaleidoscopic experience 
of persons interacting with others. 
 In the following excerpts, the three tildes demarcate the start and finish of a block of text, 
as they do in the original. 
 
 ~~~ 
 structure in reverse is the black sky – inside 
 defining (as, one) – blue destroying – not – gap – where is figures – is 
dawn 
 being the reduction of the sky by (one’s) structure not seen after merely 




Here Scalapino plays on night (“black sky”), day (“blue”), and dawn. It is tempting to read 
“black sky” as a representation for the Buddhist idea of emptiness. And indeed one might 
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fruitfully suggest that one’s structure (bodily frame or cognitive structure) conceived “in reverse” 
is empty as a conceptual category (an “inside” or subjective framing) – events are “fictive” both 
“while occurring” (3) and “in reverse,” mentally going back thinking of past events. The 
sequence of dawn, day, and night, while having their basis in actual physical events, are also 
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have it, devoid of inherent existence. Positing a definition, as of oneself or one’s perceptions, 
may be a kind of destruction. Things seen in the light of day, during the “blue sky,” are also 
interpretations (in the next block, she writes “interpretative – blue destroying – itself – their – 
structure in being after only”) (2). 
 But however one interprets these fragmentary and recombinatory statements of themes, 
they rarely fit into a neat causal or chronological or psychological pattern. Instead, a perpetual 
uncertainty and haziness remains at the edges of any words or concepts one attempts to link 
together. One is left with the implication of linkages and deeper meanings, but without a definite 
structure or system of meaning taking shape. 
 
 ~~~ 
 they think (of it, this) knowledge is of one – inner. only. woman carried 
can see inner. this is some don’t hate everyone. this is being. people need the 
thought of comfort. there’s no comfort. 
  the physical body has comfort 
  sometimes 
  (enervated) 




There is no precedent for the pronoun “they” in the text previous to this block. Perhaps the 
speaker is stating a general assumption of the public. Whoever “they” are, they believe (and 
apparently Scalapino thinks they believe erroneously) that knowledge is only a private, 
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individual accumulation of experience. This corresponds with her premise that rebellion from 
social conditions is perceived as – and driven into – the personal realm of experience, instead of 
acknowledging “the social as phenomenological” and not transparently natural or given. In R-hu, 
an autobiographical and philosophical essay, Scalapino states, 
 
Deliberately dislocating anything/observation is on (perspective) to take it (the 
observed and observation itself) constantly out of the given was not rebellion 
(sure) but to change ‘this’ illusionist, solidified perspective, to get at being (while 
alongside), which isn’t and can’t be in the illusionist hierarchical structure. Notice 
how one has to deny rebellion. A shock has been administered to one by suddenly 
being in this hierarchical structure [when Scalapino moved back to the United 
States from the East]. They’re saying that it is merely “personal” that one would 
notice this structure.50  
 
Her ironic aside “(sure)” indicates that rebellion indeed must somehow get beyond the cognitive 
illusion of a “solidified perspective” and acknowledge that the hierarchy of the social structure is 
empty of inherent being. Knowledge – in terms of both individual experience and social 
conditioning – “gives no comfort,” as opposed to the body (subjective experience), which 
sometimes does. One “gets at being” be denying the comfort of retreating one’s rebellion to the 




  enervated – extended 
  not itself 
  the physical body has 
   comfort – this is inner 
 





Scalapino sometimes does seem to be tracing a philosophical position with the continuation of 
the comfort of the body (as opposed to the comfort of knowledge) in the next block of text, 
reiterating the correlation between physical comfort and subjective or “inner” experience: the 
body’s comfort is an interior experience, irreducibly incapable of being shared. In the last line, 
“people don’t hate everyone is to the physical body’s inner,” a social or public condition so 
global in its articulation as almost to lose its meaning, is juxtaposed with an expression of the 
biological individual’s subjective experience. In other words, a most public condition (“people” 
not hating “everyone”) is placed next to a most private one. Whether these two are set in 
opposition to one another is unclear, and thus they stand in seeming yet unresolved opposition, 
yet also in a kind of conflation. 
 
 ~~~ 
 there’s nothing outside – man kneeling horizontal lying in snowing outside 
– for oneself kneeling in intense action. 
 he’s only overflowing on rim as sky not snowing 
 




“[T]here’s nothing outside”: the outside (social convention) is a “bogus” construction. This 
laconic statement could also refer to the belief that there’s no direct correspondence between our 
articulation of the world and the world itself. Yet in the next statement Scalapino refers to what 
was perceived to be outside. But these “outside” phenomena are contradictory: the man is both 
“kneeling” and “horizontal lying”; it is both “not snowing” and “snowing. There’s also an 
emphatic “overflowing” taking place, as if the meanings of the text, and perhaps also inside and 





 bow encrusted trees – not snowing – man’s horizontal lying while waiting, 
cold – (for oneself kneeling) – is sky being split, as: ‘not’ snowing 
 his is overflowing rim of sky – in undercutting snowing sky 
 




“[I]tself” (that is, the state of being an entity, a self) “overflows” its boundaries because it cannot 
be only a discrete being. The sky is split into “not snowing” and “‘not’ snowing, snowing being 
both a common, quotidian reality and a statement of words to describe the perceived reality. 
Underscoring the contrarieties of the text, the sky is simultaneously a “snowing sky.” The man’s 
being is described as “‘inside,’” in quotation marks; his interior being is not only interior but 
overflows, undercuts its discrete being. He seems to be awaiting his own action 
 
 ~~~ 
 interpretative is the ‘fixing’, and as such distortion of phenomenal activity 
(per se, not simply fixing the view of actions) 
 
 an ‘outside’ outwardly-articulating ‘social’ interpretation which 
qualitatively changes the object of its consideration – as does the inner ‘warp’, 




Through the act of memory and interpretation, events and phenomena are inevitably transformed 
(“distorted”) and their meanings set out on a course toward ossification. This is true both of 
acculturation and of one’s “inner warping” of present action. The exterior or social “warp” and 
its object, as well as one’s inner interpretation and its object, are mutually determining, not 
dualistically separate. These interpretative acts and their interactions with their objects are 
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“there.” Scalapino avoids stating that they “exist,” perhaps to avoid the implication of anything 
inherent about their existence. 
 
 ~~~ 
 but – outside – but which is fully open – because outside of one as 
occurring lightly 
 
 a ‘burst’ that’s from one being returned to oneself – after one being away 




“[O]utside of one” is “fully open” and “occur[s] lightly,” perhaps because this exterior is empty 
of inherent or essential existence, taking its social pattern or public stamp from the “warp” of 
interpretation; it is not closed and heavy with an inevitability of meaning or form. “[T]he outside 
of one’s awareness” indicates that consciousness is not only inner and subjective, but outward 
and inclusive, merging and to a degree indistinguishable from its outward or social manifestation 
in group consciousness. A later passage in the poem states, “somewhere interior that’s the outer 
world (it actually) / – inner – represented – without comfort anywhere” (28). “[I]nterior” and 
“outer world” here resolve into one another; “interior” is “it actually,” “the outer world.” In yet 
another passage, we find that “the adamant social being / is inner” (32); even the most 
recalcitrant social structure begins with individual thought processes. Yet this inner also “isn’t 
there” (30), and in fact, “there is no inner.” Not only does Scalapino blur boundaries between 
inner and outer, subjectivity and objectivity, but disavows any inherent existence of the shaping 
of either realm, of any “recalcitrance,” “weight,” or “fixedness” to the inner or outer 
manifestations and phenomena of human thought and action. Interior and exterior “warps” may 
be inevitably constructed out of human necessity and drive, but these warps do not exist 
inevitably, outside of these necessities. As Scalapino would phrase it, they do not exist “per se.” 
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 The aforegoing analysis gives only a glimpse of the complexity of New Time, which 
enacts a radical dialectics in the realms of temporality and of intersubjective experience. It is a 
difficut work with many recurring themes continually surfacing throughout the work in different 
contexts, never allowing any particular position to settle into a fixed belief, but freely circulating 
and continually generating new semantic possibilities in its wake. 
 It seems fitting to close this discussion of Scalapino’s poetic interest in private and public 
spheres with a reference to Robin Blaser, another poet deeply and philosophically concerned 
with such issues. In “The Recovery of the Public World,” Blaser points to the limitations of 
claims to primacy of any one aspect of reality, such as socioeconomic, artistic, political, sacred, 
of the widespread “disaster and danger [in modernity] of such total claims to reality, in which the 
complex discourses of a world and their relation to one another disappear in the hegemony of 
one of them . . .”51 Much of Scalapino’s writing is engaged in a similar project, that of warning 
against the dangers of giving public or private concerns primacy in any human community or 
interactions, or of giving either one – or any particular aspect of one – the stature of a fixed or 
ideal structure or content through social or individual interpretation of events: 
 
 A “public world” was one’s illusion or shadow of such that can’t reflect its 
origin, as this was nonexistent. And is subjective while being only an occurrence 
which then isn’t that as it isn’t one. 
 So it is to have a “public world” occur only from what people say and do 
now 
 It is not a reference or future.52  
 
The strictly and essentially subjective is an illusion, since the mind is “action literally,”53 the 
biological functioning of neurons and chemicals, “while being only an occurrence which then 
isn’t that as it isn’t one.” The mind’s activity is “only” its event in the present, and “isn’t one,” 
that is, doesn’t define one’s being, since it is constantly changing. And thus it also isn’t an 
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occurrence, since to describe it as such would be to begin the process of limiting or “warping” it 
after its instant has passed. By the same token, the public world is also in a sense an illusion; it 
does not contain within itself an allusion to the past or to its future, and thus cannot represent any 
origin; such representation would partake in a narrative constructed to interpret the causality of 
events or behavior. 
 Each in her own way, Berssenbrugge and Scalapino present in their poetry moments of 
intersubjectivity that are enacted as profoundly dialogical and dynamically reciprocal events. 
Berssenbrugge’s poetic world is the more intimate of the two. In her work that deals with 
intersubjectivity, she is primarily concerned with one person’s subjective response in the 
company of an other – in particular, to the shifting consciousness and expanding semantic field 
that one experiences in an encounter with another person. This is true even when the persons in 
the poem are in a public space, such as in the stadium scene in “Empathy.” Berssenbrugge 
always seems more interested in poetically enacting what it is like to encounter – and 
communicate with – another person. Her poetry presents the experience of the other by a subject 
as dialectical and without closure. It retains both a sense of the transcendent alterity of the other 
as well as the common perceptual, cognitive, and material ground of their being in the world. As 
Merleau-Ponty has it, “I never rejoin the other’s lived experience. It is in the world that we rejoin 
one another.” Subjectivity both is and is not shared, and Berssenbrugge’s work enacts this 
paradoxical condition. Moreover, communication is both radically uncertain and mundanely 
possible. Her work does not force a decision between these two conditions, but instead allows 
both to exist simultaneously and to engage in a dialogue. In this conversation, the uncertainty of 
communication both confirms and questions the equally inescapable acknowledgment that 
communication does occur, that stories are uncovered. 
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 The intersubjectivity in Scalapino’s work, on the other hand, takes place on a wider social 
scale, showing interconnections and interdependencies among widely divergent persons and 
objects. She simultaneously creates and dissolves social categories and constructions, never 
allowing the impermeable or rigid formation of any one frame of reference. In New Time, she 
continually shuffles themes and events, time frames and intersubjective experiences, exterior and 
interior perspectives, so that there is an unresolved and continuous communication among them. 
One might say that Scalapino’s complication of a larger social realm is macrocosmic to 
Berssenbrugge’s microcosmic one-on-one experience. Above, I mentioned that each resurrects 
the submerged term of a dualism. In Scalapino’s case, the recovered term is the public realm, 
liberated from rigid conceptualizations and categories, and from its excluding function. In 
Berssenbrugge’s case, the recovered term is the radical alterity of the other, who is thus liberated 
from the coercions of a subsuming subjectivity, yet embraced within the fold of the material and 
cognitive commonalities of both. 
In spite of their differences, Scalapino’s and Berssengrugge’s work is remarkably similar 
in its philosophical approach to the relation between self and other. Although their poetry is 
philosophical, rarely does it betray the diction of a philosophical tract. Instead, their poetry 
dramatizes moments of the encounter of self with other, or with a larger social context. It is not a 
drama in the conventional sense of a work with well-defined, three-dimensional characters and a 
plot, but in the sense of a dialogue between characters that are often submerged in more realistic 
literature. The identity of their characters is speculative and their positions are continually 
shifting. They are at once relational and concrete, individual and social. And the stage on which 
they enact their philosophical play is at once invisible to the audience and rendered visible and 
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I must act right, I must intend right even when there’s 
No such thing as I or right I must choose correctly 
Keep those muscles practising, always hit the right key1  
   Philip Whalen 
 
 I hope that this dissertation will, above all, encourage the appreciation of the poets whose 
writings I have presented and analyzed. Although the critical attention to experimental poetry 
increases every year, it is still on the margins of the already rather marginal field of 
contemporary American poetry. I believe that a better understanding of this body of work in all 
its multifaceted significance is crucial for a more complete appreciation of the diversity in 
contemporary American literature. 
 In addition, I hope that the theoretical ideas that I have set forth will engender further 
discussion regarding the philosophical, political and ethical implications of experimental poetry. 
As the movement of contemporary experimental poetry of the past thirty-five years or so is 
critically reexamined and historicized, it is more important than ever to understand the 
philosophical dynamics at work in this poetry in order to avoid lapsing into unsupportable 
theories that, covertly or overtly, reinstate hierarchical structures, a negative strategy that is often 
employed in order to critique the aesthetics of mainstream poetry and poetics. Too often in the 
debates within the field of experimental poetry and poetics, critics attempt to bolster the essential 
value of one term of a binary opposition over the other, which only leads to the formation of 
another hierarchy of one valued term over the other. The extolling of the materiality of language 
over language as a transparent vehicle, the championing of the disruption of narrativity over 
ordered linearity and causality, the embracing of jouissance over encoded gnostic messages – 
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these critical strategies are doomed because they create another hierarchy in place of the 
critiqued hierarchy. If we think of the structure of a dualistic equation as an hourglass, what the 
dualistic critic does in extolling one side over the other is merely to invert the hourglass, and 
gravity pulls the sands from one funnel to the other. The two positions of the hourglass are 
structurally and dualistically identical. 
My description and favoring of a kind of dialectics of the middle path is a proposal for a 
strategy of reading experimental work, one that recognizes its philosophical significance and its 
attempt to unravel and complicate dualistic conceptual constructions. It is important to develop 
strategies that allow the reader to appreciate the radically dialectical aspect of the work, which 
reveals the mutually informing and critiquing dialogue between terms. Far from being a 
hermeneutical device whose goal is to resolve the question of value in either the conceptual 
world or a transcendent or ultimate world free of conceptualizations, the strategy emphasizes the 
nonresolving aspect of the dynamic interplay between conceptually opposed terms. In the 
preceding chapters, I demonstrated this interdependent dialogue in several different, yet 
interrelated realms, including subject and object perceptual experience, the construction of 
individual subjectivity, temporality and narrativity, and intersubjectivity. 
 I exemplified particular themes of dialectical relationships with the work of particular 
poets who seemed most concerned with the radical questioning of that particular dichotomous 
formulation. For example, I used the work of Harryman to illustrate the concept of multiple 
versus autonomous self. I could just as effectively have used her work to analyze issues 
surrounding narrative and temporality in experimental poetry. I presented the work of Lyn 
Hejinian in my investigation of the relationship between subject and object, and in my 
exploration of time and narrative. But her work could also have been used to demonstrate the 
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idea of the multiple self, following Brian McHale’s assessment of Hejinian’s Oxota: A Short 
Russian Novel as a “radically heteroglossic and polyphonic text, a fabric of multiple voices and 
multiple registers. . . . its plurality of voices resists assimilation to the voice of an ‘author.’”2 The 
works of the poets represented in this work are so rich and multifarious in their investigations 
that each one could also have served as well in almost any of the other chapters. 
 Since there are five poets and only four thematic chapters, three of the poets are 
represented in two different chapters: Scalapino, Berssenbrugge, and Hejinian. The double 
service of each of these poets demonstrates different aspects of their work. For Scalapino, for 
example, issues of narrativity and temporality are as important to her as the exploration of 
divisions between public and private realms of experience. In my estimation, the ability of these 
poets to investigate different philosophical conundrums in their works is a measure of their 
artistic importance and maturity. 
 By the same token, I could have  	




obvious example) to provide theoretical ideas for other chapters besides the one on temporality, 
history and memory. For example, his work would have beautifully accompanied the analysis of 
subject and object dialectics in Chapter Two. This would have been, however, a rather different 
chapter, even though it would probably have arrived at similar thoughts regarding the nature of 
the dialectical relationship in question. As Scalapino would have it, the two versions might have 
“come up as the same sound pattern.”3 
 Considering the rich possibilities for exploring other facets of the five poets, and for 
using the philosophers, psychoanalysts, and scientists to theorize different kinds of dialectical 
relationships, one way to further my research immediately presents itself. In Chapter Four, I 
tentatively approached the exploration of the relationship between Scalapino’s treatment of time 
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and narrative constructions and the public and private conventional dichotomy. Just as I 
proposed that Scalapino’s dialectics operates on different levels to complicate human 
conceptualizations of experience, it would be rewarding to investigate how, for example, her 
dialectics of narrativity is enmeshed with her dialectics of intersubjectivity – in other words, how 
her questioning of the conventions of temporality interacts with her questioning of the formation 
of private and public experience. Similarly, the connections I made between intrasubjective and 
intersubjective dialectics in Chapter Three could be expanded to show further points of relation. 
 Another avenue in which my research might be taken further would be to explore 
whether or to what extent this dialectical process might also inform the work of other 
contemporary experimental poets, the work of avant-garde modernist poets, and going back 
farther in literary history, the works of earlier writers sometimes claimed as predecessors or 
influences of contemporary experimentalists, such as Laurence Sterne, François Rabalais, 
Thomas Wyatt, Christopher Smart, and William Blake. 
 I hope that my work will also encourage the further investigation into correspondences 
between literature and the discoveries and theories of cognitive science. Thus far, not much work 
has been done in this area beyond a few speculative studies such as Max Nänny’s “Ezra Pound: 
Right Brain Poet” and Mark W. Booth’s “The Ballad and the Brain.”4 One significant exception 
is Mary Thomas Crane’s groundbreaking work Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive 
Theory. Her faith in the premise that “[c]urrent cognitive science offers the grounds for a number 
of theories of human subjectivity and language that are beginning to be reformulated in ways that 
make them readily applicable to the reading of literary and cultural texts”5 encouraged me, in the 
face of some doubt, to continue my first explorations into such connections between 
neuroscience and experimental poetry and to integrate some of these findings into my work. 
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 Finally, Philip Whalen’s epigraph in this concluding chapter reminds us of the ethical 
dimension within contemporary experimental poetry. With the assistance of Levinas’ ethics of 
the other, I explored some aspects of the ethical dimension in the dialectics of intersubjectivity in 
the works of Scalapino and Berssenbrugge. The ethical and political dimension of a radical 
dialectics in experimental poetry and poetics could be developed in a more comprehensive and 
detailed manner. The Buddhist flavor of Whalen’s excerpt reminds us that such a dialectics 
would take into consideration the conventional or empty category of any ethics, and yet, equally, 
the necessity of right intentions, in life as in one’s creative practice. An inquiry into the 
dialogical exchange between these paradoxically coexisting realities yields possibilities for a 
continual and open-ended practice of the ethical in an embodied poetry. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MEI-MEI BERSSENBRUGGE, 
LYN HEJINIAN, CARLA HARRYMAN, HANNAH WEINER, 
AND LESLIE SCALAPINO1 
 
Mei-mei Berssenbrugge was born in Beijing in 1947 to Chinese and Dutch-American 
parents, and grew up in Massachusetts. For twenty-five years, she lived in rural New Mexico, 
where she wrote Sphericity and Empathy. Her poetry is noted for its long lines and sentences, 
which seem to imitate the vast horizons visible from her home on a plateau in New Mexico, 
where she lived for twenty-five years, an example of the shape and scope of the concrete world 
manifesting itself in her poetry. She has collaborated with several artists, including Richard 
Tuttle (her husband) (Sphericity) and Kiki Smith (Endocrinology). She has also composed 
theater works with Frank Chin, Blondell Cummings, and others. She has long been active in 
Native-American and Asian-American cultural movements. Presently, she lives in New York 
City. Her collections of poetry include Four Year Old Girl (Berkeley: Kelsey St. Press, 1998), 
Endocrinology (Berkeley: Kelsey St. Press, 1997),Sphericity (Berkeley: Kelsey St. Press, 1993), 
Empathy (Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1989), and The Heat Bird (Providence, R.I.: 
Burning Deck, 1983). 
 Lyn Hejinian is a poet, essayist, and translator of Russian poetry. She was born in 1941 in 
the San Francisco Bay Area, and currently lives in Berkeley, California. Translations of her work 
have been published in many languages, including French, Spanish, Japanese, Italian, Russian, 
Swedish, and Finnish. From 1976 to 1984, she was editor of Tuumba Press, one of the first 
presses to publish the emerging language poets. Since 1981, she has co-edited, with Barrett 
Watten, Poetics Journal. She is co-director, with Larry Ochs, of Atelos, a literary press that 
commissions and publishes cross-genre works by poets. Her collections of poetry include A 
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Border Comedy (New York: Granary Books 2001), Happily (Sausalito, Calif.: The Post-Apollo 
Press, 2000), Sight (with Leslie Scalapino) (Washington, D.C.: Edge Books, 1999), The Cold of 
Poetry (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1994), Oxota: A Short Russian Novel (Great 
Barrington, Mass.: The Figures, 1991), My Life (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1987), 
Writing Is an Aid to Memory (Great Barrington, Mass.: The Figures, 1978), and A Thought Is the 
Bride of What Thinking (Berkeley: Tuumba Press, 1976). Her book of critical and poetic essays 
is The Language of Inquiry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
 Carla Harryman is a poet, essayist, and playwright, who was born in 1952. Her hybrids of 
various kinds of writing demonstrate her tendency to blur traditional genre distinctions. During 
the 1970s, Harryman edited Qu, a journal of experimental prose. Her plays have been produced 
by Poets Theater in San Francisco. Her collections include Gardener of Stars (Berkeley: Atelos, 
2001), The Words: After Carl Sandburg’s Rootabaga Stories and Jean-Paul Sartre (Oakland, 
Calif.: O Books, 1999), There Never Was a Rose Without a Thorn (San Francisco: City Lights, 
1995), Memory Play (Oakland, Calif.: O Books, 1994), In the Mode Of (La Laguna, Canary 
Islands: Zasterle Press, 1991), Animal Instincts: Prose, Plays, Essays (Oakland, Calif.: This, 
1989), Vice (Elmwood, Conn.: Potes & Poets, 1986), Percentage (Berkeley: Tuumba Press, 
1982), Property (Berkeley: Tuumba Press, 1982), and Under the Bridge (Oakland, Calif.: This 
Press, 1980). Her poetic plays have been widely performed in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand. Currently she is Senior Lecturer in the Department of English at 
Wayne State University. 
 Hannah Weiner (1928-1997) graduated from Radcliffe College. She was, by profession, a 
designer of women’s undergarments. In her early forties, she developed an unusual and 
apparently involuntary capacity for visualizing words, which she incorporated into her poetry. 
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These visions later manifested themselves as images of beings and voices, which she also made 
an integral feature of her creative work. She lived most of her life in New York City. Her books 
of poetry include We Speak Silent (New York: Roof Books, 1996), Weeks (Madison, Wis.: 
Xexoxial Editions, 1990), Spoke (Washington, D.C.: Sun & Moon Press, 1984), Silent Teachers 
Remembered Sequel (Providence, R.I.: Tender Buttons, 1984), Sixteen (Windsor, Vt.: Awede, 
1983), Code Poems: From the International Code of Signals for the Use of All Nations 
(Barrytown, N.Y.: Open Book, 1982), Nijole’s House (Needham, Mass.: Potes & Poets Press, 
1981), Little Books/Indians ([New York]: Roof, 1980), Clairvoyant Journal (Lenox, Mass.: 
Angel Hair Books, 1978), Written In/The Zero One (Victoria, Australia: Post Neo Publications, 
n.d.), and The Magritte Poems (Sacramento: Poetry Newsletter, 1970). Weiner also wrote a set 
of four journals chronicling the onset of her visions, one of which was published: The Fast 
([New York]: United Artists Books, 1992). 
 Leslie Scalapino is a poet, playwright, and fiction writer who was born in 1947 in Santa 
Barbara, California. She spent several of her childhood years in the Far East, and experienced a 
negative culture shock on returning with her parents to the United States. She incorporates some 
of these experiences into her poetry and plays. She received a Master of Arts in English from the 
University of California at Berkeley in 1969. Currently she teaches poetry at Bard College and 
the San Francisco Art Institute. She lives in Berkeley, where she edits O Books, a press devoted 
to experimental poetry and poetics. Her collections of poetry and poetic essays include R-hu 
(Berkeley: Atelos, 2000), The Public World/Syntactically Impermanence (Hanover, N.H.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1999), Sight (with Lyn Hejinian) (Washington, D.C.: Edge Books, 
1999), New Time (Hanover, N.H.: Wesleyan University Press, 1999), Seamless Antilandscape 
(New York: Spectacular Books, 1999), The Line (N.p.: Meow Press, 1994), Crowd and not 
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evening or light (Oakland, Calif.: O Books / Sun & Moon Press, 1992), Green and Black: 
Selected Writings (Jersey City, N.J.: Talisman House, 1996), that they were at the beach – 
aeolotropic series (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1985), way (San Francisco: North Point 
Press, 1988), Objects in the Terrifying Tense/Longing from Taking Place (New York: Roof 
Books, 1993), and Considering How Exaggerated Music Is (San Francisco: North Point Press, 
1982). Her books of fiction include Orchid Jetsam (a detective novel series) (Leslie Scalapino 
writing as Dee Goda) (N.p.: Tuumba, 2001), The Front Matter, Dead Souls (Hanover, N.H.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1996), Defoe (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1994), and The 
Return of Painting, The Pearl, and Orion / A Trilogy (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1991). 
 
Note 
1 Some material from these biographical sketches was obtained from the following sources: 
Charles Alexander, review of Endocrinology, by Mei-mei Berssenbrugge. Rain Taxi, retrieved 
from the World Wide Web October 26, 2001: http://raintaxi.com/mei-mei.htm; Dia Center for 
the Arts, Readings in Contemporary Poetry website, retrieved October 20, 2002, from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.diacenter.org/prg/poetry/99_00/berssenbruggebio.html; back cover 
notes, Empathy (Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press, 1989); and the Electronic Poetry Center 
website’s author pages, retrieved October 20, 2002, from the World Wide Web: 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors; Laura Hinton, biography of Leslie Scalapino, The Literary 





COMMENTS ON METAPHORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
FROM LYN HEJINIAN’S MY LIFE 
 
The following are sentences from Lyn Hejinian’s My Life (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 
1987), in which she ironically or puzzlingly comments on particular metaphorical constructions: 
 
I had “hit upon” an idea (20). 
 
It is a way of saying, I want you, too, to have this experience, so that we are more alike, so that 
we are closer, bound together, sharing a point of view – so that we are “coming from the same 
place” (21-22). 
 
They insisted on the importance, the primacy, of “inner resources” and “inner qualities of mind,” 
so that one could “bear up” under any circumstances (28). 
 
What memory is not a “gripping” thought (37). 
 
Take your place (one) not your places (42). 
 
He framed his sentences carefully (42). 
 
Before a busy day, one wants to “get” a lot of sleep (43). 
 
We “took” a trip as if that were part of the baggage we carried. In other words, we “took our 
time” (47). 
 
My father would say I’ve a “big day” tomorrow” (50). 
 
The difference between “he presented his argument” and “they had an argument” (59). 
 




REFLEXIVE SENTENCES FROM LYN HEJINIAN’S MY LIFE 
 
Perhaps initially, even before one can talk, restlessness is already conventional, establishing the 
incoherent border which will later separate events from experience (8). 
 
My old aunt entertained us with her lie, a story about an event in her girlhood, a catastrophe in a 
sailboat that never occurred, but she was blameless, unaccountable, since, in the course of the 
telling, she had come to believe the lie herself (13). 
 
What follows a strict chronology has no memory (13). 
 
But a word is a bottomless pit. It becomes magically pregnant and one day split open, giving 
birth to a stone egg, about as big as a football (8). 
 
Life is hopelessly frayed, all loose ends (15). 
 
There were more storytellers than there were stories, so that everyone in the family had a version 
of history and it was impossible to get close to the original, or to know “what really happened” 
(21). 
 
Vision determines the view (24). 
 
There was a garden, a hole in the fence, a grandfather who had no religion – one can run through 
the holes in memory, wearing a wet hat, onto the sidewalk covered with puddles, and there are 
fingers in them (30). 
 
My aunt, holding up the little letter I had written, insisted that the act of writing-down was 
testimonial and that the writing would always be used as proof of what I held to be true. She, too, 
was a clumsy athlete (34). 
 
What is one doing to, or with, the statement (the language) or the stated (the object or the idea) 
when one means it (42). 
 
Language which is like a fruitskin around fruit (43). 
 
The inaccessibility of the meaning intrigued me all the more, since I couldn’t read the single 
letters, if that is what they were, the little marks which constitute Persian (46). 
 
The old fragmentary texts, early Egyptian and Persian writings, say, or the works of Sappho, 
were intriguing and lovely, a mystery adhering to the lost lines (47). 
 
Any work dealing with questions of possibility must lead to new work (48). 
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Only fragments are accurate. Break it up into single words, charge them to combination (55). 
 
History hugs the world. The Muses are little female fellows. To some extent, each sentence has 
to be the whole story (67). 
 
If words matched their things we’d be imprisoned within walls of symmetry (70). 
 
But the argument decays, the plot goes bit by bit (71). 
 
And if I feel like a book, a person on paper, I will continue. What is the gender on paper. A 
fatigue in the cold, fear of finishing. And doesn’t it make a difference to me, reading this book 
now, to know that you are going to read the same book afterwards, in the same copy, these 
selfsame words – and would that difference made be different if you were reading your own 
copy of the book at the same time that I was reading mine (76). 
 
An extremely pleasant and often comic satisfaction comes from conjunction, the fit, say, of 
comprehension in a reader’s mind to content in a writer’s work. But not bitter (85). 
 
If there is a story at all, accounted for, a settled thing to have experienced, it’s nothing of the 
kind. The obvious analogy is with music as with words. A sense of definition (different from that 
of description, which is a kind of storytelling or recounting, numerical, a list of colors) develops 
as one’s sense of possibility, of the range of what one might do or experience, closes with the 
years. So I gave it away (90). 
 
My life is as permeable constructedness (93). 
 
Permanent constructedness (94). 
 
It is precisely a special way of writing that requires realism (101). 
 




REALISTIC DESCRIPTION FROM LYN HEJINIAN’S MY LIFE 
 
On her walks she stepped into people’s gardens to pinch off cuttings from their geraniums and 
succulents (7). 
 
A child, meanwhile, had turned her tricycle upside down and was turning the pedal with her hand 
to make the front wheel spin (20). 
 
My grandfather had two horses, old Duke, “a fine animal,” and High Spot, with his rider, 
cantering in place, so that sitting on his back was like sitting pretty (27). 
 
I found a penny in a calla lily (51). 
 
What I felt was that figs resemble kidneys (55). 
 
The nightmare was of a giant bluebottle fly which buzzed, “I’m all there is” (54). 
 
A neighbor rolled the terriers in a stroller and wiped their little bottoms with a tissue when they 
shat (68). 
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Mei-mei Berssenbrugge. From “Irises.” 
 
During winter, this had been a matter of stripping meat from the bone, to dry and freeze, 
the color of black iris along the edge of a satellite dish. If I dream of shadows of meat 
on a white dish like the underside of a leaf, it is a feeling, like thinking. If I imagine 
a ghost and a deer, both are true. No one can describe the relation between an experience 
that needs to be communicated and the form of that communication. It lies next to its form, 
separating her, like proximity to death, the way a wild animal automatically lies next to its form. 
The metaphor that the eye knows a particular by internalizing its color and shape became 
the woman’s substitute for animal belief in life among the shades. A metaphor interpreted 
as occurrence became her method for only remembering objects which exist in the same size 
as their image in her mind, ladyslipper behind the eyesocket, pollen falling through interstices 
of her brain cells, as if exact scale were the infallible touchstone for her intention. 
Lily pads sketch out the foreground of the pond. A gossamer, livening fabric tips up alluringly 
to points of your body, the way a blue wall had assessed the posture of the women. It’s why 
you assume the logical space, giving a reason, stands in the same relation to the causal emotion 
for the space, as a halo rescued out of her life. 
Figure 2 
 








The idea of illusion suggests that existences in different worlds, herself at different 
stages, or moving from one metaphor to another, can compare. She is trying to tell you 
the moon’s color in eclipse, because she cannot reproduce a light in her memory with a pigment 
that is made, like a word, though seeing the moon enables a person to make inaccurate color. 
Think, if experience in her is time, because she gets to a state of being by experience, first. 




Low sun from behind you on asters, chamisa. You find a space as wide as if time fell outside 
the stimulus of that glow, and her memory of it became space in her. Her body and will coordinate, 
like the relation of experience to seeing and experience to feeling the moon, which has no size. 
Actual size of its color in her body assesses the vicissitudes of an aspiration created by seeing, 
so in this case, actual size became a piece of size in her. 
3 
 
You look on the plain from a bluff with him, and a point of juniper grows dark and dense 
of scattered ones, a piece of sieved material on your side of a membrane of noon light. 
Seeing the object locates it like a cause in your body, for noticing a faint green around it 
as an underground stream. Seeing what had been invisible is a response to the object. 
His presence, a cause or weight in nature, does not enter experience, but accompanies it, 





If she only sees with another person, what about the response is phenomenal, and what is 
contingent, as a comet or virus, resonating to its presence in an other human being, 
but which could be a metaphor, like grass in light, or sunlight on distant yellow trees? 
Nature, full of causes that never enter experience, contrasts to your thinking adjusting contingency 
to contingency like a synthesis. Desire to know opposes, for example, desire for children. 
It structures a branched straw in the snow, so its blue shadow is blue in a tiny armpit. When 
he sees autumn grass, I tell him about its shadow on snow, leapfrog of see/know, to straw of light. 
5 
 
A silver of cloud lights up. Not knowing where it is between you and the horizon 
turns into desire to know this. “Where” is the secret of durable pigment. “It” is the part 
hit by an angle of light that is moving, so each moment triangulates the space by way of the cloud, not 
giving you to know it, the way knowing opposes wanting a person, or a person is opposed to an infant, 





She is making the space during the day in an unanalyzed form, expressing it, using light, which 
as experience emotes a color, and one of the elements of making is the space, because she cannot 
see the light as a tool, while she is still figuring how to use it. Its use is his presence, or its end 
is, to which its use is a means. Her concentration obliterates time, like the relation of experience 




Seeing the light became a substance in her body, as knowing a ghost by seeing light in a room, 
a relation of experience to feeling. The metaphor of the light became an obliterating emotion, 
from one metaphor to another, so she got to the state of being of the light by knowing, first, 
a synthesis that put time outside her situation. She makes that into time, which can flood a plain, 
inside a leaf, a leaf of gilt on an image. Wanting to know as opposed to wanting a person 
is herself in a room flooded by light through yellow leaves. Each leaf like an ancestral feature 
assesses the vicissitudes of this aspiration. A consciousness outside a state of being is flooded. 
Figure 3 
 

















on itself. His red hair was standing up) “I just began to weep”. 
 
Much later,     after I had ceased to know the man who had once 
described to me how    ,      driving his new car with its top down 
    around and around the block     (with his 1st wife in the car –  
he said that he had been downtown with her drinking in a bar)     , 
while he was looking for the entrance to the hotel parking lot    , 
he had     collided, or rather,     had grazed the sides of 3 parked 
cars     ;     as I said, it was much later when I was standing 
on the jetty of a marina and watching a man standing up in 
a     motor boat,     while he turned it around and around in circles. 
“Well,     (I remembered the man I had known saying about himself 
   – as I watched the man in the motor boat turning it slowly 








the men – when I’d 
been out in the cold weather – were 
found lying on the street, having 
died – from the weather; though 
usually being there when it’s warmer 
 
the men 
on the street who’d 
died – in the weather – who’re bums 
observing it, that instance 
of where they are – not my 
seeing that 
 
cranes are on the 
skyline – which are accustomed 
to lift the containers to or from 
the freighters – as the new 
wave attire of the man 
 
though not muscular 
– but young – with 
the new wave dyed blonde hair – seeming to 
wait at the bus stop, but 
always outside of the hair salon 
 
the bums – the men – having 
died – from 
the weather – though their 
doing that, seeing things from their view when 
they were alive 
 
so not to 
be upper class – the new 
wave baggy pants – the 
man with the dyed blonde hair – who’s always standing in 




figure – as gentle – as 




of the man with the dyed 
blonde hair and 
new wave attire – and 
the freighter 
 
of our present 
president – who doesn’t 
know of the foreign 
environs – as vacant – and 
to the freighter and 
his and its relation 
 
when our present 
president is in an inverse 
relation to them – when there’s 
a social struggle in their 
whole setting, which is 
abroad 
 
the bums – who’ve 
died – but could be only when 
they’re living – though it 
doesn’t have desire, so inverse in 
that one setting 
 
to their 
social struggle in their 
whole setting, which is 
abroad and its 
relation to the freighter 
 
to the person of 
new wave attire – that 
person’s relation to 
the freighter 
 
when the bums are not 
alive – at this time – though 
were here, not abroad – and 
not aware in being so of a 
social struggle 
 
the man in the new 
wave attire – as the relation 
of him 
being another person – as 
the freighter and 
his and its relation 
 
the inverse 
relation to the freighter 
only occurring when that 
person is living 
 
the man – who’s 
accustomed to 
working in the garage –  
as having 
that relation to 
their whole setting 
 
I have been – am –  
dumb – as the way 
in which that would occur – the 
bums – not their existence or 
ding from the weather – though 
the effect of that 
 
for me to 
be dumb – to have 
been actually stupid – so that 
really could occur – the 
bums – in an event 
 
so – dumb as an 
active relation to 
the bums or to the freighter and 
the still oil 
rigs – on the ocean 
 
to the repair of 
the car – so inverse in that 
setting – though 
it doesn’t have desire – of 
the present 
 
as the oil rigs – which 
are the freighter – on the ocean – pushed 
up to be the relation 
with me, by my being – am – dumb – their 
to have that occurrence 
 
to have that – for them, some 
people who’d had an attitude 
of snobbery – always – so that they’re dumb – when it’s 
senseless – that relation with 
them 
 
I almost froze – and realized I 
could die from it – when the bums 
were in that situation – and then not 
caring, though that’s not possible 
 
which had been repaired 
– to the car – as I 
am – when that’s senseless – though 
it doesn’t have desire – of the present 
 
the bums –  
found later – in the whole setting 
– though when the car 
hadn’t been repaired – and so 
their grinding and 













For me, the insignificant or everyday gesture constructs a choreography of parts 
and what touches me is where the inarticulate, the error or tension finds concrete manifestation 
and is recognized. 
 
First, I see roses in the dark with him, a compaction of spare light, 
then a road through the woods in pitch dark. How she perceives the corridor in the dark 
is a space within the time in which they were moving, 
as if perspective of a space in the dark constructed a hierarchy in her mind, 
in reverse of how the contents of her wishes remain unchanged and timeless, 
so the innermost nature of her wishes is as much known and unknown to them as the reality of the external world. 
It is as incompletely presented by what she can see as is the external world 
by communication with someone she wishes for. 
In this way her interrogation of him appears instead as a dialogue pertaining to uses of power, 
because she can only remember what has been consciously said to her, 
so that her feeling of identifying with him is like a quick flash or a signal. 
When it is intense, tormenting and continuous, it’s using itself to construct a rhetorical story again. 
This state of confusion is never made comprehensible by being given a plot, 
in the same way a complicated plot is only further complicated by being simplified, 
although connectedness may not always be an artifice, 
for example, when it reveals ways in which she construes what she perceives 
according to an internal connection which will announce its conflict in the plot, 
a tension like his mistaken gesture which is interesting as a site of power formation. 
It may well be where the feeling of mysteriousness occurs 
in which she believes him, but she doesn’t want to prove it, 
because an appearance in the dark will not deceive after enough appearances 
and everywhere, sooner or later, there will be a hint of a tree or space above a lake, 
so describing something as it is could by precise reference gain a neutral tone, 
but in this case adheres to his and her manner of asking 
where is the space, instead of what space it is. 
There occurs an interval of northern lights over their walk whose circumference is inferrable, 
but whose outermost region lacks any known form of registration, 




In an empty stadium they alternate the refrain of a song in Japanese. The light is harsh 
on rows of seats like cells of a honeycomb under high magnification. 
The entire stadium resembles a honeycomb or geodesic dome turned inside out and concave. 
He is saying, I am here. She is saying, where are you. 
Speech and thought arise simultaneously as an hysterical question. An idea is a wish. 
As a descriptive stream or spontaneous reaction to him, 
speech serves as a starting point for uncovering a story through translation from wish into desire, 
but when thought becomes reflective, a problem of interpretation enters the stream of emotion itself. 
The speaking becomes fixed, although there is no such thing as repetition. 
The speaking is a constant notation of parallel streams of thought and observations 
whose substance is being questioned in a kind of oral thought at once open and precise, 
but with a tension between ideas and her sense of scandal at invoking a real person. 
He makes a rift or glimpse, both generative and relative to the glimpse, 
a liberty of interruption, or exclusion, inside the stadium 
in light so bright she sees her eyelash as a golden line reflecting on the inside of her sunglasses. 
In the same way the song must never be allowed to threaten the presentation of what takes place in the song, 
so that she may try to develop empathy for what she really wants to happen to her, 




Anything with limits can be imagined, correctly or incorrectly, as an object, 
even some language in the way that it is remembered, if you consider 
each repetition a fact or object of varying strength in various situations of frequency and quantity, 
and although you can never vary an unconscious wish, 
which can only reveal itself in the contingency of the words, sexualizing the words, 
the way a shadow moves up a wall of trees growing intensely gold at sunset. 
Her equivalent for this is a time-lapse photograph of lightning, in proportion 
to each moment you are looking. It is her attempt to show him a lightning storm 
or any interval of colored light on the plain as what is good in life, the person, and what is good, 
so instead of saying what time it is, she is asking, where is the time, its ratio as an opened lens 
on clear sky. It may be relevant to ask if this kind of autobiography limits formal 
or object possibilities, meaning less neutral or less real within her empathy for what is good in life 
from his point of view. From her point of view, feminizing an art of presence 
such as moving or speaking, with its distinct kind of maneuverability 
is akin to those collages that verge on trompe l’oeil. Only when she looks closely 
does she realize that that head is really not the one connected to that body, 
although everyday gestures or tensions accrete an intimacy she can recognize. 
Be that as it may, real and constant luminosity of the parts can create 
a real self who will remain forever in the emotion of a necessary or real person. 
To deny this is to deny the struggle to make certain meanings stick. 
 
